Wegner's monograph presents the view that conscious will is a feeling that we experience when we perform an action through a mechanistic process of the brain, rather than a mental force that causes the action. The view is supported by several lines of evidence in which conscious will is dissociated from the actual performance of voluntary movements, as in automatism. The book further extends an insightful analysis of the mental system behind the illusion of conscious will and inspires neuroscientists to reflect on its neural substrates.

Atran & Norenzayan's (A&N's) analysis fits with other perspectives on evoked culture: Cultural beliefs might emerge simply from the fact that people share a common cognitive architecture. But no perspective on culture can be complete without incorporating the unstoppable role of communication. The evolutionary landscape of culture will be most completely mapped by theories that describe specifically how communication translates evolved cognitive canals into cultural beliefs.

The hypothesis that excessive early infant crying evolved to reduce the risk of withdrawal of parental care is disputed on the grounds that excessive infant crying is irritating and imposes fitness losses rather than gains. Alternative explanations for the early crying curve that take into account development on the part of the infant and the emerging infant-caregiver bond are proposed.

Consideration of the adaptive problems faced by our ancestors suggests functional reasons why people exhibit some biases in social judgment more than others. We present a taxonomy consisting of six domains of central social challenges. Each is associated with somewhat different motivations, and consequently different decision-rules. These decision-rules, in turn, make some biases inherently more likely to emerge than others.

Any complete theory of speaking must take the dialogical function of language use into account. Pickering & Garrod (P&G) make some progress on this point. However, we question whether their interactive alignment model is the optimal approach. In this commentary, we specifically criticize (1) their notion of alignment being implemented through priming, and (2) their claim that self-monitoring can occur at all levels of linguistic representation.

Evidence from optic ataxic patients with bilateral lesions to the superior parietal lobes does not support the view that there are separate planning and control mechanisms located in the IPL and SPL respectively. The aberrant reaches of patients with bilateral SPL damage towards extrafoveal targets seem to suggest a deficit in the selection of appropriate motor programmes rather than a deficit restricted to on-line control.

We argue that religious ritual's ability to facilitate communication and the pervasiveness of its basic characteristics across societies, as well as its precedence in other social species, suggests that religious behavior is more than a mere by-product. Religious constructs constitute associationally conditioned mnemonics that trigger neuroendocrine responses which motivate religious behaviors. The adaptive value of these constructs resides in their utility as memorable and emotionally evocative primes.

Wegner's thesis that the experience of will is an illusion is not just wrong, it is an impediment to progress in psychology. We discuss two readings of Wegner's thesis and find that neither can motivate his larger conclusion. Wegner thinks science requires us to dismiss our experiences. Its real promise is to help us to make better sense of them.

The majority of the commentaries focused on excessive crying and colic and included two major themes: the consideration of proximate physiological mechanisms, and challenges to my interpretation of the signal functions of early infant crying amount. I initially concluded that none of the competing signaling hypotheses enjoyed strong support, but I nevertheless favored the signaling vigor hypothesis above the signaling need and manipulation hypotheses. Consideration of the neurobiological causation of the n-shaped crying curve and further evidence and argumentation concerning the potential signal functions, however, do not allow for the elevation of any one of these hypotheses above the others, and it remains the case that none are strongly supported. Taken together, however, the target article and commentary do provide a solid foundation for further research. In the target article, I also proposed a model of how infant cry acoustics can influence patterns of care and abuse. Commentary has enriched this model by including the consideration of developmental changes in cry acoustics across early infancy, and by further integrating the cry signal with other modalities of communication and with later development. I trust that the foregoing will show that the joint pursuit of the proximate mechanisms and the potential signal functions of early infant cry amount and cry acoustics should prove fruitful. Before embarking on my reevaluation, however, I begin this response by addressing the issue of consciousness in evolutionary accounts of signaling.

Conversational partners' representations may be less aligned than they appear even when interlocutors believe they have successfully understood each other, as data from a series of experiments on surveys about facts and behaviors suggest. Although the goal of a mechanistic psychology of dialogue is laudable, the ultimate model is likely to require far greater specification of individual and contextual variability.

Glover proposes a planning–control model for the parietal lobe that contrasts with previous formulations that suggest independent mechanisms for perception and action. The planning–control model potentially solves practical functional problems with a proposed independence of perception and action, and offers some new directions for a study of human performance.

This commentary notes the emergence of a “People are Stupid” school of thought that describes social behavior as mindless, automatic, and unconscious. I trace the roots of this “school,” particularly in the link between situationism in social psychology and behaviorism in psychology at large, and suggest that social psychology should focus on the role of the mind in social interaction.

Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) ask: “Why do agent concepts predominate in religion?” This question presupposes that we have a notion of religion that is (1) well enough defined, and (2) characterized independently of that of supernatural agents. I question these two presuppositions. I argue that “religion” is a family resemblance notion built around the idea of supernatural agency.

Wegner's many examples of illusory involuntariness do not warrant the conclusion that the experience of voluntariness is also an illusion. His arguments appear to be related to the contemporary emphasis on automaticity in social cognition and behavior; both appear to represent a revival of situationism in social psychology.

In order to formulate hypotheses about the evolutionary underpinnings that preceded the first glimmerings of language, mother-infant gestural and vocal interactions are compared in chimpanzees and humans and used to model those of early hominins. These data, along with paleoanthropological evidence, suggest that prelinguistic vocal substrates for protolanguage that had prosodic features similar to contemporary motherese evolved as the trend for enlarging brains in late australopithecines/early Homo progressively increased the difficulty of parturition, thus causing a selective shift toward females that gave birth to relatively undeveloped neonates. It is hypothesized that hominin mothers adopted new foraging strategies that entailed maternal silencing, reassuring, and controlling of the behaviors of physically removed infants (i.e., that shared human babies' inability to cling to their mothers' bodies). As mothers increasingly used prosodic and gestural markings to encourage juveniles to behave and to follow, the meanings of certain utterances (words) became conventionalized. This hypothesis is based on the premises that hominin mothers that attended vigilantly to infants were strongly selected for, and that such mothers had genetically based potentials for consciously modifying vocalizations and gestures to control infants, both of which receive support from the literature.

Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) mechanistic account of dialogue assumes that linguistic alignment between interlocutors takes place automatically, without using cognitive resources. However, even the most basic processes of speech perception depend on resource use. The lack of invariant mapping between input patterns and interpretations in dialogue, as in speech perception, may require controlled, rather than automatic, processing.

I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.

The Krueger & Funder (K&F) article would gain in constructive value if the authors spelled out what role the heuristics-and-biases approach could play in balancing the field of social cognition, lowering the burden of blame on it, cautioning overly enthusiastic readers from championing the “enough-with-the-biases” movement, and acknowledging that not all biases are caused by minorities.

We believe the dichotomy of processes introduced in the target article is highly speculative, because the dichotomy is shaped by the questionable assumption of modularity and the complementary assumption of locality. As a result, the author falls into a line of circular reasoning that biases his analysis of the experimental and neuropsychological data, and weakens the proposed model.

In early hominins, there possibly was high selective pressure for the development of reciprocal mother and child vocalizations such as proposed by Falk. In this context, temporoparietal-prefrontal networks that participate in tasks such as working memory and imitation may have been strongly selected for. These networks may have become the precursors of the future language areas of the human brain.