When did Germany become economically integrated? Based on a large new data set on trade flows within and across the borders of Germany, I explore the geography of trade costs across Central Europe, 1885–1933. The key finding is that the German Empire before 1914 was a poorly integrated economy. This internal fragmentation resulted from cultural heterogeneity, from administrative borders, and from natural geography that divided Germany into eastern and western parts. After World War I and again with the Great Depression, internal integration improved, while external integration worsened in part because of border changes along the lines of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity. By the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933, Germany was reasonably well integrated.

This article investigates sex-specific mortality rates in eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury rural Germany to determine whether there was any gender bias in the allocation of household resources. Family reconstitution data from 60 villages provide evidence of considerable excess female mortality among married adults. The empirical findings are consistent with a bargaining approach to understanding intrahousehold resource allocation and suggest that women's survival disadvantage is related to their positions in the remarriage market, the perceived value of their work, as well as differences in altruism. Agricultural change appears to be one factor responsible for the emergence of this disadvantage.

Douglass North and Barry Weingast's seminal account of the Glorious Revolution argued that specific constitutional reforms enhanced the credibility of the English Crown, leading to much stronger public finances. Critics have argued that the most important reforms occurred incrementally before the Revolution; and that neither interest rates on sovereign debt nor enforcement of property rights improved sharply after the Revolution. In this article, I identify a different set of constitutional reforms, explain why precedents for these reforms did not lessen their revolutionary impact, and show that the evidence, properly evaluated, supports a view of the Revolution as a watershed.

Earlier accounts of the creation of property rights in the California gold fields ignored culture and are incomplete. We argue that culture matters in solving collective-action problems. Such problems in the California gold fields were solved through reliance on cultural focal points. Focal points included individualism, equality, respect for property, and rewards commensurate to work. Cultural concepts of fairness served to create norms and institutions that miners were willing to defend, which included majority rule, election of officials, trial by jury, allocation of a first-come, first-served basis and rules for working claims.

In 1816 England officially abandoned bimetallism and made silver coins into tokens that were only limited legal tender. Earlier monetary authorities had lacked the ability to manage a subsidiary coinage, a necessary complement to the monometallic gold standard. A successful token coinage must be both costly to counterfeit and credibly backed to ensure that the tokens do not depreciate to their intrinsic value. These problems were solved in the nineteenth century through the introduction of steam-driven stamping presses and with the assistance of the Bank of England.

The boll weevil is America's most celebrated agricultural pest. We analyze new county-level panel data to provide sharp estimates of the time path of the insect's effects on the southern economy. We find that in anticipation of the contact, farmers increased production, attempting to squeeze out one last large crop. Upon arrival, the weevil had a large negative and lasting impact on cotton production, acreage, and especially yields. In response, rather than taking land out of agricultural production, farmers shifted to other crops. We also find striking effects on land values and population movements.

It has been widely believed that demand elements, jointly with supply shifts, were crucial in determining the timing, location, and general characteristics of the Industrial Revolution in England and Continental Western Europe. The possible forms which the role of demand might have taken are specified and examined both theoretically and empirically. While demand factors cannot be ruled out altogether, they were definitely of a secondary order of importance. Neither exogenous increases in the demand for manufactures, nor induced technological change are likely to have been a factor of decisive importance. A macroeconomic interpretation of the “demand hypothesis” is examined and rejected.

The study of mortality rates and trends in the United States before 1860 has been rather unsystematic to date. Most scholars have been content to estimate the mortality rate at some point in time and only a few serious efforts have been made to ascertain the long-term trends in mortality. Particularly lacking are efforts to relate estimates of mortality in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to those of the nineteenth century. In addition, the few studies that have attempted to discuss long-term trends in American mortality have been forced to rely on estimates of mortality gathered from different sources and based on different techniques of analysis. Unfortunately, almost no efforts have been made to estimate possible biases introduced when comparing mortality data from different types of records.

This article presents new estimations of per capita GDP in colonial times for the two pillars of the Spanish empire: Mexico and Peru. We find dynamic economies as evidenced by increasing real wages, urbanization, and silver mining. Their growth trajectories are such that both regions reduced the gap with respect to Spain; Mexico even achieved parity at times. While experiencing swings in growth, the notable turning point is in 1780s as bottlenecks in production and later, the independence wars reduced economic activity. Our results question the notion that colonial institutions impoverished Latin America.

In the middle of the nineteenth century Britain was the major supplier of iron and steel to the world market, while Germany and the United States were substantial importers. But by 1913 German exports had exceeded British exports—with American exports not far behind—and Britain had become a major importer of steel. The goal of this paper is to explain this change in the pattern of trade. Its method is, first, to establish that the pattern of trade reflected the pattern of iron and steel prices prevailing in the three countries, and, second, to account for the pricing pattern in terms of international differences in input prices, technical efficiency, and deviations between price and unit production costs. I shall demonstrate that Britain's mid-century export success was due to its superior technical efficiency and lower raw material prices, and to the enormous excess profits earned by the German iron industry during its mid-century period of rapid economic growth. Britain's decline as an exporter was due to a reversal of this favorable situation: after 1900 the British industry was considerably less efficient than the German and American industries, and it labored under the burden of higher raw material prices. I shall argue, however, that vigorous entrepreneurs could have overcome both of these disadvantages.

Economists directly observe warranted “fundamental” values in only a few cases. One is that of closed-end mutual funds: their fundamental value is simply the current market value of the securities that make up their portfolios. We use the difference between prices and net asset values of closed-end mutual funds at the end of the 1920s to estimate the degree to which the stock market was overvalued on the eve of the 1929 crash. We conclude that the stocks making up the S & P composite were priced at least 30 percent above fundamentals in late summer, 1929.

Farm foreclosures in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s reached heights never previously or since exceeded. In this paper hypotheses are proposed and tested to account for the cross-state variation in farm foreclosures during the interwar period. Foreclosures are modeled to depend on depressed farm earnings throughout the 1920s and 1930s, optimistic agricultural expansion brought on by World War I, and cross-state variation in mortgage debt structure. The empirical results are consistent with the proposed multiple causal model.

Through a detailed reconstruction of 1933 GDP for the two provinces in China's most advanced region, the Lower Yangzi, I show that their per capita income was 55 percent higher than China's average, and they had experienced a growth and structural change between 1914–1918 and 1931–1936 comparable to contemporaneous Japan and her East Asian colonies. This article highlights the unique political institution of early-twentieth-century Shanghai as a city state, with its rule of law and secure property rights laying the foundation for economic growth in the Lower Yangzi with long-term impact throughout East Asia.

Although largely neglected in most histories of the French Revolution, the central government’s persistent budget deficit was a factor of paramount importance. The fiscal crisis inherited from the monarchy defied solution because of the war of attrition fought by economic interest groups. The struggle produced radical changes in macroeconomic policy to shift the burden of adjustment, altering the course of and prolonging the Revolution.

This study contributes to a revised picture of nineteenth-century bilateralism. Employing a new disaggregated data set, it argues that bilateral treaties did not implement general free trade, but instead reduced tariffs unevenly through commodity-specific preferences, especially favoring manufactured goods. Gravity model estimates show that specific liberalizations increased exports of corresponding items, but not overall trade. Exporters from countries whose governments used bilateralism strategically to bring down partner tariffs benefitted most. Hence, the network in form and outcome is more properly identified with reciprocal liberalization practiced by the French than with British free-trade ideology.

International, rather than domestic, causes of both the Bank Holiday of 1933 and the calm in the banking system that followed are emphasized here. New information on gold losses by the New York Federal Reserve, rather than domestic currency hoarding, serve to explain the Bank Holiday's specific timing. Expectations that Roosevelt would devalue the dollar stimulated much of the gold loss. I also argue that Roosevelt's restrictions on gold holdings and foreign exchange dealings and his devaluation of the dollar by 60 percent were more important to the stability of the banking system after the Bank Holiday than was deposit insurance.

In 1940 the Ford Motor Company employed half of the black men in Detroit but only 14 percent of the whites. We find that black Detroiters were concentrated at Ford because they were excluded from working elsewhere. Those most affected were young married black men. A Ford job was virtually the only opportunity they had to earn a family wage; but to keep it, they had to put out the extra effort that Ford required. White married men in Detroit had better employment opportunities elsewhere, so they tended to avoid Ford or leave very quickly.

By combining new archival and existing data, this article provides estimates of the economic impact of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, the largest natural catastrophe ever recorded in Europe. The direct cost of the earthquake is estimated to be between 32 and 48 percent of the Portuguese GDP. In spite of strict controls, prices and wages remained volatile in the years after the tragedy. The recovery from the earthquake also led to a rise in the wage premium of construction workers. More significantly, the earthquake became an opportunity to reform the economy and to reduce the economic semi-dependency vis-à-vis Britain.

This article analyzes the ownership structures and governance institutions of New York's corporations in the 1820s, using a new dataset collected from the records of the state's 1823 capital tax, and from the corporate charters. In contrast to Berle and Means's account of the development of the corporation, the results indicate that many firms were dominated by large shareholders, who were represented on the firms' boards, and held sweeping power to utilize the firms' resources for their own benefit. To address this problem, many firms configured their voting rights in a way that curtailed the power of large investors.

The journals of slave ship surgeons of the 1790s are used to address questions on the relative importance of African conditions versus those on ships, crowding, the effectiveness of Dolben's Act, and the interaction between slave and crew health. In contrast with previous work we find that most slaves who died did so near the middle of the voyage. Crowding was important to health and mortality, but the restrictions of Dolben's Act did little to reduce losses. The crew was largely isolated from patterns of disease among slaves.