In this paper, we revisit the relationship between economic freedom and growth across 407 German districts (Kreise). We build six indicators of economic freedom and cluster them into categories reflecting tax rates and size of the government and public sector. Exploiting the variation in the constructed indices of economic freedom, the evidence suggests less indebted districts with a lower share of taxes and a relatively smaller public sector achieve consistently higher growth rates and income levels. The beneficial effect of economic freedom on growth is robust to the variety of specification checks and does not appear to be driven by sample selection. The evidence does not indicate a lower level of economic freedom in former East German districts or greater economic freedom in West German districts but unveils a persistent north–south divide in the post-unification period. In the counterfactual scenario, a transition to the 90th percentile of economic freedom is associated with large income and growth gains. Such a transition would yield higher income levels and growth rates with a notable decrease in regional economic inequality within Germany.

We make a distinction between centralized, decentralized, and distributed payment mechanisms. A centralized payment mechanism processes a transaction using a trusted third party. A decentralized payment mechanism processes a transaction between the parties to the transaction. A distributed payment mechanism relies on the network of users to process a transaction on a shared ledger. We maintain that bitcoin is neither a centralized nor a decentralized payment mechanism. It is, instead, a distributed payment mechanism. We then consider decentralized and centralized aspects of the broader bitcoin payment space.

We forward the hypothesis and empirically establish that variations in the strength of family ties are rooted in culture. In particular, we show that individualism is associated with looser family ties. We exploit the associations between contemporary individualism and historical climatic and disease environments to establish a causal relationship. At both the individual- and country-levels, we find strong support that individualism reduces family ties. The estimated effects are economically large and robust to a wide variety of potentially confounding variables.

I investigate the historical development of limited liability – widely considered a cornerstone of the business corporation – and challenge the commonplace linear narratives about how limited liability evolved. I dismiss the claim that limited liability was invented with the very first joint-stock business corporations around 1600. I also reject the assertion that it became dominant with the limited liability acts of the mid-19th century. My argument is that it was only around 1800 that limited liability became a separate corporate attribute, distinct from legal personality, and that limited liability in the modern sense became a uniform attribute of all corporations only in the 20th century. Since corporations, stock markets and the corporate economy enjoyed a long and prosperous history well before limited liability in its modern sense became established and dominant, the economic theory of limited liability needs to be revisited. The paper opens a new set of conceptual, empirical and theoretical research questions, and points to new possibilities in terms of viable future liability regimes.

This paper addresses the issue of how rules are conceptualized by Hodgson in Old Institutional Economics (OIE). The argument is put forward that the concept of rules can be constructively clarified. Rather than provide a general form of single rules within a rule system, we argue for a taxonomic range of single rule forms. This approach has the additional advantage of providing a more explicit account of how rules operate as part of a rule system. It also provides one way to address the fluidity of rules. Rules are understood to be more or less fluid (incomplete) and subject to a practical dynamism. This, we argue, can be differentiated from the idea of tendency based on the capacity of agents not to follow rules. A useful concept here is that of ‘mezzo rules’ or recodifications that both define the rule and distance the agent from their own rule-following behaviour. In pursuing the argument we also highlight various methodological implications. First, conceptual development is a key aspect of the OIE, particularly when it is located within Dow's structured pluralism. As such elaboration on rule forms enhances the consistency of OIE as methodology. Second, the exploration of a taxonomic range of rules and of forms of fluidity can provide useful resources in mapping out institutional processes in real research.

This article is a reply to the comments made on my target article, ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, at the beginning of this issue.

A rough balance of political power between monarchs and a militarized landed aristocracy characterized medieval Western Europe. Scholars have argued that this balance of power contributed to a tradition of limited government and constitutional bargaining. I argue that 5th- and 6th-century barbarian settlements created a foundation for this balance of power. The settlements provided barbarians with allotments of lands or taxes due from the lands. The allotments served to align the incentives of barbarian warriors and Roman landowners, and realign the incentives of barbarian warriors and their leadership elite. Barbarian military forces became decentralized and the warriors became political powerful shareholders of the realm.

Geoffrey Hodgson has a number of criticisms regarding the ‘economic approach to property rights’ that has been mostly championed by members of the UCLA and Washington departments of economics during the 1960s–1990s. In this short note I address these comments and point out that most are simply a matter of nomenclature. When there are disagreements they stem from Hodgson’s failure to account for positive transaction costs and this literature’s emphasis on operational explanations of organization.

Was technological progress during and after the Industrial Revolution top-down or bottom-up? The technology that created the great inventions was driven by a combination of pathbreaking ideas and the dexterity and skills of trained artisans. While those forms of human capital were quite different, they both came out of small elites of intellectuals and craftsmen, what are rapidly becoming known as “upper-tail human capital.” I analyze the institutions that drove the incentives for both, and show that they came together to produce the Great Enrichment. These incentives were both material and social: between 1500 and 1700, the search for financial security and reputation cooperated in producing a unique institutional environment in which the elites in Western Europe produced the three legged-stool of European modernity: the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment. Once these three movements had succeeded, the foundation for modern economic growth had been laid.

This paper reviews work that tests (1) how formal and informal institutions, and especially their interaction, affect participation in the shadow economy in transition countries; and (2) how participating in these shadow economies affects individuals' well-being. The key findings are that a clash of individuals' perceptions of formal institutions with their informal institutions increases involvement in the shadow economy. Conversely, a trustworthy relationship with the government and other individuals makes people more inclined to comply. The importance of their social and institutional context also appears in how individuals' involvement in the shadow economy relates to their well-being. These findings complement insights from the rich literature on tax morale, on the exchange between public institutions and citizens and between culture and institutions more generally. The findings also contribute to the institutional economic literature by empirically showing that: (1) focusing on formal institutions alone, that is strengthening the rule of law, is a necessary but insufficient response to the shadow economy; (2) taking informal institutions, such as individuals' trust and tax morale, into account is of equal importance; and (3) most importantly, formal and informal institutions go hand in hand, and their interaction should be an essential part of the new institutional perspective.

Venture capitalism is a major institutional innovation based on identifying economies of scope in transactions of technological knowledge, bundled with managerial competence, reputation, screening procedures, and equity. It has paved the way to the emergence of new surrogate markets for knowledge, i.e. financial markets specialized in trading knowledge-intensive property rights. This development has important benefits in terms of risk management and hence profitability of investments in high-tech start-ups. The dynamic efficiency effects of the new institution also derive from the fact that the public at large, through its investments in knowledge-based income streams, contributes to the creation of new economically useful knowledge and capabilities.

If those with political power benefit from corrupt institutions, rulers might not adopt the rule of law so the ruling class can command a larger share of a smaller pie. An empirical analysis reveals that the size of government is larger in those countries that enforce the rule of law. If government expenditures provide some measure of the ability of the ruling class to command resources, this suggests that those with political power could benefit from imposing a fairer and more objective legal structure. Another conjecture is that those in power maintain corrupt governments to pay off their supporters and enhance their ability to remain in power. However, the rule of law is also positively associated with political stability, so better enforcement of the rule of law also enhances the ability of incumbent governments to remain in power.

Little is known of why institutional transfers have been largely disappointing. Berkowitz et al. (2001) have argued that because of what they call the transplant effect, imported law lacks effectiveness unless there is an initial level of familiarity or the imported law is successfully adapted to local legal norms. Yet, history shows that institutional transfers are possible: Why have some countries been more successful than others in importing foreign institutions? The paper introduces a framework for the analysis of the transplant effect, which is based on institutional economics. In the second part, we investigate the case of Borno State in northeastern Nigerian where institutions transferred during colonial rule and upon independence have been largely ineffective. In the case of Borno, the lack of a European educated bureaucratic class, low commitment of the political leadership, generally low levels of education and urbanization contributed to the low effectiveness of imported institutions.

Many years ago, Emmanuel Todd came up with a classification of family types and argued that the historically prevalent family types in a society have important consequences for its economic, political, and social development. Here, we evaluate Todd's most important predictions empirically. Relying on a parsimonious model with exogenous covariates, we find mixed results. On the one hand, authoritarian family types are, in stark contrast to Todd's predictions, associated with increased levels of the rule of law and innovation. On the other hand, and in line with Todd's expectations, communitarian family types are linked to racism, low levels of the rule of law, and late industrialization. Countries in which endogamy is frequently practiced also display an expectedly high level of state fragility and weak civil society organizations.

The absence of democracy in the Arab–Muslim world is a ‘striking anomaly’ for democratization scholars. This cannot be seen as caused by religion as such, as there are now several democratic Muslim-majority states. Popular explanations such as values, culture, economic development, natural resources, or colonial legacy have been refuted. Based on Ostrom's approach regarding local groups’ ability to establish institutions for ‘governing the commons’, we present a novel explanation for this puzzle, based on historical variations in institutions for financing religion. In Northwestern Europe, religion and secular services managed by local religious institutions have been financed ‘from below’, creating local systems for semi-democratic representation, transparency, and accountability. In the Arab–Muslim region, religion and local secular services have been financed ‘from above’, by private foundations lacking systems for representation and accountability. It is thus not religion, but how religion has been financed, that explains lacking successful democratization in the Arab–Muslim world.

This paper adds to the growing empirical evidence on the importance of habits in governing human behavior, and sheds new light on individual inertia in relation to transportation behavior. An enriched perspective rooted in Veblenian evolutionary economics (VEE) is used to construct a theoretical framework in order to analyze the processes at play in the formation and reinforcement of habits. The empirical study explores more specifically the synchronic processes strengthening the car-using habit. In addition to underlining the shortcomings of a ‘decision theory’ perspective to address urban transportation behaviors, we find that synchronic habits can have a significant effect on behavioral inertia. Our results suggest the existence of positive feedback between the development of synchronic habits, qualitative perceptions of driving times, and reinforcement of the car-using habit. The paper points out also that the diachronic dimension of habits would constitute another promising domain for further research on behavioral inertia in transportation.

Modern theory identifies several sources of economic growth, such as capital accumulation, new techniques, secure property rights and contracts, and absence of rent seeking. This paper introduces new social technologies as yet another source of growth and emphasizes our incomplete knowledge of social systems. I introduce a framework for analyzing institutional policy and use the case of modern biotechnology to explain how uncertainty about social technologies, persuasion, and competing beliefs influence the evolution of property rights.

Several studies link development to institutions transplanted by European colonizers and here we extend this line of research to Asia. Japan imposed its system of well-defined property rights on some of its Asian colonies. In 1939, Japan began to register private land in its island colonies, an effort that was completed in Palau but interrupted elsewhere by World War II. Within Micronesia, robust economic development followed only in Palau where individual property rights were well defined. We show that well-defined property rights in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for irrigation systems. Considering Japanese colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument to identify the causal impact of new institutions. Our estimates show that property-defining institutions were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia.

This is the second of two papers that generate and analyze quantitative estimates of the development of English caselaw and associated legal ideas before the Industrial Revolution. In the first paper, we estimated a 100-topic structural topic model, named the topics, and showed how to interpret topic-prevalence timelines. Here, we provide examples of new insights that can be gained from these estimates. We first provide a bird's-eye view, aggregating the topics into 15 themes. Procedure is the highest-prevalence theme, but by the mid-18th century attention to procedure decreases sharply, indicating solidification of court institutions. Important ideas on real-property were substantially settled by the mid-17th century and on contracts and torts by the mid-18th century. Thus, crucial elements of caselaw developed before the Industrial Revolution. We then examine the legal ideas associated with England's financial revolution. Many new legal ideas relevant to finance were well accepted before the Glorious Revolution. Finally, we examine the sources of law used in the courts. Emphasis on precedent-based reasoning increases by 1650, but diffusion was gradual, with pertinent ideas solidifying only after 1700. Ideas on statute applicability were accepted by the mid-16th century but debates on legislative intent were still occurring in 1750.

It is argued that routines can be fruitfully conceived of as multilevel mechanisms. The merits of viewing routines as multilevel mechanisms are that it helps in putting together a coherent picture of what routines are, what routines do, and how they do it. In particular, it helps in getting a clearer picture of how skills and routines are ontologically (rather than metaphorically) related to each other. It allows us to see that while routines are generative mechanisms producing recurrent patterns of firm behavior, as multilevel mechanisms they themselves are at the same time recurrent patterns of interaction within firms. Because of its ‘behavioral’ spirit, viewing routines as multilevel mechanisms (rather than as, for example, unobservable dispositions of firms to energize patterns of behavior in firms) greatly facilitates further empirical research on crucial, as yet unresolved issues, such as how stable and robust routines are and to what extent firm behavior is routine.