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A sentimental education: The place of sentiments in personality and social psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2017
Abstract
“Sentiment” is a potentially appealing concept for social and personality psychologists. It can render some complex affective phenomena theoretically tractable, help refine accounts of social perception, and illuminate some personality dispositions. The success of a future sentimental psychology depends on whether “sentiment” can be delimited as a distinct domain, and whether a credible classification of sentiments can be developed.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017
References
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Target article
On the deep structure of social affect: Attitudes, emotions, sentiments, and the case of “contempt”
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Author response
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