Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-lj6df Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-09T01:34:23.110Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Balancing competences: How institutional cosmopolitanism can manage jurisdictional conflicts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2015

MATTHIAS KLATT
MATTHIAS KLATT*
Affiliation:
University of Hamburg, Rothenbaumchaussee 33, 20148 Hamburg, Germany
*
*Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Conflicts of competences are ubiquitous in law. They represent a serious challenge, in particular, to global constitutionalism and institutional cosmopolitanism. This article argues from a participant’s perspective, following a normative-analytical approach. It develops new taxonomy of competence conflicts. In essence it defends a flexible legal solution to competence conflicts that is inspired by the idea of practical institutional concordance and provides a middle way between strict legal solutions and political appeals for dialogue. Legal authority beyond the state and competence admit of degrees and variability, depending on the legal and factual circumstances of the case at issue. This understanding is enabled by interpreting competences as formal principles. Drawing on research by Alexy and Kumm the details of balancing competences as a distinct legal method are elaborated, using a triadic scale and various factors for determining the concrete weight of a competence. The theory of balancing competences is then applied to the example of competence conflicts in the multilevel system of fundamental rights protection in the EU. In result, a universal but case-sensitive theory is presented that optimally combines flexibility and stability and allows for a pluralist understanding of sovereignty. Institutional cosmopolitanism is thus defended against sceptical pluralism.

Keywords

balancingcompetenceEU constitutional lawformal principlespluralism
Type
Research Article
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 195 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Glenn, HP, The Cosmopolitan State (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) 286.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Hart, HLA, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994) 79–99.Google Scholar

3 Ross, A, Directives and Norms (Routledge, London, 1968) 130.Google Scholar

4 Ibid 118, 135.

5 Hart (n 2) 27–28.

6 Kelsen, H, General Theory of Norms (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Lindahl, L, Position and Change: A Study in Law and Logic (D Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1977) 85ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Spaak, T, The Concept of Legal Competence: An Essay in Conceptual Analysis (Dartmouth, Brookfield, 1994) 21.Google Scholar

8 Ross (n 3) 130ff.

9 Krisch, N, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berman, PS, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 23–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Rosenfeld, Cf M, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Kumm, M, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262, 282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Isiksel, T, ‘Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm’ (2013) 2 Global Constutionalism 160, 189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 Zidar, A, ‘Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 483CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 483; Kumm, M, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority’ in Avbelj, M and Komárek, J (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 39.Google Scholar

13 Kumm, M, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ in Dunoff, JL and Trachtman, JP (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Besson, S, ‘The Truth about Legal Pluralism’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review 354CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 357–58; Stone Sweet, A, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 491, 491–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Kumm, M, ‘The Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Dickson, J and Eleftheriadis, P (eds), Philosophical Foundations of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 216, 217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Krisch, N, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012)Google Scholar; Lindseth, PL, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fischer-Lescano, A and Teubner, G, ‘Regime Collisions’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999.Google Scholar

16 On the distinction between an internal (participant) and an external (observer) perspective, see Litowitz, DE, ‘Internal versus External Perspectives on Law’ (1998) 26 Florida State University Law Review 127.Google Scholar See also Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority (n 12) 42.

17 Pérez, AT, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 41–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krisch (n 9) 109–52.

18 Slaughter, A, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99, 112Google Scholar; Slaughter, A, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103, 1108Google Scholar; Slaughter, A, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191, 195ffGoogle Scholar; Ahdieh, RB, ‘Between Dialogue and Decree’ (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 2029, 2050ff.Google Scholar

19 Kelsen (n 6) 124–25; Wolfrum, R and Matz, N, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer, Berlin, 2003) 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 Ross (n 3) 168–74; Perelman, C, Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique (Dalloz, Paris, 1976) 39Google Scholar; Kelsen, H, Pure Theory of Law: William Ebenstein, translation (2nd edn, New York, 1969) section 34e.Google Scholar

21 Alexy, Cf R, ‘Kollision und Abwägung als Grundprobleme der Grundrechtsdogmatik’ (2001) 6 World Constutional Law Review 181, 207.Google Scholar

22 Alexy, Cf R, ‘Zur Struktur der Grundrechte auf Schutz’ in Sieckmann, J (ed), Die Prinzipientheorie der Grundrechte: Studien zur Grundrechtstheorie Robert Alexys (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007) 105CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 105; Besson, S, ‘The European Union and Human Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 323, 324–26, 343–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 Klatt, M and Meister, M, The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 1–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 A Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order’ (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 53, 62; Zucca, L, ‘Monism and Fundamental Rights’ in Dickson, J and Eleftheriadis, P (eds), Philosophical Foundations of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 331, 331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Allott, P, ‘Europe and the Dream of Reason’ in Weiler, JHH and Wind, M (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 202Google Scholar, 217. Cf Glenn (n 1) 203–58.

26 Bossuyt and Verrijdt refer to these two categories as the ‘two perils’ of multilevel human rights protection; see Bossuyt, M and Verrijdt, W, ‘The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 355, 355–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 Fontanelli, F, ‘How Interpretation Techniques Can Shape the Relationship between Constitutional Courts and the European Union’ (2010) King’s Law Journal 371CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 388; Pérez (n 17).

28 Douglas-Scott, S, ‘A Tale of Two Courts’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629, 639.Google Scholar

29 ECJ, Costa/ENEL, ECR 1253, para 12 (15 July 1964); ECJ, Kommission/Luxemburg, ECR I-3207, para 38 (2 July 1996); ECJ, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECR 1125, para 3 (17 December 1970).

30 Kumm, M, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351, 353–55.Google Scholar

31 For a helpful overview, see Mayer, FC, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’ in von Bogdandy, A and Bast, J (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) 399, 400–21.Google Scholar

32 Kumm (n 30) 363–70.

33 BVerfGE 37, 271; BVerfGE 73, 339; BVerfGE 89, 155; BVerfGE 123, 267; BVerfGE 126, 286. Cf Kumm’s ‘three lines of national constitutional resistance’ (n 10) 264–65.

34 I am using the variable K for competence. K denotes the German term Kompetenz which is familiar to the English reader of EU law. The obvious alternative variable C denoting the English term competence would have the disadvantage of being ambiguous, since C is introduced in Figure 2 as denoting the circumstances of a case. I owe this use of the variables to a suggestion made by an anonymous referee.

35 BVerfGE 73, 339.

36 Cf Kumm (n 30) 363.

37 Kumm (n 10) 269–70. See also MacCormick, N, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 79–136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38 Krisch (n 9) 109–52.

39 Zucca, Monism and Fundamental Rights (n 24) 340.

40 Krisch (n 9) 152. See also: ‘[P]luralism is characterized precisely by the absence of a legal and institutional framework to regulate disputes between sub-orders.’ Ibid 241 (emphasis added).

41 Slaughter (n 18) 112, 195ff and 1108; Ahdieh (n 18) 2050ff.

42 Shany, Y, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 260Google Scholar; Shany, Y, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations between National and International Courts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 172–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lavranos, N, ‘The Solange-Method as a Tool for Regulating Competing Jurisdictions among International Courts and Tribunals’ (2008) 30 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 275Google Scholar, 276, 334; Fontanelli, F and Martinico, G, ‘Focusing on Courts’ in Snyder, FG and Maher, I (eds), The Evolution of the European Courts: Institutional Change and Continuity (Bruylant, Brussels, 2009) 37, 55–56Google Scholar; Martinez, JS, ‘Towards an International Judicial System’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 429Google Scholar; D’Alterio, E, ‘From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 394CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Glenn (n 1) 165–86.

43 Martinico, G, ‘Judging in the Multilevel Legal Order’ (2010) King’s Law Journal 257, 269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44 Scheek, L, ‘The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through Human Rights’ (2005) 65 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 837Google Scholar, 875 (emphasis added).

45 Fontanelli, Cf F, ‘Yuval Shany’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 1297, 1299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46 Raabe, M, Grundrechte und Erkenntnis (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1998) 292Google Scholar; Cf Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority (n 12) 42.

47 ‘The problem here is that this kind of judicial politics is primarily geared to the preservation of relative power of the courts … .’ Zucca, Monism and Fundamental Rights (n 24) 340.

48 Mayer, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction (n 31) 426.

49 Klatt, M, ‘Robert Alexy’s Philosophy of Law as System’ in Klatt, M (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 1, 5–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 15–16, 17–18; Alexy, R, ‘Law and Correctness’ in Freeman, M (ed), Current Legal Problems (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) 205Google Scholar; Klatt and Meister (n 23) 68–70.

50 Cf Zucca, Monism and Fundamental Rights (n 24) 342.

51 See Figure 1 above and S Oeter, ‘Rechtsprechungskonkurrenz zwischen nationalen Verfassungsgerichten, Europäischem Gerichtshof und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte’ (2007) 66 VVDStRL 361, 366. Kumm labels this position as ‘European Constitutional Supremacy’ (n 10) 266.

52 Schilling, T, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 389Google Scholar, 409. Kumm labels this position ‘National Constitutional Supremacy’; see Kumm (n 10) 266.

53 Avbelj labels this position convincingly as ‘the hierarchical model’; see Avbelj, M, ‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law—(Why) Does it Matter?’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 744, 746–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

54 Weiler, JHH, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens’ (1997) 22 European Law Review 150, 155–56Google Scholar; Lindseth (n 15) 266–77.

55 Fontanelli (n 45) 1299.

56 Pérez (n 17) 67; Culver, K and Giudice, M, ‘Not a System but an Order’ in Dickson, J and Eleftheriadis, P (eds), Philosophical Foundations of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 62–68; Kumm (n 30) 384.

57 MacCormick, N, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 10; Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 26) 362–63; Barents, R, ‘The Precedence of EU Law from the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 421, 435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58 For a flexible legal solution see also Avbelj’s ‘heterarchical model’ which also defends the possibility of conditional primacy; see (n 53) 750–54.

59 Cf Kumm (n 30) 374 fn 46: ‘The existence of a third approach is rarely contemplated’.

60 Weiler, JHH and Haltern, U, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order’ (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal 411, 447.Google Scholar

61 See (n 39) above.

62 A von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’ in Bogdandy and Bast (n 31) 11, 32.

63 Jestaedt, M, ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund’ in Krause, R, Veelken, W and Vieweg, K (eds), Recht der Wirtschaft und der Arbeit in Europa: Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Blomeyer (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2004) 637, 669.Google Scholar

64 Fritzsche, Cf A, ‘Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in European Law’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 361, 386Google Scholar; Prechal, S, ‘Institutional Balance’ in Heukels, T, Blokker, N and Brus, M (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam: A Legal Analysis (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998) 273, 274Google Scholar; Lenaerts, K and Verhoeven, A, ‘Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance’ in Joerges, C (ed), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 35, 38.Google Scholar

65 Jestaedt (n 63) 664.

66 Stone Sweet (n 13) 493 (emphasis added).

67 Bieber, R and Salomé, I, ‘Hierarchy of Norms in European Law’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 907, 909.Google Scholar

68 Spanish Tribunal Constitucional, Declaration 1/2004 (Unofficial translation): 13 December 2004, accessed 29 September 2014, <http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/restrad/Paginas/DTC122004en.aspx>. Cf Mayer, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction (n 31) 431 fn 246; Avbelj (n 53).

69 ECJ, Elchinov ECR I-08889, para 27 (GA Cruz Villalón 10 July 2010).

70 On practical concordance of material principles, see Hesse, K, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (20th edn, Müller, Heidelberg, 1995) 28.Google Scholar Hesse’s idea is here transferred to formal principles.

71 This flexible approach is used by the UK Supreme Court to determine the relationship between the legislature and reviewing courts, see Supreme Court UK, R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) UKSC 38, paras 102, 298 (25 June 2014).

72 ECJ, Parliament v Council ECR I-02067, para 22 (22 May 1990).

73 Supreme Court of Estonia, Constitutional judgment 3-4-1-6-12, para 130 (12 July 2012); Ginter, C, ‘Constitutionality of the European Stability Mechanism in Estonia’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 335, 343–47.Google Scholar

74 Mayer, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction (n 31) 430: ‘conditional principle of primacy’ (emphasis added).

75 Borowski, M, ‘Legal Pluralism in the European Union’ in Menéndez, AJ and Fossum, JE (eds), Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick’s Legal and Political Theory (Springer, Dordrecht, 2011) 185, 206.Google Scholar

76 Cf Glenn (n 1) 12, 265–76, 286.

77 von der Groeben, C, ‘Book Review of Aida Torres Pérez. Conflicts of Rights in the European Union. A Theory of Supranational Adjudication’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 296, 300.Google Scholar See also Canor, I, ‘Harmonizing the European Community’s Standard of Judicial Review?’ (2002) 8 European Public Law 135, 166; Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 26) 385–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

78 Kumm (n 10); Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism (n 13); Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority (n 12). See also Kleinlein, T, ‘Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint?’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1141, 1171.Google Scholar

79 Kumm (n 30) 375.

80 Alexy, Robert, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 48–54.Google Scholar

81 Alexy, R, ‘Balancing, constitutional review, and representation’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 572CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 573–74; Kumm (n 10) 306; Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority (n 12) 59; see also Avbelj (n 53) 762: ‘maximising the interests of all three levels involved’.

82 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 80) 82.

83 Rivers, J, ‘Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174, 205.Google Scholar

84 Borowski, M, ‘The Structure of Formal Principles’ in Borowski, M (ed), On the Nature of Legal Principles (Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 2010) 19, 26Google Scholar; Alexy, R, ‘Comments and Responses’ in Klatt, M (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 329, 329.Google Scholar

85 Borowski, The Structure of Formal Principles (n 84) 30. See also Borowski, M, ‘Die Bindung an Festsetzungen des Gesetzgebers in der grundrechtlichen Abwägung’ in Clérico, L and Sieckmann, J (eds), Grundrechte, Prinzipien und Argumentation (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2009) 99CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 125: ‘The exercise of a formal principle always concretizes the optimization object of the formal principle as regards content’ (translated by author).

86 Klatt, Cf M, ‘Positive Rights – Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

87 Rivers, Cf J, ‘Proportionality, Discretion and the Second Law of Balancing’ in Pavlakos, G (ed), Law, Rights and Discourse: Themes from the Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) 167, 170.Google Scholar

88 Provost, R, ‘Judging in Splendid Isolation’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 125CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 148–53: ‘degree of bindingness’, ‘spectrum of bindingness’. Rivers, J, ‘Constitutional Rights and Statutory Limitations’ in Klatt, M (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 248CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 254; Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism (n 13) 289: ‘graduated authority’.

89 Alexy (n 21) 207, referring to the constitutional order within a state.

90 Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 80) 102. On the second law of balancing, relating to epistemic reliability, see Klatt and Meister (n 23) 11, 80–83.

91 Cf Klatt and Meister (n 23) 10.

92 Ibid (n 23) 12–13, 34–36; Alexy, R, ‘The Weight Formula’ in Stelmach, J, Brozek, B and Zaluski, W (eds), Studies in the Philosophy of Law. Frontiers of the economic analysis of law (Jagiellonian University Press, Crakow, 2007) 9, 15.Google Scholar

93 The situation of a stalemate, occurring in the scenarios light/light, moderate/moderate and serious/serious, will not be considered further here. See Klatt and Meister (n 23) 58.

94 On the difference between internal and external justification, see Klatt and Meister (n 23) 54; Klatt, M and Schmidt, J, ‘Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional Law’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 74; Alexy, R, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989) 221, 230.Google Scholar

95 Alexy, Comments and Responses (n 84) 438.

96 Klatt, Robert Alexy’s Philosophy of Law as System (n 49) 20–21; Klatt, M, ‘An Egalitarian Defense of Proportionality-Based Balancing’ (2014) 12International Journal of Constitutional Law 891Google Scholar, 897–99; Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 80) 107, 109.

97 For a flexible approach to the relationship between the legislature and reviewing courts in the UK, using a variety of factors, see Supreme Court UK, R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) UKSC 38 (25 June 2014) at para 73.

98 Cf Alexy (n 94) 249.

99 Kavanagh, A, ‘Deference of Defiance?’ in Huscroft, G (ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) 184CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 184; King, JA, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 409CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 428–29. Rejecting democratic legitimacy as a factor, however, Jowell, J, ‘Judicial deference’ (2003) Public Law 592.Google Scholar

100 Cf Rivers, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Limitations (n 88) 254; Brady, ADP, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act: An Institutionally Sensitive Approach (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 107–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

101 International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2003 QB 728, 765 (Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 13 May 2003). Cf Rivers (n 83) 204.

102 Kumm (n 10) 300.

103 Legg, A, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 76–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

104 Cf Supreme Court UK, R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) UKSC 38 (25 June 2014) at para 111; Lester, AP and Pannick, D, Human Rights Law and Practice (2nd edn, LexisNexis, London, 2004) 97Google Scholar; Carolan, E, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 106–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pavlakos, G and Pauwelyn, J, ‘Principled Monism and the Normative Conception of Coercion Under International Law’ in Evans, MD and Koutrakos, P (eds), Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 317, 323.Google Scholar

105 BVerfGE 88, 203, para 188. See also BVerfGE 45, 187, para 175. See also Skinner v Eklahome, 316 US 5335, 541 (1942); United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152n.4 (1938).

106 ECHR, Gillow v The United Kingdom, para 55 (24 November 1986). Brems, Cf E, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1996) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 240, 264.Google Scholar See also A v Secretary of State for the Home Department UKHL 56, section 108 (House of Lords 16 December 2004).

107 Nollkaemper, A, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 262–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also United States v Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

108 Kavanagh, Cf A, ‘Proportionality and Parliamentary Debates: Exploring Some Forbidden Territory’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 443, 25–30.Google Scholar

109 Teitz, LE, ‘Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple’ (1992) 26 International Law 21Google Scholar, 57, section 3e: ‘substantive law likely to be applicable and the relative familiarity of the affected court with that law’. See also Kavanagh, Deference of Defiance? (n 99) 184; King (n 99) 433ff; Wesson, M, ‘Disagreement and the Constitutionalisation of Social Rights’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 221, 239.Google Scholar

110 Kumm (n 10) 300; Edward, D, ‘Subsidiarity as a Legal Concept’ in Cardonnel, P, Rosas, A and Wahl, N (eds), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 93.Google Scholar For a critical account, see Follesdal, A, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law’ (2013) 2 Global Constitutionalism 37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

111 Legg (n 103) 61–62.

112 Teitz (n 109) 56, section 3c; International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2003 QB at 767, per Laws LJ; Brems (n 106) 290–91.

113 ECJ, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, paras 41–46 (GA Cruz Villalón 12 June 2012). Fontanelli, F, ‘Hic Sunt Nationes’ (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review 315, 320–22.Google Scholar

114 US Supreme Court, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 US 800, 818; cf Teitz (n 109) 46.

115 Supreme Court UK, R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) UKSC 38 (25 June 2014) at para 75: ‘must depend on all the circumstances’; cf rule J9 in Alexy (n 94) 250.

116 Cf Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (n 80) 346. The list of factors employed in this article is not conclusive. In national constitutional orders, e.g., the nature of the issue at stake is also deemed relevant. The more the case relates to controversial issues of social policy or contested moral or religious questions, the higher is the weight of Parliament’s assessment, cf Supreme Court UK, R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) UKSC 38 (25 June 2014) at 297, but see ibid, 191.

117 Brandom, RB, Making It Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994)Google Scholar; Alexy (n 94).

118 Avbelj (n 53) 750 (original emphasis).

119 Mayer, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction (n 31) 434.

120 Möllers, Cf C, ‘German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional Ultra Vires Review of European Acts Only under Exceptional Circumstances’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 161, 166.Google Scholar

121 Beck, Cf G, ‘The Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 46, 57–58.Google Scholar

122 BVerfGE 73, 339 at para 103.

123 Kumm (n 10) 299–300.

124 BVerfGE 37, 271 at para 26.

125 BVerfGE 73, 339 at para 103: ‘particularly through the decisions of the European Court’.

126 BVerfGE 37, 271 at para 26.

127 BVerfGE 102, 147 para 63 (emphasis added). The unofficial English translation, available at the website of the FCC, is incorrect since it continues with ‘in the in respective case’ (para 39 in the English translation). This case-relatedness is, however, clearly not intended by the FCC.

128 Voßkuhle, A, ‘Multilevel cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’ (2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 175, 192.Google Scholar

129 Cf ibid ‘unlikely that this admissibility threshold may ever be passed’.

130 A von Bogdandy et al., ‘Reverse Solange’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 489, 508.

131 Ibid 508–9.

132 Ibid 493–94.

133 Ibid 513.

134 BVerfGE 125, 60.

135 Cf Möllers (n 120) 162.

136 BVerfGE 125, 60 at para 182.

137 Ibid para 241.

138 Cf ECJ, Ireland v Parliament and Council, ECR I-00593 (10 February 2009).

139 Bossuyt and Verrijdt (n 26) 384.

140 Avbelj, Cf M, ‘Theorizing Sovereignty and European Integration’ (2014) 27 Ratio Juris 344, 356.Google Scholar

141 Cf Kumm (n 10) 300; see also Avbelj’s heterarchical model, Avbelj (n 53) 750–54.