Institutions affect economic outcomes, but variation in them cannot be directly linked to environmental factors such as geography, climate, or technological availabilities. Game theoretic approaches, based as they typically are on foraging only assumptions, do not provide an adequate foundation for understanding the intervening role of politics and ideology; nor does the view that culture and institutions are entirely socially constructed. Understanding what institutions are and how they influence behavior requires an approach that is in part biological, focusing on cognitive and behavioral adaptations for social interaction favored in the past by group selection. These adaptations, along with their effects on canalizing social learning, help to explain uniformities in political and social order, and are the bedrock upon which we build cultural and institutional variability.

The core problem of any group selection hypothesis is the possibility that pro-social individual behavior contributing to a selection advantage for the group as a whole is potentially subject to free-riding. If group behavior and, hence, the conditions for group selection change through imitation and migration between groups, as argued in Hayek's theory of societal evolution, the explanation of group selection needs to account for the individuals' cognitively reflected motivation to adopt pro-social behavior in the face of free-riding. To do so a game-theoretic model is suggested that incorporates observational learning as a mechanism of acquiring, and choosing between, strategies.

Several studies link development to institutions transplanted by European colonizers and here we extend this line of research to Asia. Japan imposed its system of well-defined property rights on some of its Asian colonies. In 1939, Japan began to register private land in its island colonies, an effort that was completed in Palau but interrupted elsewhere by World War II. Within Micronesia, robust economic development followed only in Palau where individual property rights were well defined. We show that well-defined property rights in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for irrigation systems. Considering Japanese colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument to identify the causal impact of new institutions. Our estimates show that property-defining institutions were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia.

This is the second of two papers that generate and analyze quantitative estimates of the development of English caselaw and associated legal ideas before the Industrial Revolution. In the first paper, we estimated a 100-topic structural topic model, named the topics, and showed how to interpret topic-prevalence timelines. Here, we provide examples of new insights that can be gained from these estimates. We first provide a bird's-eye view, aggregating the topics into 15 themes. Procedure is the highest-prevalence theme, but by the mid-18th century attention to procedure decreases sharply, indicating solidification of court institutions. Important ideas on real-property were substantially settled by the mid-17th century and on contracts and torts by the mid-18th century. Thus, crucial elements of caselaw developed before the Industrial Revolution. We then examine the legal ideas associated with England's financial revolution. Many new legal ideas relevant to finance were well accepted before the Glorious Revolution. Finally, we examine the sources of law used in the courts. Emphasis on precedent-based reasoning increases by 1650, but diffusion was gradual, with pertinent ideas solidifying only after 1700. Ideas on statute applicability were accepted by the mid-16th century but debates on legislative intent were still occurring in 1750.

Constitutional scholars emphasize the importance of an enduring, stable constitutional order, which North and Weingast (1989) argue is consistent with credible commitments to sustainable fiscal policies. However, this view is controversial and has received little empirical study. We use 19th-century US state-level data to estimate relationships between constitutional design and the likelihood of a government default. Results indicate that more entrenched and less specific constitutions are associated with a lower likelihood of default.

Property institutions should ideally provide economic actors with certainty that their local choices about investment will not be unsettled by shifting political economic equilibria. We argue that for this to occur, political autonomy, administrative and enforcement capacity, political constraints, and accessible legal institutions are each necessary. A comparison of the evolution of property rights for settlers and American Indians in the United States shows how political and legal forces shape the evolution of property institutions. American Indians, who had property institutions before Europeans arrived, could not defend their land from Europeans and later Americans due to lacking military capacity. Settlers' property rights were relatively secure because the government had sufficient autonomy and capacity to broadly define and enforce their rights, political institutions constrained the government from expropriating settlers' property, and legal institutions provided a forum for settlers to adjudicate and defend their rights in court. Native Americans, in contrast, had systematically inconsistent and often expropriative policy treatment by the government. Although tribes have technically been sovereign since the 1970s, tribal governments continue to lack sufficient political and legal autonomy and capacity to define and enforce property institutions in response to evolving local conditions.

This paper aims at offering a reconstruction of the salient features of the most important formal institution introduced by European states in the Early Modern Period with the aim of recognizing and protecting the intellectual property of the inventors. Such institutions went under different names – ‘Privilegio’ in Venice, ‘Patent’ in England, ‘Privilège’ in France, ‘Cedula de privilegio de invençion’ in Spain – and, in general, took the form of the concession of a special prerogative to the inventor by the sovereign or the republic, by virtue of which he could exploit, in economic terms, his own invention through holding a monopoly. The article starts with the origins of the privileges for invention, of which the first examples are to be found in the Middle Ages, but whose official ‘genesis’ is commonly identified with the Venetian law of 1474. The fundamental characteristics of the Venetian system, which was later imitated by other European states, are analysed. In the following section, the adoption of this model by those other states – Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands – is illustrated. In fact, the majority of these would make legislation on intellectual property an instrument of mercantilist policy, under the same conditions as prevailed in Venice. Further, we will examine some of the opportunities that the diffusion of these measures offered to those involved and the way in which they – as craftsmen, merchants, and speculators – took advantage of the business of privileges. Finally, before concluding, some thoughts on the changes made in the policy of privileges given the transformations that took place in the course of the eighteenth century, in order to understand the ‘adaptive’ capacity of these institutions.

The main objective is to discuss the historical-evolutionary character of the latest work of Douglass North. His views have been lately criticized, especially as far as their historical insight is concerned, as well as the nature of the concepts and the ideas he used. Three interconnected arguments dealing with North's neoclassical roots, his individualistic point of departure and his inclination to universalistic explanations sustain this allegation, and they will be presented in the first part. In the second part, a response to these arguments is suggested. Finally, the evolutionary character of his later work is discussed and established in the last part. It is held that by introducing ‘culture’ into the heart of the analysis of institutional change, North is oriented toward context dependent and consequently historically specific explanations.

This paper investigates the relationship between judicial resources and individuals’ trust in the justice system. We argue that the justice budget is likely to have a positive and significant impact on individuals’ trust in justice, thanks to its role as a signal when individuals face uncertainty regarding the judicial environment. We test this hypothesis empirically using three different budget-related variables: the justice budget per incoming case, the number of magistrates and the intensity of legal aid. Across our three regressions, we find a positive and significant correlation between judicial resources and individuals’ declared trust in the justice system. This positive relationship is robust to the introduction of socio-demographic, cultural, institutional and economic control variables. We finally offer empirical support to the intuition that the effect of the justice budget on trust in justice is likely to be greater when individuals are more satisfied with the level of democracy in their country.

We illustrate mechanisms that can give rise to path dependence in legislation. Specifically, we show how debtor-friendly bankruptcy law arose in the United States as a result of a path dependent process. The 1898 Bankruptcy Act was not regarded as debtor-friendly at the time of its enactment, but the enactment of the law gave rise to changes in interest groups, changes in beliefs about the purpose of bankruptcy law, and changes in the Democratic Party's position on bankruptcy that set the United States on a path to debtor-friendly bankruptcy law. An analysis of the path dependence of bankruptcy law produces an interpretation that is more consistent with the evidence than the conventional interpretation that debtor-friendliness in bankruptcy law began with political compromises to obtain the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.

I reply to amiable criticisms by Greif, Mokyr, Langlois, Lawson, and Tabellini of my own criticism of neo-institutionalism. They say that ‘culture’ is included in neo-institutionalism – which is mistaken on any serious definition of culture, such as those involving ethics, rhetoric, ideology, and ideas. They also say that neo-institutionalism has advanced beyond Max U and Samuelsonian economics. That's also mistaken. They do not attend to the humanities, which as ‘humanomics’ can indeed acknowledge ‘culture’ and non-Max U. Their particular historical examples show the opposite of what they think is shown. Ideas, rhetoric, ethics changed, and had to change, before institutions mattered.

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have become a popular approach to bring about improved environmental behaviors. When such programs are launched in developing countries, an additional benefit is that they are said to improve incomes for the poor. In this paper, we argue that PES schemes are not ‘market-based’. Indeed, they are not even ‘market-like’. The incentive properties said to be present in such programs are of doubtful efficacy. We suggest that PES schemes are instances of a new class of transaction – the inducing transaction – whose purpose is to make certain resource users the instruments of the desires of others. We relate the success of PES schemes to Veblenian ‘habituation’ and Peircean ‘habit breaking and habit taking’ to suggest that PES schemes face a daunting challenge if they are to bring about durable behavioral changes.

Coase always expressed dissatisfaction with neo-classical economics and advocated for a new approach. Rather than using toy mathematical models built from unrealistic, idealized assumptions, Coase preferred to study real-world contexts, including actual legal cases. He demonstrated the utility of his approach in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. Yet almost all of Coase's contemporaries completely ignored, Coase's call for a new approach and his sustained use of legal cases to illustrate his arguments and to situate his analysis in reality. In this paper, we show that the profession interpreted Coase's seminal article exactly the opposite of what he had intended, and reduced his analytical contributions to a toy model of the exact sort he was criticizing. This ironic history of the most cited article both in law and in economics helps us understand the development of ideas within both fields and how disciplinary blinders shape intellectual progress.

Externalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify state regulation of the economy. This paper explores the concept of externalities from a philosophical perspective. It criticizes the utilitarian nature of economic analyses of externalities, showing how they cannot take into account values like freedom and justice. It then develops the analogy between the concept of externalities and the ‘harm principle’ in political philosophy. It argues that the harm principle points to the need for a theory of basic interests to judge when a harm is imposed. Similarly, externality analyses should use such a theory of basic interests as the basis for judgments about legitimate state intervention. This proposal is defended against objections, and illustrated with a case study of the US Supreme Court's ruling on the Affordable Care Act, which shows how the judicial reasoning implicitly interprets externalities in terms of basic interests.

Moral behavior and legal institutions coevolve. While evolutionary game theory has often analyzed the evolution of moral behavior within given institutional rules, it has not examined the coevolution of moral preferences and different institutional aspects of the decision environment. By an ‘indirect’ evolutionary approach, we analyze the coevolution of moral preferences (in the sense of trustworthiness) and legal institutions like court rulings and legal insurance. We find that preference detection capabilities crowd in morality and can thus render useless the role of courts and legal insurance as public institutions. Legal institutions become crucial for the emergence of morality, however, when information about preference types is not available. This holds true even when courts do not have superior detection capabilities than other agents.

From a New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspective, standards are acknowledged to play a central role in building efficient market infrastructure by defining what is exchanged and reducing the level of transaction and measurement costs. Nevertheless, only a few prior NIE studies have considered standard-setting activities as coordination and governance issues per se. This article aims to fill this gap by adapting and extending the classical Williamsonian analytical framework to the governance of standard-setting institutions. This analysis is substantiated by empirical data on global private standards in the agricultural sector. Our results highlight the importance of standard selection and the limits to current harmonisation as regards institutional failure to define alternative multilateral governance mechanisms at the international level.

We look at the institutional determinants of both within- and across-country variations in US foreign direct investment (FDI) flows over time. The strength of our approach is that in contrast to the previous work that has focused on average FDI flows across countries, we are able to explain both the variations in FDI flows across and within countries for a given year. Our core hypothesis is that in countries with high quality of contract enforcement, multinationals are more likely to invest in the industries, where by their very nature investments are relationship specific. Conversely, in countries with low quality of contract enforcement, multinationals are more likely to invest in industries where investments to a large degree are not relationship specific. Using-three dimensional panel data for US FDI flows to 50 countries and 6 sectors for the period 1984–2010, we find strong support for our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that countries that want to attract US FDI in sectors that are highly intensive in technology and institutions such as transportation and electronics should improve their property rights and contracting environment.

Part of the debate fueled by cryptocurrencies has revolved around the question of what we call money. This paper identifies two traditions in monetary theory that have tried to answer that question. On the one hand, the money or non-money view follows a strategy proposed by a version of philosophical essentialism, in which there is a set of defining characteristics of money that make it categorically different from other things used in transactions. On the other hand, the liquidity degree view emphasizes that the multiple objects that circulate as a means of payment differ in their degree of acceptability. Since there is no absolute standard of liquidity, a precise dividing line between money and non-money cannot be drawn. We challenge the money or non-money view, arguing that there is nothing in the nature of money that can be interpreted as a natural kind essence by which money can be categorically separated from non-money.

The current paper explores the municipal debt crisis that resulted from the panic of 1873, which caused a significant number of local governments in the United States to default on their debt obligations. The aftermath of that episode was one of constitutional change meant to constrain municipal governments from pursuing similar activities in the future. This paper empirically investigates the impact that these restrictions had on municipal borrowing costs, analyzed from bond yield data taken from several major US financial markets, so as to evaluate how binding and significant markets actually perceived these constraints to be. Overall, the results suggest that borrowing costs were lower for municipal governments that faced more stringent creditor guarantees regarding the issuing and repayment of debt, hard budget constraints, and also strict debt limits, while tax limits generally increased borrowing costs. These results not only conform too much of the current literature regarding the political economy of institutional constraints on public finance, they also add several important insights, especially when comparing defaulting to non-defaulting municipalities.

In the past decade, Australia has begun to privatize its irrigation system. Two general models have emerged: a single and a dual ownership structure. This paper examines the trade-offs, costs and benefits, and the attendant efficiencies regarding costs of ownership. In particular, we examine member capital investment incentives and resultant risk-bearing costs related to capital formation. The paper concludes that the dual ownership structure system has significant economic advantages relative to its single-structured counterpart.