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Innate valuation, existential framing, and one head for multiple moral hats

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Bree Beal  and
Philippe Rochat
Bree Beal
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology & Institute of Liberal Arts, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. [email protected]@emory.edu
Philippe Rochat
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology & Institute of Liberal Arts, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. [email protected]@emory.edu
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Abstract

We support John Doris's criticism of “reflectivism” but identify three shortcomings: (1) his neglect of humans' evolved predispositions and tendencies, (2) his failure to appreciate that identity and responsibility arise first from parsing our world ontologically, in a process we call “existential framing,” and (3) a potentially alarming implication of his “dialogic” model of identity formation: if identity is negotiated across diverse social situations, why isn't dissociative identity disorder more common?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e38
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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