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Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Mattia Gallotti
Mattia Gallotti*
Affiliation:
Jean Nicod Institute, École Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, France. [email protected]
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Abstract

Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the “we-mode”). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 422 - 423
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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