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The brain as part of an enactive system

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Shaun Gallagher ,
Daniel D. Hutto ,
Jan Slaby  and
Jonathan Cole
Shaun Gallagher
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152. [email protected]://www.ummoss.org/ School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, United Kingdom. [email protected]://herts.academia.edu/DanielDHutto Philosophy Program, University of Wollongong, Wollongong NSW 2522, Australia
Daniel D. Hutto
Affiliation:
School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, United Kingdom. [email protected]://herts.academia.edu/DanielDHutto Philosophy Program, University of Wollongong, Wollongong NSW 2522, Australia
Jan Slaby
Affiliation:
Exzellenzcluster “Languages of Emotion,” Freie Universität Berlin, 14195 Berlin, Germany. [email protected]://www.janslaby.com/
Jonathan Cole
Affiliation:
Department of Clinical Neurophysiology, Poole Hospital, Poole, Dorset BH15 2JB, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view, rather than representing or computing information, the brain is better conceived as participating in the action.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 421 - 422
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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