New benchmark estimates of Black-White income ratios for 1870, 1900, and 1940 are combined with standard post-World War census data. The resulting time series reveals that the pace of racial income convergence has generally been steady but slow, quickening only during the 1940s and the modern Civil Rights era. I explore the interpretation of the time series with a model of intergenerational transmission of inequality in which racial differences in causal factors that determine income are very large just after the Civil War and which erode slowly across subsequent generations.

“The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.”

This article examines how the marine insurance industry evolved in Britain and America during its critical formative period, focusing on the information asymmetries and agency problems that were inherent to the technology of overseas trade at the time, and on the path-dependent manner in which the institutions that addressed these problems evolved. I argue that the market was characterized by multiple equilibria because of a potential lemons problem. Exogenous shocks and endogenous institutional development combined to bring about a bifurcation of institutional structure, the effects of which persist to the present day.

Indian society is one of the most complex in existence, and we know little about its structure, functioning, or—more important—its development and dynamics. The neglect of Indian's economic history, particularly the period 1800–1947, is one of the most distressing gaps. It is dismaying to realize that even within very broad ranges of error we do not know whether during the past century-and-a-half the economy's performance improved, stagnated, or actually declined. Not only is ignorance of Indian economic behavior over time disturbing in itself, but the attempts at planning since 1947 have suffered because of this. It is difficult to predict outcome and consequences of any major development policy in the absence of any clear clues about the long-run dynamics of the Indian economy and society.

The U.S. Constitution, by taking away the power of the states to issue paper money, removed a major source of flexibility in state public finance. In their search for new sources of revenue and fiscal flexibility, the states discovered that the banks they chartered could fill the gap. Investment earnings and tax revenues derived from banks soon became major elements of state public finance. We discuss the nature of these early business-government relationships and provide the first systematic assessment of their relative importance in state finance.

This article documents differences in body size between white, black, and Indian mid-nineteenth-century American men and investigates the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of frame size using a unique data set of Civil War soldiers. It finds that over time men have grown taller and heavier and have relatively less abdominal fat, implying that “modern” chronic diseases such as ischemic heart disease were common in the past. Changes in frame size explain almost half of the mortality decline among white men between 1914 and 1988 and predict even sharper declines in older age mortality between 1988 and 2022.

I reexamine Douglass North and Barry Weingast's argument regarding credible commitment and sovereign debt in post-revolution England. The central problem that the architects of the revolution settlement had to solve, I argue, was not the king's frequent reneging on financial commitments (a symptom), but the moral hazard that generated the kings' malfeasance (the underlying cause). The central element of the revolution settlement was thus not better holding kings to their commitments, but better holding royal advisors to account for all consequences of the Crown's policies—through what we now call ministerial responsibility.

This article presents a new series of monthly equity returns for the British stock market for the period 1825-1870. In addition to calculating capital appreciation and dividend yields, the article also estimates the effect of survivorship bias on returns. Three notable findings emerge from this study. First, stock market returns in the 1825-1870 period are broadly similar for Britain and the United States, although the British market is less risky. Second, real returns in the 1825-1870 period are higher than in subsequent epochs of British history. Third, unlike the modern era, dividends are the most important component of returns.

Recent historical research tends to view the 1848 revolutions in Europe as caused by a surge of radical ideas and by long-term socioeconomic problems. However, many contemporary observers interpreted much of the upheaval as a consequence of short-term economic causes, specifically the serious shortfall in food supply that had shaken large parts of the Continent in 1845–1847, and the subsequent industrial slump. Applying standard quantitative methods to a data set of 27 European countries, we show that it was mainly immediate economic misery, and the fear thereof, that triggered the European revolutions of 1848.

What do economic historians do? I analyze quantitatively The Journal of Economic History's contents since its founding, showing subfields, nations, and periods studied, and which scholars and universities have contributed. The timing, extent, and participants of the cliometric revolution are investigated. New rankings of economic history programs are made.

This article takes advantage of an exogenous shift towards patenting in chemicals to test whether patents contribute to the geographic diffusion of innovations. Data on U.S. innovations that were exhibited at four world fairs between 1851 and 1915 suggest that innovative activity became less localized after patenting rates increased. These changes cannot be explained by changes in the localization of chemical production or economy-wide changes in the localization of innovations.

This article constructs new measures of worktime for Europe, North America, and Australia, 1870–1913. Great Britain began with the shortest work year and Belgium the longest. By 1913 certain continental countries approached British worktimes, and, consistent with recent findings on real wages, annual hours in Old and New Worlds had converged. Although globalization did not lead to a race to the bottom of worktimes, there is only partial evidence of a race to the top. National work routines, the outcome of different legal, labor, and political histories, mediated relations between hours and income.

Once one of the richest countries in the world, Argentina has been in relative economic decline for most of the twentieth century. The quantitative records of income growth and accumulation date the onset of the retardation to around the time of the Great War, and patterns of aggregate saving and foreign borrowing show that scarcity of investable resources significantly frustrated interwar development. A demographic model of national saving demonstrates that the burdens of rapid population growth and substantial immigration depressed Argentine saving, contributing significantly to the demise of the Belle Époque following the wartime collapse of international financial markets.

By the 1700s Europeans dominated the gunpowder technology, which was surprising, because it had originated in China and been used with expertise throughout Eurasia. To account for their dominance, historians have invoked competition, but it cannot explain why they pushed this technology further than anyone else. The answer lies with a simple tournament model of military competition that allows for learning by doing. Political incentives and military conditions then explain why the rest of Eurasia fell behind Europeans in developing the gunpowder technology. The consequences were huge, from colonialism to the slave trade and even the Industrial Revolution.

Early in 1932 the Federal Reserve System made a serious attempt to reverse the “Great Contraction” throught expansionary open market operations, but abandoned it a few months later. In this paper we offer an interpretation of the episode that throws new light on the Fed's behavior during the Depression. Key are the attitude of private bankers, Britain's abandonment of the gold standard, and the brief open market campaign. To protect bank profits the Fed abandoned the program which set the stage for the complete financial collapse of the United States in early 1933.

Spain's contribution to the “New Emigration” differed from that of other Southern European countries in that it was oriented to Latin America far more than to the United States, in that it reached massive proportions only after 1900, and in that the various Spanish provinces varied greatly in their emigration rates. Differences in wealth, income, literacy, urbanization, and migratoly tradition best explain these international and interprovincial differences.

Household budget studies are used to assess working-class demand for manufactures over industrialization. Contrary to demand-side proponents, increased urbanization, enhanced opportunities for women's and children's work, and a declining subsistence sector all retrenched consumption patterns into demand for the products of traditional industries and decreased demand for the products of new manufacturing industries. However, consideration of national expenditure on necessities shows an increasing surplus available for discretionary expenditure between 1801 and 1841. This reflects an increased purchasing power of the middle and upper classes that may have manifested itself as substantially increased demand for domestic manufactures.

The use of height data to measure living standards is now a well-established method in economic literature. Although blacks and whites today reach similar terminal statures in the United States, nineteenth-century African American statures were consistently shorter than those of whites. Greater insolation (vitamin D production) is documented here to be associated with taller black statures. Black farmers were taller than workers in other occupations, and, ironically, black youth statures increased during the antebellum period and decreased with slavery's elimination.

This article presents a critical survey of ten books from the history of capitalism, a newly emerging subfield of history. At their best, the books offer provocative insights and vivid descriptions of some of the darker episodes of our economic past. Yet specious arguments and failures of analytical reasoning sometimes undermine these books' effectiveness as social criticism. I highlight insights from the field of economic history that would strengthen the work of historians of capitalism. I also suggest some opportunities for dialogue, if not collaboration, between the two communities of scholars.

This article examines the Confederate cotton bonds floated in Europe in March 1863 and traded on the London market. Over a 27 March 1863 to 17 June 1865 sample we isolate two, nonreversed, “turning points” that follow news of Confederate defeat at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July 1863 and the fall of Atlanta in September 1864.

Up until the mid-nineteenth century Russia had an enserfed peasantry, a mere 1,000 or so miles of railways, and a small, almost insignificant market sector. When serfdom was abolished (1861) and the expansion of railroads started to occupy a prominent place in development policy toward the end of the nineteenth century, Russia was launched on a transformation from a state of preindustrial and pre-capitalistic backwardness into a path of modernization and industrialization.