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Why value values?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Samuel Murray
Samuel Murray*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556. [email protected]://philosophy.nd.edu/people/graduate-students/sam-murray/
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Abstract

Doris argues that an agent is responsible for her behavior only if that behavior expresses (a relevant subset of) the agent's values. This view has problems explaining responsibility for mistakes or episodes of forgetfulness. These problems highlight a conceptual problem with Doris's theory of responsible agency and give us reasons to prefer an alternative (non-valuational) theory of responsible agency.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e54
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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