This paper compares two financial institutions that provided the same functions at the same time, but in different countries and with different memberships. Though the London and New York stock exchanges appear to be alike between 1850 and 1914, they were not, as each responded in its own way to the forces acting upon it. The result was a radically different organization of the securities market in Britain and the United States. This had important implications for the money and capital markets and consequences for business and the economy.

Are firms with strong market positions powerful engines of technological progress? Joseph Schumpeter thought so, but his hypothesis has proved difficult to verify empirically. This article highlights Schumpeterian market-power and creative-destruction effects in a sample of early-twentieth-century U.S. industrial firms; his contention that an efficiently functioning capital market has a positive effect on the rate of innovation is also confirmed. Despite market power abuses by incumbents, the extent of innovation stands out: 21 percent of patents assigned to the firms sampled between 1920 and 1928 are cited in patents granted between 1976 and 2002.

Transportation improvements in the nineteenth century loom large in the historiography of the profession during the twentieth century. This article describes the ongoing construction of a historical geographic information systems (GIS) transportation database designed to provide new insights into the impact of the transportation and communications revolution in the continental United States by providing evidence on the spatial dimensions of those changes over time. It also reviews some preliminary findings and reinterpretations based upon these data.

The last remaining gap in the national accounts of Russia and the USSR in the twentieth century, 1913 to 1928, includes the Great War, the Civil War, and postwar recovery. Filling this gap, we find that the Russian economy did somewhat better in the Great War than was previously thought; in the Civil War it did correspondingly worse; war losses persisted into peacetime, and were not fully restored under the New Economic Policy. We compare this experience across regions and over time. The Great War and Civil War produced the deepest economic trauma of Russia's troubled twentieth century.

There are two widely held explanations for South Asia's failure to attain the level of economic performance achieved by the now developed countries of the world: One is that British imperial policy frustrated economic growth after 1750; the other is that the Indian value system and die social structure that reflected that value system were obstacles to economic growth. It is worthy of note that both interpretations tend to visualize pre-1750 South Asia at a level of economic organization and performance at least equal to that of western Europe in 1750, with the economic gap appearing only subsequently.

Africa and Latin America secured independence from European colonial rule a century and half apart: most of Latin America by the 1820s and most of Africa by 1960. Despite the distance in time and space, they share important similarities. In each case independence was followed by political instability, violent conflict, and economic stagnation lasting for about a half-century. The parallels suggest that Africa might be exiting from a period of postimperial collapse and entering one of relative political stability and economic growth, as did Latin America almost two centuries ago.

Using records of individual depositors' accounts, this article provides a detailed microeconomic analysis of two banking panics. The panics of 1854 and 1857 were not characterized by an immediate mass panic of depositors and had important time dimensions. We examine depositor behavior using a hazard model. Contagion was the key factor in 1854 but it created only a local panic. The 1857 panic began with runs by businessmen and banking sophisticates followed by less informed depositors. Evidence suggests that this panic was driven by informational shocks in the face of asymmetric information about the true condition of bank portfolios.

This article studies the employment effects of one of the largest forced population movements in history, the influx of millions of German expellees to West Germany after World War II. This episode of forced mass migration provides a unique setting to study the causal effects of immigration. Expellees were not selected on the basis of skills or labor market prospects and, as ethnic Germans, were close substitutes to native West Germans. Expellee inflows substantially reduced native employment. The displacement effect was, however, highly nonlinear and limited to labor market segments with very high inflow rates.

The cliometrics literature on slave efficiency has generally focused on static questions. We take a decidedly more dynamic approach. Drawing on the records of 142 plantations with 509 crops years, we show that the average daily cotton-picking rate increased about fourfold between 1801 and 1862. We argue that the development and diffusion of new cotton varieties were the primary sources of the increased efficiency. These findings have broad implications for understanding the South's preeminence in the world cotton market, the pace of westward expansion, and the importance of indigenous technological innovation.

State personal income per capita estimates at six census years are adjusted for state differences in prices and labor input per capita. Decomposition of the variation in state nominal income levels into the contributions of prices, demography, and (residual) labor productivity reveals considerable diversity in the relative importance of each by region and period. Convergence rates across the century differ according to the choice of series (nominal income, price-adjusted income, or productivity). The West and the South play crucial roles in regional convergence, but at different times.

Industrial historians have generally failed to note the importance of the technical standards that have been developed through intercompany agreements in the automobile industry. While they have studied the changing institutional character of American industry and have chronicled the mechanical developments of recent technology, they have undertaken but few explorations into die complex interrelationships between mechanical technology and business structure. In relating the growdi of intercompany technical standards' in the automobile industry up to about 1930, this study attempts to show the influence of changing business conditions on standardization and hence on the mechanical technology of the automobile.

Though the economy of Italy has been transformed in the one hundred years since its uninfication, the various regions have experienced quite different degrees of development. Southern Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, all of which comprises 40 per cent of the land area and, today, about 37 per cent of the population, has lagged far behind the North.

Common property rights were widespread in English agriculture for at least 600 years. Since privatizing common fields allegedly produced huge profits in the eighteenth century, common land owners seemingly squandered 15 percent of potential income for generations. Ingenious explanations have been produced for this market failure. This article argues for a simple, brutal resolution. Common fields survived because enclosure was generally unprofitable before 1750, when changing relative prices made private property rights marginally more efficient. Then people responded quickly to modest profits. The rich gains from enclosure existed only in the imaginings of wild-eyed eighteenth century agrarian reformers.

Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in supervision and regulation help explain the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S. counties during the Great Depression. More stringent capital requirements lowered suspension rates whereas laws prohibiting branch banking and imposing high reserve requirements raised them. States whose bank supervisors could liquidate banks minimized contagion and credit-channel dislocations and experienced lower suspension rates. Those that gave their supervisors sole authority to issue bank charters and granted their supervisors long terms strengthened the incentives for bank lobbyists to influence supervisory decisions and consequently experienced higher rates of suspension.

Europeans have been coming to America and commenting about the nature of American technology for over a century. Despite the evident economic changes in the course of this century, the comments on the differences between American and European technology—or, more properly for the nineteenth century, on the differences between American and British technology—have stayed remarkably constant. The factors noted by a few British visitors of the 1850's, perhaps the first technically qualified foreign group to take a careful look at American manufacturing, still form the backbone of discussion today. Chief among the factors noted is the high cost of American labor, but this explanation of American peculiarities by no means stands alone.

Based on six sets of witnesses' accounts from the North of England and London over the period 1760 to 1830, new estimates of male labor input during the Industrial Revolution are derived. I present a new method of converting witnesses' activities into estimates of labor input, and derive confidence intervals. Working hours increased considerably. Moderate gains in per capita consumption during the Industrial Revolution have to be balanced against this decline in leisure. This adds further weight to pessimistic interpretations: I calculate that consumption per capita, adjusted for changes in leisure, remained essentially unchanged between 1760 and 1830.

In early modern Europe the major concern of many people was getting enough food to stay alive. The “problem of subsistence” varied considerably, however, between one country—or one region—and another. England, for instance, was free of major subsistence crises during the later seventeenth century, when France was hard hit by repeated and deadly famines. In this essay I shall point out some of the differences between these two countries that might explain the success of one and the failure of the other to feed its people.

The system of inside contracting has received little attention from economic historians despite its importance in the development of American industry. Although several authors have mentioned the system, none has described its operation in detail. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to remedy this omission and analyze the reasons for the elimination of the system, with particular reference to one manufacturing plant (Winchester Repeating Arms Company).

Historically, lands of recent settlement have had a thirst for immigrants, but one that has been procyclical (negatively related to unemployment rates). For a period in the early 1980s, Australia's major political parties supported high immigration in spite of rising unemployment. This article explores the long-run relationship between immigration and local unemployment, posing the question, “Do migrants rob jobs?” It also seeks to apply long-run historical analysis to recent economic debate: would Australia's unemployment rate have been lower in very recent times without so many immigrants?

Long-distance trade depends crucially on the enforcement of long-distance contracts, those in which principals are significantly removed from agents. The problem of contract enforcement in the English East India Company reflected a multi-task principal-agent problem in which servants traded publicly for the company and at the same time conducted their own private trade. Private trade, sustained by the private use of company resources, and dismissals were the mechanisms that made East India contracts work. Mechanisms that served little purpose were salaries and pre-employment bonds.