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Contempt as the absence of appraisal, not recognition, respect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2017

Michelle Mason
Michelle Mason*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455. [email protected]://michellemasonphilosophy.wordpress.com/
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Abstract

Gervais & Fessler's defense of a sentiment construct for contempt captures features distinguishing the phenomenon from basic emotions and highlights the fact that it comprises a coordinated syndrome of responses. However, their conceptualization of contempt as the absence of respect equivocates. Consequently, a “dignity” culture that prescribes respect does not thereby limit legitimate contempt in the manner the authors claim.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 40 , 2017 , e243
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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