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The evolution of puritanical morality has not always served to strengthen cooperation, but to reinforce male dominance and exclude women

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2023

Konrad Szocik*
Affiliation:
Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA [email protected] Department of Social Sciences, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Rzeszow, Poland

Abstract

Puritanical morality regulates a range of seemingly insignificant behaviors, including those involving human sexuality. A sizable portion of the latter particularly burdens women, who are held responsible for the moral conduct of men. In my paper, I show that these norms have not necessarily served to evolve cooperation, but to subjugate and eliminate women from public life.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

The target article by Fitouchi et al. offers an idealistic vision of the evolution of cooperation. I would like to supplement this idealistic picture with a non-idealistic feminist critique by referring to the puritanical regulation of sexual behavior and those elements that concerned women. The main assumption of my paper is that the evolution of cooperation in the model presented by the authors is the evolution of cooperation between men, not including women, treating women instrumentally, which corresponds to the patriarchal nature of the mechanisms described in this theory.

The authors cite the example of norms that mandate the covering of the body by women caused by concern for the possible loss of self-control by men, which can undermine cooperation in society. The authors propose analyzing the prohibition of premarital sex in terms of proximate behavior intended to strengthen cooperation. Even if this was the real adaptive value of the prohibition of premarital sex, the burden and consequences were on the woman who ceased to be a virgin and possibly became pregnant. Women usually did not have the right to make decisions about marital matters, a telling example of which is the practice of bride abduction or arranged marriages found in various cultures (Vandermassen, Reference Vandermassen2008). If we say that this is the nature of female biology, but no longer of male biology, then we restore the meaning of the idea that biology is the destiny of women.

The cooperative component of these and similar practices is insignificant compared to the sexist desire of men to dominate women and exclude them from public life. If the restrictions discussed by the authors that characterize puritanical morality did indeed reinforce cooperation, it was a cooperation between men and men. Women were excluded because cooperation is a feature of public space, and the place of women in sexist societies was the private sphere, where cooperation occurred spontaneously, based on kinship ties. Moreover, women were usually subordinated and dependent on men controlling resources, so they were definitively not subjects of the evolution of cooperation (Vandermassen, Reference Vandermassen2005, p. 187). According to the sexual selection model proposed by Patricia Adair Gowaty, males sought to control women, whereas females sought to repel that control (Gowaty, Reference Gowaty1992). The model proposed by the authors to explain cooperation is a model that excludes women.

The practice of covering women, usually coupled with the prohibition of their movement without the company of a male guardian, leads to women in these cultures becoming invisible and immobile – in a sense, ceasing to exist (Rawlinson, Reference Rawlinson2016). Thus handicapped, they become easily controllable and cease to be competitors (Gowaty, Reference Gowaty1992). Deprived of any place in public space, women are forced to take care of the home, relieving men of these responsibilities.

Also worth keeping in mind is the feminist critique of the theory of biological and cultural evolution. It is worth remembering the context of discovery, not just justification, exposed by feminist social epistemologies, as well as feminist philosophy of science. The social and cultural context of an era shapes the way scientists think and do science. This was also true of Charles Darwin and the stereotypes he reproduced about the role of gender, evident in his theory of sexual selection (Nelson, Reference Nelson2017). This applies not only to scientific theories, but also to religious and ethical systems, including the concept of puritanical morality. Although many of the mechanisms described by the authors can be explained in terms of the evolution of cooperation, there is a strong rationale for the hypothesis that explains the aforementioned mechanisms regulating women's behavior and practices in terms of their exploitation and domination by men. It is worth recalling here the interpretation of the feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, who showed, that the man has always been and is the self and the woman only “the other,” the man as subject and the woman as object. The practice of covering women is an objectification of the woman, who for the man was never an equal to him – such status was only held by another man. The evolution of cooperation and its effect, the social contract, is really a sexual contract between men (Pateman, Reference Pateman1988) (and also a racial contract, if we take into account the exclusion and colonization by white Europeans of the rest of the world; Mills, Reference Mills1997).

The missing element of the target article is the omission of this component of exploitation of women and their objectification. But even if these practices were to actually enhance cooperation, the entire burden falls on women, not men, who are stigmatized for distracting men from publicly relevant issues. The evolution of cooperation that has taken place in this way requires an explanation of why evolution has discriminated against, marginalized, and placed a burden on women. Although the mechanisms in question may be adaptive in an ideal society, in a non-ideal – patriarchal – society they are a tool of oppression and control, adaptive only for a select group of men. In the abstract world of evolutionary theory, females invest more in parental care, but this biological asymmetry in a non-ideal society has become a justification for the cultural and social asymmetry between men and women (Vandermassen, Reference Vandermassen2005, pp. 78–79). Interestingly, the social naturalness of this asymmetry was assumed by religious systems, which can be interpreted as supporting the mechanisms favored by sexual selection. It is worth adding, however, that reproductive morals are a better indicator of religiosity than cooperative morals (Van Slyke & Szocik, Reference Van Slyke and Szocik2020), which seems to minimize the cooperative value of religiously sanctioned restrictions, especially affecting women. It is difficult to see the gender socialization manifested in restrictions on women's freedom and choice as having any relevance to the evolution of cooperation other than sexist exploitation and subjugation by men. This is especially true of regulations, including penalties on sexual behavior and reproduction, which were almost exclusively imposed on women (Vandermassen, Reference Vandermassen2005, pp. 149–150). If these regulations were meant to promote cooperation, why has not male sexual behavior been equally regulated throughout history?

Financial support

This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland (UMO 2021/41/B/HS1/00223).

Competing interest

None.

References

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