Although in fundamental agreement with Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) position, we discuss a potential source of confusion regarding the socially constituted nature of mental states. Drawing from recent work by Kusch (1997; 1999), we argue, more specifically, that mental states are instances of “artificial kinds,” and so, stand between the more common classificatory extremes of “the natural” and “the social.”

We discuss how Burns' conception may be further extended to integrate research on eye movement abnormalities, but then point to a contradiction between Burns' conception of schizophrenia as the genetic price for human social life and the diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) data, which constitute his central piece of evidence.

The “new” theory of Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) needs be compared with existing elaborated and tested models concerning the social origins underpinning the sense of being a person with thoughts and feelings in relation to others. Illustrations are provided from contemporary attachment theory and research in the context of questioning the potential legacy of Piaget as a theorist of social relationships.

Schizophrenia may not have reduced reproductive success in ancestral times as much as it does today, so explaining how genes for it evolved is more understandable given this prehistoric perspective. Ethological analysis of schizophrenia – understanding how basic emotional behaviors, such as dominance striving, are affected by the condition – might prove useful for comprehending and treating its social emotional symptoms.

The relevance of chaotic itinerancy and other types of exotic dynamical behavior described by Tsuda (2001) certainly goes beyond the scope of his target article. These concepts of dynamics may offer a general framework for the understanding of complexity, which could help to restructure the analysis and conceptualization of mental states in novel ways, providing insights for the philosophy of mind.

The target article distinguishes between modal and amodal emulators (the former predict future sensory states from current sensory states and motor actions, the latter operate on more abstract descriptions of the environment), and motor and environment emulators (the former predict the results of one's own actions, the latter predict all changes in the environment). I question the applicability of modal emulators, and the generalization to environment emulators.

Children's exposure to and participation in mental state discourse contributes to their development of social understanding. Vygotsky's mechanism of internalization is used to account for this process, which has advantages of cultural and linguistic universality. If children internalize mental state discourse, however, then their own use of mental state language should be related to social understanding.

“Articulate models” subservient to formal intelligence are imagined to be heterarchies of automata capable of performing the “symbolic (quasi-spatial) syntheses” of Luria (1973), where “quasi-spatial” points to the abstract core of spatiality: the symbol productions, combinations, and substitutions of algebraic reckoning. The alleged cognitive role of internal “topographic images” and of “efference copies” is confronted with this background and denied.

I defend the case for an evolutionary theory of schizophrenia and the social brain, arguing that such an exercise necessitates a broader methodology than that familiar to neuroscience. I propose a reworked evolutionary genetic model of schizophrenia, drawing on insights from commentators, buttressing my claim that psychosis is a costly consequence of sophisticated social cognition in humans. Expanded models of social brain anatomy and the spectrum of psychopathologies are presented in terms of upper and lower social brain and top-down and bottom-up processes. Finally, I argue that cerebral asymmetry evolved as an emergent property of primary intrahemispheric reorganisation in hominoids.

Kampis proposes the study of chaotic itinerancy, pointing out its significance in domains of cognitive science and philosophy. He has discovered in the concept of chaotic itinerancy the possibility for a new dynamical approach that elucidates mental states with a physical basis. This approach may therefore provide the means to go beyond the connectionist approach. In accordance with his theory, I here highlight three issues regarding chaotic itinerancy: transitory dynamics, diversity, and self-modifying system.

Hommel et al. (2001) try to explain the emergence of distal representations by an evolutionary account which includes their theory of event coding. A closer look at the way the terms “distal representations” and “representations of events” are defined reveals, however, that their hypothesis of a common code for perceived and to-be-produced events is in fact superfluous. Moreover, it shows that they mix up empirical facts with conceptual/definitional facts in the second assumption of their explanation.

Relational experiences shape emergent social understanding, and two influences deserve particular attention. First, parent-child conversation about shared experiences incorporates both implicit and explicit information about mental states that catalyzes the social construction of understanding, especially in juxtaposition with the child's direct experience. Second, emotion infuses the contexts and cognitions about social experiences that provoke the child's constructivist efforts.

First, I note three questions that need further exploration: how fast the emulator operates, compared to the real-time events it models; what exactly perceptual emulation, with no motor component, consists of; and whether images are equivalent to raw sensations. Next, I propose that Grush's framework can explain the role of motor activation in processing “imitable” stimuli.

The suggestion of seeking specificity in a higher-order array is attractive, but Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) fail to provide a compelling empirical basis to their claim that specificity exists solely in the global array. Using the example of relative motion, the alternate hypotheses that must be considered are presented.

The emulation theory of representation articulated in the target article is further explained and explored in this response to commentaries. Major topics include: the irrelevance of equilibrium-point and related models of motor control to the theory; clarification of the particular sense of “representation” which the emulation theory of representation is an account of; the relation between the emulation framework and Kalman filtering; and addressing the empirical data considered to be in conflict with the emulation theory. In addition, I discuss the further empirical support for the emulation theory provided by some commentators, as well as a number of suggested theoretical applications.

In contrast to Pylyshyn's view, there is no such thing as “reasoning in general.” Different types of reasoning tasks are solved with different reasoning strategies. A more specific null hypothesis is that spatial inference with mental images involves the same representational formalism as that of spatial inference with mental models. There is no evidence that this hypothesis must be rejected.

Strong between- and within-animal differences during spatial activities lead us to claim that a given animal is directly sensitive to a given substructure of the global array. This vicarious subset is not cut out by the senses but by redundancies emerging from physical properties. We argue that the subset is not a single ambient array, or a combination of single ambient arrays, but a complex holistic part of the global array.

Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) view enculturation as the internalization of cultural concepts given in social interactions. They claim that enculturation implies relativism and fails to take into account both the constructive activity of the child and the gradual nature of development. Their view is contrasted with the notion of the child as both enculturated and enculturing throughout the course of development.

The view that children's understanding of mind is constructed through social interaction is consistent with other social-constructivist models. We provide examples of similar claims in research on emotion perception, pretense understanding, autobiographical memory, and event knowledge. Identification of common elements from such socio-cultural perspectives may lead to greater theoretical integration and provide a new framework for exploring human development.

Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) make the point that the statement “I am moving” made by subjects in a “swinging room” cannot be explained as an illusion of motion, and there is thus no perceptual illusion. In this they are correct. There is in fact motion, but of the environment. We argue that the subjects misinterpret this because the information to the visual system is ambiguous and also deceiving.