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Spatial inference: No difference between mental images and mental models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 February 2005

Markus Knauff  and
Christoph Schlieder
Markus Knauff*
Affiliation:
Max-Planck-Institute for Biological Cybernetics, D-72076Tübingen, Germany Center for Cognitive Science, University of Freiburg, D-79098Freiburg, Germany
Christoph Schlieder*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Information Systems and Applied Computer Sciences, University of Bamberg, D-96045Bamberg, Germany
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract:

In contrast to Pylyshyn's view, there is no such thing as “reasoning in general.” Different types of reasoning tasks are solved with different reasoning strategies. A more specific null hypothesis is that spatial inference with mental images involves the same representational formalism as that of spatial inference with mental models. There is no evidence that this hypothesis must be rejected.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , August 2004 , pp. 589 - 590
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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Footnotes

Commentary onZenon W. Pylyshyn (2002). Mental imagery? In search of a theory. BBS 25(2):157–182.