After outlining sceptical theism (ST) and the fine-tuning argument (FTA), I demonstrate how arguments for the former undercut the latter. I then consider and reject three recent proposals for ameliorating the conflict: positive ST, considerations about normative superiors, and appeal to theistic metaethics. I contend, however, that Kirk Durston’s complexity argument for ST does not undercut the FTA but in fact supports it. In defending that thesis, I respond to Climenhaga’s contention that ST undermines all warrant for theistic belief, the FTA included.

A prominent challenge to analytic theology charges that its methodology leads to idolatry. This article explores a response to this challenge that draws upon the Eastern Orthodox apophatic tradition. Apophatic approaches, which emphasize how little we can truthfully say or know about God, are not exclusive to Orthodox Christianity. But these views take a unique form within the tradition insofar as they accord a prominent role to the distinction between God’s essence and God’s energies. The divine essence is what it is to be God, what God is as such, what God is at God’s core. In contrast, the divine energies are properties, modes, or activities of God not included in the divine essence but intimately related to it. Proponents of the distinction have claimed that it can help theorists to navigate the Christian tradition’s cataphatic and apophatic commitments, which don’t always sit comfortably together. This article argues that there are ways of crafting the essence/energy distinction that can also help to address the ‘Idolatry Argument’ against analytic theology.

Objections to the orthodox doctrine of an eternal hell often rely on arguments that it cannot be a person’s own fault that she ends up in hell. The article summarizes and addresses three significant arguments which aim to show that it could not be any individual’s fault that they end up in hell. I respond to these objections by showing that those who affirm a classical picture of sin have Moorean reasons to reject these objections. That classical perspective holds that all (serious) sin involves choosing eternal destiny apart from God and that no sin could possibly be caused by God. Consequently, it is necessary for ending up in hell that someone commit a serious sin, and it is sufficient for ending up damned that one persists forever in sin. Since the objections conflict with Moorean commitments central to the classical perspective, those who hold to such a classical perspective on sin would have good reason to reject all these arguments, which involve assumptions that would entail that such a perspective is false.

The received view is that Kant denies all moral luck. But I show how Kant affirms constitutive moral luck in passages concerning radical evil from Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. First, I explicate Kant’s claims about radical evil. It is a morally evil disposition that all human beings have necessarily, at least for the first part of their lives, and for which they are blameworthy. Second, since these properties about radical evil appear to contradict Kant’s even more famous claims about imputation, ‘ought implies can’, and free will, I unpack Henry Allison’s proof of radical evil and show how it is consistent with interpretations of Kant’s broader views about morality. Third, I define and illustrate the category of constitutive moral luck and argue that Kant embraces the existence of constitutive moral luck given Allison-style interpretations of radical evil. This provides a reason for philosophers to reject the received view, and it creates an occasion for Kantians and Kant scholars to check their reasons if they deny moral luck.

Modal panentheism claims that God encompasses all possible worlds and that a substantial number of possible worlds exist. This article defends a version of modal panentheism that is grounded in perfect-being theology, which maintains that God holds all great-making properties to the highest possible degree. In addition to goodness, modal panentheists consider encompassment to be a great-making property, and therefore, God (a maximally encompassing being) is said to encompass all possible worlds.

Nagasawa argues that modal panentheism faces a significant problem: the modal problem of evil. The argument states that if modal realism is true, then there exists a substantial number of possible evils that contradict God’s perfect goodness. Nagasawa proceeds to claim that modal evil poses a greater threat to modal panentheism than actual evil does to traditional theism.

This article develops two responses to the modal problem of evil. The first response (maximal-panentheism) argues that God need not be all-good or all-encompassing. The second response (no evil worlds) argues that worlds contradicting God’s perfect goodness are not possible worlds. In the light of these responses, I claim the modal problem of evil for modal panentheism is no more intractable than the problem of evil for traditional theism.

Based on fieldwork with two related Afro-Brazilian religions, Umbanda and Quimbanda, this article explores the value of Donald Davidson’s semantic theory for making sense of ethnographic fieldwork. Specifically, we look at the role of scriptedness in communication, including religious ritual. We first clarify the role of social externalities in Davidson’s view of communicative interpretation, which is broader than his initial framework of radical interpretation. We then offer an account of what constitutes communicative and interpretational success, by drawing on Davidson’s account of prior and passing theory. Prior theories are interpreters’ initial hypothetical frameworks, ranging from general (e.g., the rational, intentional nature of self and other, and a shared perceivable world) to local (e.g., assumptions about cultural, social, and institutional contexts). Passing theories are tactical, on-the-fly modifications that we hypothesize in order to get mutual understanding back on track. We introduce the concept of ‘semantic reduction’ to operationalize the view that specific, local social externalities provide clues that help keep interpretation on track. In the case of religious ethnography, these include ritual, doctrinal, narrative, symbolic, material, temporal, and spatial frames that constrain the generation of passing theories. Examples from fieldwork illustrate the potential value of our appeal to Davidson’s ideas.

In a recent article Jack Mulder, Jr gives a Plantinga-style defence of the Virgin Mary’s free consent to bear Jesus at the Annunciation. Against Mulder, I argue that a theodicy (rather than a defence) is necessary to undermine my arguments, that Mulder’s Catholic appeal to Mary’s Immaculate Conception amounts to a kind of freedom-undermining metaphysical grooming, and therefore Marian consent remains invalid.

There is this view propounded by some theorists which claims that some conceptions of the nature of time are incompatible with the Christian position on the defeat of evil. The aim of this article is twofold. First, to clarify exactly which thesis about time’s nature is taken to be problematic for the defeat of evil. And second, to show that scriptural support for understanding the defeat of evil as requiring that evil not be in the range of the existential quantifier, something implicitly contended by those who put forward this problem, is weak and that these passages can be read in plausible ways which are affirmable by those who endorse the ‘problematic’ thesis.

Can the best arguments for a privation theory of evil be parodied, with equal plausibility, as arguments for a privation theory of good? The privation theory of evil claims that evil has no positive existence, and it is but a privation of good. The privation theory of good claims the opposite. I approach this topic as one element in the so-called evil-God Challenge. Stephen Law has argued that the epistemic support for belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect God (theism) is on a par with the epistemic support for belief in an omniscient, omnipotent, but completely evil-God (maltheism). In fact, he concludes, the arguments for an evil God are symmetrical with, and isomorphic to, those for a good God. The privation theory of evil has often been used to defend theism against the argument from evil. Thus, part of the evil-God Challenge is to evaluate arguments for the privation theory of evil for their vulnerability to maltheist parody. I consider a broad range of arguments for the privation theory of evil, and I argue that most of them are vulnerable to parodic neutralization. Furthermore, I argue that although the thesis of the convertibility of being and goodness is often held to entail the privation theory of evil, or to be entailed by it (or to be equivalent to it), it is independent of the privation theory. I do find that David Oderberg’s recent argument for the privation theory of evil resists any easy maltheist parody, but I argue that it has a defect. I sketch an argument according to which his good-as-fulfillment account is compatible with a perfectly evil god. My tentative conclusion is that the privation theory of evil enjoys little more plausibility than does the privation theory of good.

The dominance of the Abrahamic tradition in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion has led some to call for greater exploration of alternatives to the traditional conception of God, such as Pantheism, Ultimism, and Axiarchism. While we think this call for alternatives is important, we go in a different direction. Rather than explore and defend alternative conceptions of God, we defend a range of fairly traditional but non-religious conceptions of God. This range of views, from deism to philosophical theism, enjoys a variety of benefits over its religious competitors and deserves greater attention.

The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, but there is only one God – this is the traditional problem of the Trinity. Recently, a new problem for the doctrine of the Trinity has been developed. God is triune, the Son is God, but the Son is not triune – that’s the new Triunity Problem. In this article, I show that adopting any solution to a traditional problem makes it possible to solve the new problem without incurring additional costs. I distinguish possible types of solutions to the traditional problem and point out the costs involved. I then show how each of these solutions can be used and developed to solve the new problem.

An examination of the apparent gap – familiar in many branches of philosophy – between ‘the facts’ and ‘values’, focusing especially on Sam Gamgee’s perception of ‘Earendil’s Star’ and the real nature of ‘the planet Venus’: Is it possible to trust in the awe and admiration we may feel towards ‘the heavens’ in the light of current astronomical theory about the wider world? How can humane values, including love of beauty, survive in an inhumanly indifferent world? Can obvious fictions have more than allegorical significance? Must we rely on fictions to survive as humane creatures, or may those seeming fictions, and our initial emotional response, provide true guidance to the way things are, and how we might be?

Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion aims to explain analytic theology to other theologians, and to scholars of religion, and to explain those other fields to analytic theologians. The book defends analytic theology from some common criticisms, but also argues that analytic theologians have much to learn from other forms of inquiry. Analytic theology is a legitimate form of theology, and a legitimate form of academic inquiry, and it can be a valuable conversation partner within the wider religious studies academy. I aim to articulate an attractive vision of analytic theology, foster a more fruitful inter-disciplinary conversation, and enable scholars across the religious studies academy to understand one another better. Analytic theology can flourish in the secular academy, and flourish as authentically Christian theology.

I respond to challenges posed by Andrew Dole, Joanna Leidenhag, Kevin Schilbrack, and Sameer Yadav. Key topics include: whether the engagement between analytic theology and the academic study of religion really is mutually beneficial, distinguishing analytic theology from science-engaged theology, restrictive methodological naturalism, and whether I misconstrue analytic theology’s ‘characteristic damage’.

This article critically evaluates Jeffrey Koperski’s decretalism, which presents the laws of nature as divine decrees functioning as constraints rather than dynamic forces. Building on his work, we explore whether his model successfully avoids the implications of occasionalism, as he claims. By analysing his latest publications, we first reconstruct Koperski’s argument and then present three key objections. These include (1) issues related to scientific realism, (2) the principle of simplicity, and (3) the reduction of Koperski’s model to occasionalism. We argue that despite his attempts to distinguish his framework, Koperski’s model ultimately collapses into occasionalism due to the continuous divine sustenance required for natural processes. By engaging with recent developments in metaphysical and scientific debates, this article highlights the limitations of Koperski’s decretalism.

Rebel Angel Theodicy – often called Satan Theodicy – is the thesis that horrendous evils are directly or indirectly caused by angels who disobeyed God. In this article, I defend it, developing Gary Emberger’s suggestion that they influenced the course of evolution. After defending speculative theodicy, I expound Rebel Angel Theodicy and reply to seven objections that explicate the widespread judgement of implausibility:

1. 1. That the existence of angels is metaphysically problematic.

2. 2. That God has no good reason to create angels.

3. 3. That angels have no power to harm human beings.

4. 4. That God, foreknowing the possibility of rebellion, would not delegate to angels the power to guide evolution.

5. 5. That even if there was a good reason for God to delegate this power to angels it is metaphysically impossible for an omnipotent God to do so.

6. 6. That God, knowing of the angels’ rebellion, would subsequently intervene to put evolution back onto the preferred divine plan.

7. 7. That there is no plausible motive for angels to rebel.