We report data from an experiment using stimuli designed to differ in their availability for processing by the dorsal visual pathway, but which were equivalent in tasks mediated by the ventral pathway. When movements are made to these stimuli as targets, there are clear effects early in the movement. These effects appear at odds with the planning–control model of Glover.

Applying Behrendt & Young's (B&Y's) model of thalamocortical synchrony to complex visual hallucinations in neurodegenerative disorders, such as dementia with Lewy bodies and progressive supranuclear palsy, leads us to propose that the primary pathology may be cortical rather than thalamic. Additionally, the extinction of active hallucinations by eye closure challenges their conception of the role of reduced sensory input.

Sprinkled with humor, social psychology illuminates cognition in Wegner's beautifully written and cleverly crafted book. However, scantily exploiting such themes as psychopathology, development, and neural correlates of consciousness, Wegner's account does not fully project into cognitive neuroscience. Broaching the topic of self-regulation, we outline neurocognitive data supplementing the notion that voluntariness is perhaps more post hoc ascriptions than bona fide introspection.

Self-experimentation is a valuable companion to self-management in the benefit of pharmaco-cognitive-behavior combination therapies. However, data on individuals participating as active therapeutic agents are sparse. Smoking cessation therapy is an example. Roberts' self-experimentation suggests trying more diversity in research to generate new ideas. This may inform current approaches to the cessation of smoking.

Krueger & Funder (K&F) presuppose that the base rate for social cognition is more rational than is indicated by research, and that a focus on cognitive errors and behavioral shortcomings is responsible for the fragmented nature of social psychology. Insight concerning both issues is forthcoming from advances in evolutionary psychology and the adaptation of dynamical systems theory to social psychology.

Falk's argument takes for granted that “protolanguage” used a genetic propensity for producing word-forms. Using developmental evidence, I dispute this assumption and, instead, reframe the argument in terms of behavioral ecology. Viewed as niche-construction, putting the baby down can help clarify not only the origins of talk but also the capacity to modify what we are saying as we speak.

We argue that planning and control may not be separable entities, either at the behavioural level or at the neurophysiological level. We review studies that show the involvement of superior and inferior parietal cortex in both planning and control. We propose an alternative view to the localization theory put forth by Glover.

Falk's contribution to a continuity theory of the origins of language would be complemented by an account of the origins of displaced reference, a key characteristic distinguishing human language from animal signaling systems. Because deception is one situation in which nonhumans may use signals in the absence of their referents, deception may have been the starting point for displaced reference.

Social-cognitive psychologists' problem orientation is, in itself, no threat to the generation of normatively neutral general theory. What would put general theory at risk is, rather, the reliance on a valence-balancing explanatory heuristic. Fortunately, social-cognitive research communities have resources to override this heuristic and utilize more epistemically effective cultural tools.

Self-surveillance and self-experimentation are of concern to everyone interested in finding out the factors that increase one's risk of stroke from <8% to nearly 100%; one also thereby contributes to transdisciplinary science.

The cholinergic system is a good candidate for the role of determining the relative weight given in cortical information processing to new sensory information versus prior knowledge. We discuss the physiological data supporting this, and suggest that this Bayesian perspective can easily be reconciled with the dynamical framework proposed by Behrendt & Young (B&Y).

We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion.

Behrendt's & Young's (B&Y's) persuasive scientific theory explains hallucinations, and is supported by a wide variety of psychological evidence, both normal and abnormal – unlike their philosophical thesis, Kantian idealism. I argue that the evidence cited by the authors in support of idealism actually favors realism. Fortunately, their scientific theory is separable from their philosophy, and is methodologically consistent with realism.

Dean Falk has strategically explored “mother-infant gestural and vocal interactions . . . in chimpanzees and humans” in order to offer hypotheses “about the evolutionary underpinnings that preceded the first glimmerings of language.” Though she offers compelling evidence for many interesting hypotheses as to the epigenesis of language, other possibilities have yet to be explored. Here we explore the role of gestural communication among deaf signers and the neural correlates associated with this type of communication.

The views expressed in the commentaries challenge many of the tenets of the planning–control model as espoused in the target article. This response is aimed at addressing the most serious of these challenges as well as clarifying errors of interpretation. It is argued that the majority of the challenges from brain and behavior, although meritorious, can nonetheless be incorporated within the planning–control model. It is concluded that only some minor revision of the model with regard to anatomy is necessary at this time.

Krueger & Funder (K&F) are right that various imbalances characterize social psychology, but I question whether they are characteristic of psychology or cognitive science as a whole. Dual-process theories, popular in the latter fields, emphasize both processing biases and the adaptiveness of human cognition in a more balanced manner.

According to a multivariate approach on creativity, self-experimentation may well provide many of the conditions that allow for new ideas to occur. This research method is valuable in particular because the researcher's high level of participation in the search for a solution fosters the involvement of the necessary cognitive skills and conative traits.

This book is a tour de force in showing that what we believe to be actions dictated by conscious will are not, in fact, wholly dictated by conscious will. However, Wegner has fallen into the trap of making claims that go beyond his data to make his case more compelling and newsworthy. Psychology needs to be informed by common sense.

There are good reasons why social psychologists have emphasized the negative side of human reasoning. They are simply following humans' tendency to pay particular attention to unusual occurrences. Attempts to refocus attention onto a wider range of behavior should include the influence of learning on both normative and non-normative behavior.

Examination of the target article for its relevance to the analysis of private behavior leads to three concerns: the absence of a new methodology for studying private behavior, the undisclosed possibility of interactions, and insufficient attention to the social context of idea generation. Regardless of these concerns, a larger issue remains: Can a science of n = 1 be credible?