As long as the American Constitution serves as the focal point of American identity, many constitutional interpretative theories also serve as roadmaps to various visions of American constitutional identity. Using the debate over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, I expose the identity dimension of various interpretative theories and analyse the differences between the roadmaps offered by them. I argue that according to each of these roadmaps, courts’ authority to review legislation is required in order to protect a certain vision of American constitutional identity even at the price of thwarting Americans’ freedom to pursue their current desires. The conventional framing of interpretative theories as merely techniques to decipher the constitutional text or justifications for the Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian authority to review legislation and the disregard of their identity function is perplexing in view of the centrality of the Constitution to American national identity. I argue that this conventional framing is a result of the current understanding of American constitutional identity in terms of neutrality toward the question of the good. This reading of the Constitution as lacking any form of ideology at its core makes majority preferences the best take of current American identity, leaving constitutional theorists with the mission to justify the Court’s authority to diverge from majority preferences.

The core promise of the modern concept of constituent power is to make the people-as-the-governed active participants in the shaping and ruling of political regimes. Its development was related to the consolidation of the modern state. Current circumstances, though, raise the issue of the possibility of a non-state based concept of constituent power, and of appropriate constituencies. The article argues that dominant views have made the people-as-the-governed capacity to act dependent upon state sovereignty, whereas the latter actually was informed by theses antithetical to popular sovereignty. In order to show how a non-state based concept of constituent power may be articulated, the article builds on a critique of Martin Loughlin’s attempt to capture the structure of beliefs that frames the idea of the state and the function of constituent power within that structure. The first part of the article focuses on the main elements of such a theory in order to situate its basic assumptions about constituent power. The second discusses the issues raised by such a conception, amongst other things as to the status granted to the structure of beliefs that frames the idea of the modern polity in Loughlin’s perspective; this discussion opens the way to an alternative conception of constituent power, one that stresses that the core fact of the political is that people are always already embedded in relations of power that are not restricted to the state, relations in the course of which they strive to achieve their civic freedom. Political power is not necessarily made public until the people-as-the-governed, in challenging the boundaries of the polity, claim it.

A growing literature explores how global governance mechanisms can be made more effective and democratic to tackle trans-boundary development challenges like global epidemics, global poverty or climate change. The international system today is characterized by an increasing influence of non-state actors gradually undermining the prominent role of the state. Considering this new reality, the focus of analysis has increasingly shifted towards examining the fundamental role of non-state actors, in particular from civil society, in building democratic global governance mechanisms. The literature still says little about joint governance efforts of both state and non-state actors to promote democracy on the global level. This article examines two global governance mechanisms, UNITAID and the FAO Committee on World Food Security, which were created by the joint action of state and non-state actors to tackle trans-boundary development challenges. Departing from the ideal type of democratic polycentrism this article argues that both mechanisms can be seen as encouraging experiments in global democracy. This analysis attempts to show that democratic polycentrism may prove to be a useful theoretical blueprint for pursuing more democratic global governance mechanisms and that more democracy on the global level depends on the joint activities of democratic states and civil society actors.

Many recent arguments for trans-state and global democracy would offer broad leeway on constitutionalized right standards to states, and few formal mechanisms for individuals to challenge domestic rights rejections beyond the state. Such a stance, it is shown here, tends to be rooted in implicit presumptions of domestic consensus. Challenges are offered to this and related presumptions in accounts of cosmopolitan democracy, as well as global variants of liberal nationalism and political liberalism. An alternative, primarily instrumental approach to trans-state and global democracy is detailed. It would give emphasis to ways in which formal suprastate participation, complemented by challenge mechanisms for individuals, could play a crucial role in helping to strengthen individual rights protections within states. The case for adopting such an approach is reinforced through attention to the efforts of a persistent domestic democratic minority – Dalits in India – to reach out to the global human rights regime for help in pressuring their own state to better protect rights against exclusion and subjugation.

This article seeks to confront the contemporary condition in which cosmopolitan law – meant to resonate as something citizens across borders author and live together – instead is increasingly a source of detachment, confusion, and alienation. Taking the European Union’s twin crises of democratic legitimacy and social solidarity as its starting point, the article offers a critique of existing approaches to supranational constitutionalism that are insufficiently responsive to this disenchantment. The article’s purpose, in turn, is to present perspectives from philosophy and legal theory that might promisingly recast, in this new cosmopolitan frame, our thinking about law as a mode of social integration. Specifically, the article’s central claim is that time – as a seldom-examined, yet essential dimension of law – is closely linked to law’s cosmopolitan potential and, concurrently, to the motivational resources for cosmopolitan solidarity. It is through a sensitivity to time – our awareness of the past passing into the present in anticipation of a future – that citizens can meaningfully hold together cosmopolitan law’s dual, ostensibly divergent hopes: shared commitment and self-decentring plurality. Drawing on Seyla Benhabib’s ‘democratic iterations’ and its roots in the work of Jacques Derrida and Robert Cover, the article elaborates the following two concepts: ‘cosmopolitan promise-making’, a diachronic form of cosmopolitan political agency; and ‘cosmopolitan legal narrative’, a set of plural, evolving constitutional interpretations open to mutual engagement over time. These concepts, in temporalizing our understanding of political identity and constitutional law, together serve to underwrite a cosmopolitan legal order without also thinning solidarity’s social and democratic foundations. The article concludes with a critique of the contemporary role of European courts and a concrete vision for the cosmopolitan development of EU jurisprudence. Reinterpreting Article 4(2) TEU as the right to constitutional narrative, the article advances new modalities and normative aspirations for constitutional interpretation beyond the nation-state.

Many critics of the proportionality principle argue that balancing is an instrument of judicial self-empowerment. This contribution argues that the relationship between balancing and judicial power is more complex. Balancing does not necessarily create judicial power, but it presupposes it. This argument is confirmed through a case study of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The analysis shows that the German Constitutional Court was very reluctant to base decisions, in which it overturned legislation, on balancing in the first two and a half decades of its jurisprudence. However, in the late 1970s, once the Court had strengthened its own institutional position, it increasingly relied on balancing when declaring laws as incompatible with the constitution. Then, balancing developed into the predominant argumentation framework of constitutional review that it is today in the Court’s jurisprudence.

A surge in academic interest in the interaction of international law with international politics has recently raised the profile of the rule of law in global politics. The idea of an ‘international rule of law’ is central to many accounts of international order, and to both political science and legal scholarship. Despite its popularity, the concept is rarely defined or examined. This article considers the theory and practice of the international rule of law. It shows first that the international rule of law cannot be deduced from the conventional Anglo-American version of the rule of law in domestic legal theory, as sketched by Joseph Raz and others. It then considers two competing versions of a distinctly international concept of the rule of law, one based on a positivist theory of compliance and the other on a structurationist theory of practice. The former is more common in legal and political scholarship but the latter accounts better for the political power of international law in relation to states.

Conflicts of competences are ubiquitous in law. They represent a serious challenge, in particular, to global constitutionalism and institutional cosmopolitanism. This article argues from a participant’s perspective, following a normative-analytical approach. It develops new taxonomy of competence conflicts. In essence it defends a flexible legal solution to competence conflicts that is inspired by the idea of practical institutional concordance and provides a middle way between strict legal solutions and political appeals for dialogue. Legal authority beyond the state and competence admit of degrees and variability, depending on the legal and factual circumstances of the case at issue. This understanding is enabled by interpreting competences as formal principles. Drawing on research by Alexy and Kumm the details of balancing competences as a distinct legal method are elaborated, using a triadic scale and various factors for determining the concrete weight of a competence. The theory of balancing competences is then applied to the example of competence conflicts in the multilevel system of fundamental rights protection in the EU. In result, a universal but case-sensitive theory is presented that optimally combines flexibility and stability and allows for a pluralist understanding of sovereignty. Institutional cosmopolitanism is thus defended against sceptical pluralism.

The author’s 2012 book On Global Justice gives pride of place to the idea that humanity collectively owns the earth. Independently, there has been a flourishing literature on the justification of rights to territory. Central to this discussion are a Kantian and a Lockean approach. This paper recapitulates the author’s approach to humanity’s collective ownership of the earth and argues that, properly understood, both of those approaches should integrate the global standpoint constituted thereby. However, the goal here is not to amend the Kantian and Lockean approaches to territory, but to refute them. To that end the paper also argues that both approaches endorse an unacceptably strong view of the justifiability of states and should therefore be rejected. The view in On Global Justice emerges vindicated, according to which territorial rights, the justification of states and immigration all need to be theorized together, and need to be theorized from a genuinely global standpoint.

International criminal law (ICL) developed in large part from international humanitarian law during the mid-to-late twentieth century. The International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent institution to investigate and prosecute ICL cases finally was established in 2002. Although widely supported, certain states feared that the ICC would diminish national sovereignty. Yet, in formal legal terms, ICL and the ICC’s Rome Statute are just like other branches of public international law in terms of their relationship with national constitutional arrangements. ICL does not challenge states’ primary executive and judicial powers; it does not introduce any general rights for citizens or particularly onerous obligations for states that are already subject to the rule of law; and its intrusion on national sovereignty is only in evidence when a state’s leaders either are responsible for atrocities or are incapable of protecting their citizens from such atrocities. ICL thus is very different from international human rights law (IHRL), which directly impacts national constitutional arrangements. When ICL does come into play, however, arguably it may perform quasi-constitutional functions, in particular offering the only means under public international law to remove state officials from office when they are believed responsible for the most harmful abuses of power.

The emergence of strong authorities beyond the nation state has raised questions about the absence of democratic legitimacy at the supranational level. The usual response to this dilemma has been an attempt to uncouple the strict link between national statehood and democracy, and in the process, to confer a degree of legitimacy on supranational authorities. This article argues that such an uncoupling is unconvincing, and that within the legitimacy-democracy-statehood triangle, the uncoupling of legitimacy and democracy is a more promising strategy. The legitimacy of supranational authorities is grounded in their appeal to ‘public reason’ – a legitimacy-conferring device well-suited to supranational authorities, as illustrated in this article by the examples of the European Court of Human Rights and the WTO dispute settlement system. On this basis, the article argues that we should not see the relationship between statehood legitimacy (based optimally on electoral democracy) and supranational legitimacy (based on public reason) as mutually antagonistic and engaged in zero-sum competition. Rather, this relationship allows scope for synergy, with supranational authorities often playing an important role in supporting democracy at the nation-state level.

There is recent scholarship suggesting that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has now emerged as a master concept in relation to responding to mass atrocity crimes and that the R2P can further be seen as representative of an emerging global constitutional norm. In critical response, this article provides the first attempt to systematically investigate R2P’s relationship with global constitutionalisation as well as to explore its wider implication with regard to global constitutionalism. In doing so, the article examines existing discussions of R2P and global constitutionalism, tracks the normative evolution of R2P in order to determine its current ‘stage’ of norm diffusion, and further attempts to locate the extent to which the R2P can be perceived as also part of a process of global constitutionalisation. From this analysis the article concludes that although the R2P could be labelled as, at best, a weak emerging norm, it fails to meet the more demanding signifier of an emerging constitutional norm and that there is further evidence to suggest that the R2P might be better understood as a stalled or degenerating norm.

National courts, largely in South Asia and Latin America, have deemed unconstitutional certain constitutional amendments that have been enacted into law in their respective jurisdictions. In the article, this author explores the normative arguments for and against the judicial enforcement of implicit substantive constraints on formal constitutional changes. In essence, the author argues that, in determining whether judges should render the substance of constitutional amendments unconstitutional, one must examine how the impugned constitutional amendment was passed. In jurisdictions where a constitutional amendment can be passed by a dominant party/coalition without bipartisan support or the general support of the people, the courts may intervene, but only where the constitutional amendment(s) in question is/are so manifestly unreasonable that such a revision is akin to a substantial destruction of the pre-existing constitution. But no constitutional amendment should ever be judicially invalidated for violating any implied ‘basic features’ of the constitution when the amendment process is particularly cumbersome and requires significant bipartisan support and the general public’s express or implicit endorsement for the amendment to pass.

This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human rights norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognizably organized as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system.