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The participatory dimension of individual responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Sofia Bonicalzi
Affiliation:
School of Advanced Study, University of London, Senate House, London WC1E 7HU, UK. [email protected] Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich, 80539 Munich, German.
Mattia Gallotti
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. [email protected]://www.mattiagallotti.com/

Abstract

Collaborativism is the view that moral reasoning is better when it is socially embedded. We propose that, when people take part in dialogic exchanges, they align in ways that open up novel avenues for sharing values and rationality criteria and, therefore, for exercising responsible agency. The hypothesis that collaborative interactions unfold through the alignment of minds and bodies helps articulate Doris's participatory approach to morality.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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