Was clearinghouse membership a key factor mitigating withdrawls from intermediaries during the Panic of 1907? Analyzing balnace-sheet information on institutions in New York and Chicago, we find ecidence that clearinghouse memebers had institutions in New York and Chicago, we find evidence that clearinghouse members had smaller contractions in demand deposits than did nonmembers. New York City trusts, isolated from the clearinghouse, were subject to heightened perceptions of risk, and suffered large-scale withdrawals because they were outside of the clearinghouse and therefore much less prepared to withstand large-scale depositor runs. We suggest that this aspect of the Panic of 1907 helped to forge support for the creation of a U.S. central bank.

New Jersey played a dominant role in the merger wave at the turn of the century. The state facilitated the rise of large firms by liberalizing its corporation law in exchange for incorporation fees and franchise taxes. This article suggests that chartermongering emerged from the U.S. federal political system and the economic structure of the state. Delaware became the preferred state of incorporation as New Jersey's economic structure changed.

How do property rights evolve when unoccupied areas attract economic use? Who are the first claimants on the frontier and how do they establish their property rights? When do governments provide de jure property rights? We present a conceptual framework that addresses these questions and apply it to the frontiers of Australia, the United States, and Brazil. Our framework stresses the crucial role of politics as frontiers develop by identifying situations where the competition for land by those with de facto rights and those with de jure rights leads to violence or potential conflicts.

Early banks in New England functioned not as commercial banks in the modern sense but as the financial arms of extended kinship networks. These groups used banks to raise capital for their diversified enterprises and give their operations a stable institutional base. Because entry into banking was essentially free, favoritism in credit markets—the usual affliction of such a system—seems to have been unimportant. Instead, the economy as a whole benefited from the ease with which capital could be mobilized for industrial development.

Railroads in late nineteenth-century Japan are credited with facilitating factor mobility as well as access to human and financial capital, but their impact on firms has been unclear. Using a prefecture-level panel data set and a difference-in-differences model that exploits the temporal and spatial variation of railroad expansion, I investigate the relationship between railways and increased firm activity. Rail access led to higher average firm capitalization, particularly in manufacturing, and more populated and less accessible areas gained disproportionately more firms. By widening markets and allowing for agglomeration economies, Japanese railways promoted capital investment and more efficient resource allocation.

I evaluate the effectiveness of financial markets in the early Roman Empire in this article. I review the theory of financial intermediation to describe a hierarchy of financial sources and survey briefly the history of financial intermediation in eighteenth-century Western Europe to provide a standard against which to evaluate the Roman evidence. I then describe the nature of financial arrangements in the early Roman Empire in terms of this hierarchy. This exercise reveals the extent to which the Roman economy resembled more recent societies and sheds light on the prospects for economic growth in the Roman Empire.

Recent studies suggest that the earnings of pre-1890 immigrants grew slowly compared with those of natives and imply that these immigrants did not assimilate well into the American labor market. Using data for Michigan and California this article estimates new specifications for immigrant and native-born earnings, and finds that immigrants who arrived as children had similar earnings profiles to the native-born. Immigrants who arrived as adults suffered an initial earnings disadvantage but their earnings grew faster than those of the native-born. These results are consistent with the traditional view that pre-1890 immigrants assimilated well.

We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century, the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century, further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find support for our technological account using a new data set covering thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000. We find little evidence that the French Revolution was a watershed in terms of levels of mobilization.

We establish several facts about medieval monetary debasements: they were followed by unusually large minting volumes and by increased seigniorage; old and new coins circulated concurrently; and, at least some of the time, coins were valued by weight. These facts constitute a puzzle because debasements provide no additional inducements to bring coins to the mint. On theoretical and empirical grounds, we reject explanations based on by-tale circulation, nominal contracts, and sluggish price adjustment. We conclude that debasements pose a challenge to monetary economics.

The aim of this article is to investigate the railroads' contribution to German economic growth from the 1840s to the 1870s. The analysis focuses on background linkage effects. It is shown that the emergence of the modern German iron industry was due to the railroads' demand for iron products. A comparison with the United States reveals the considerably greater importance of German railroad construction for its domestic iron industry from 1840 to 1860. The British iron industry not only profited from domestic railroad construction but benefited significantly from railroad construction abroad, a fact too often neglected.

Peru's experience with sovereign debt during the guano boom is one of the most remarkable in the nineteenth century. Despite the country's ongoing political instability and poor capital market reputation, the price of Peruvian bonds soared shortly after settlement in 1849, and the country enjoyed relatively low credit risk until the 1870s. This article discusses the incentives Peru and its creditors faced, and explains how Peru's extraordinary performance in financial markets was founded on its credible commitment to service its debt with the guano proceeds.

Despite hundreds of studies of the influence of economic interests on the formation of the U.S. Constitution, no consensus has been reached. Our study of the Constitutional Convention differs from previous ones by offering an explicit theoretical model of delegates' voting behavior and employing multivariate statistical techniques. We extend our earlier work by analyzing new information on constituents' economic interests and ideology. Further our econometric results on individual roll-call votes strongly suggest delegates who owned slaves or represented slaveowning constituents were more likely to oppose issues favoring a national form of government.

From about 750 to 1100, China experienced a series of economic changes roughly comparable to the subsequent patterns of European growth from the Crusades to the eve of the French Revolution. The spread in the use of money, development of new credit and fiscal institutions, increase in interregional and international trade, and colonization of hitherto marginal land which took place in the Occident during the half millennium preceding the Reformation was paralleled by an earlier era of progress in East Asia during the two-hundred-fifty years from the rebellion of An Lu-shan (755) to the treaty of Shan-yüan 1004). And the achievements of late sixteenthand early seventeenth-century England, which John Nef terms an “early industrial revolution,” were in many respects even exceeded by the impressive expansion of mining and manufacturing in eleventh-century China.

The provision of capital is generally recognized to be one of the main problems of countries undergoing the process of industrialization. This is true also of the special case of Great Britain, the first country to experience an industrial revolution. In the British case, however, it is important to note that much capital had been accumulated even before the 1760's, the decade when industrial growth began to accelerate and to change its direction. Most of this earlier capital was invested in commerce, in finance, in farming, and in stocks of manufactured goods and raw materials, and what was noteworthy in the next two generations was, not so much the absolute (and probably also relative) growth in the quantity of capital, but a change in its composition: the emergence, for the first time, of large concentrations of fixed capital.

We report estimates of the fiscal multiplier for interwar Britain based on quarterly data, time-series econometrics, and “defense news.” We find that the government expenditure multiplier was in the range 0.3 to 0.8, much lower than previous estimates. The scope for a Keynesian solution to recession was less than is generally supposed. We find that rearmament gave a smaller boost to real GDP than previously claimed. Rearmament may, however, have had a larger impact than a temporary public works program of similar magnitude if private investment anticipated the need to add capacity to cope with future defense spending.

There are two widely held explanations for South Asia's failure to attain the level of economic performance achieved by the now developed countries of the world: One is that British imperial policy frustrated economic growth after 1750; the other is that the Indian value system and die social structure that reflected that value system were obstacles to economic growth. It is worthy of note that both interpretations tend to visualize pre-1750 South Asia at a level of economic organization and performance at least equal to that of western Europe in 1750, with the economic gap appearing only subsequently.

Scholarly opinion currently evinces disturbing symptoms of latent schizophrenia on the subject of economic growth in the ante-bellum United States. Virtually every student of the era now appears convinced that the long-term rate of growth of aggregate product per capita underwent a significant acceleration “somewhere during the period between 1815 and 1860,” as Douglass North recently phrased it. And, if many economic historians protest W. W. Rostow's labeling the years following 1843 as the period of the U.S. “take-off,” most do not seem to balk at accepting the guess hazarded by Raymond Goldsmith: “a fairly sharp break in the trend of real national product per head … occurred not very long before 1839,” quite probably during the 1830's. To the uninitiated, it might seem obvious that everybody also subscribes to an explicit set of assertions about the secular rate of growth of per capita product during the period from, say, the founding of the nation to the date of the putative acceleration; otherwise, how could all agree that a significant alteration in the trend had occurred?

Economic development depends on the establishment of appropriate institutions, such as a patent system that defends property rights in inventions. Skeptics argue that patents in early America were unenforceable because judges arbitrarily ruled against patentees. I examine 795 patent cases to assess the role of the courts and find that judges protected patent rights because they believed that inventors were motivated by expected returns. Although changes occurred in the 1850s, the courts consistently upheld the view that the patent system fostered economic growth. If inventive activity indeed responded to material incentives, this finding implies that the legal system stimulated technical change by reinforcing the effectiveness of the patent system.

The laws of the United States are extremely favorable to the division of property.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America