The ‘war on terror’– perhaps how it has led to an ‘age of terror’– has come to dominate many aspects of international relations and indeed of relations between the state and the citizen since the ‘defining moment’ of the 2001 attacks. This special issue examines whether there is an ‘age of terror’, and if so, how that ‘age of terror’ has led to new approaches and to new thinking on the part of Western states and establishments by drawing on the UK's experience in Northern Ireland, the nature of collaboration on counter-terrorism across the European Union and in thinking about the implications of terrorism for strategy. State approaches are critiqued, and alternatives suggested, in thinking about the relationship between human rights and the ‘war on terror’, and indeed in reconceptualizing the study of terrorism. In the final articles of this issue alternative and non-state critiques, approaches and analyses are developed.

The study of welfare state reform has in the last decade been strongly influenced by the ‘new politics’ literature. A fundamental assumption of this literature is that the public has fixed attitudes concerning welfare benefits; however, this may be hard to sustain empirically. Instead, this article argues that public support differs depending on whether a welfare programme aims at relieving fixed or variable needs. By analysing reforms of old-age pension schemes and the introduction of workfare strategies in the United States, France and Denmark, the fruitfulness of this approach is indicated.

This article compares the use of people outside government to consider electoral reform in three countries using the single-member plurality electoral system. The composition of electoral reform bodies, ranging from commissions of experts (New Zealand) and ex-politicians (Britain) to assemblies of randomly selected citizens (British Columbia), appears to have influenced how well their recommendations were received by the public. Governments should be careful not to assume that they can retain control of the electoral reform process once they let it out of their hands, as the cases of New Zealand and British Columbia show, where majorities of the voters chose reform.

This paper applies categories developed in the classic literature on political opposition to the developing European Union. It is clear that the EU has never developed the third great milestone identified by Dahl in his analysis of the path to democratic institutions. That is, we still lack the capacity to organize opposition within the European polity. This failure to allow for opposition within the polity is likely to lead either (a) to the elimination of opposition altogether, or (b) to the mobilization of an opposition of principle against the EU polity. This problem is also beginning to reach down into the domestic sphere, in that the growing weight of the EU, through its indirect impact on national politics, helps to encourage domestic democratic deficits, hence limiting the scope for classical opposition at the national level. Here too, then, we might expect to see either the elimination of opposition or the mobilization of a new – perhaps populist – opposition of principle.

One of the recurring topics in the history of sovereign nation-states is the way in which national identity, and social and cultural differences are dealt with politically. In the Netherlands, that has always had a strong tradition of social citizenship, the government has recently responded to plural nationhood and its problems by turning to new concepts of citizenship. In this article, it is argued that notions of citizenship are, in the end, used to reinforce Dutch sovereignty by creating and maintaining national cohesion. The underlying assumption in public policy is that a strong sense of national citizenship that replaces the old model of social citizenship is the only way to reconcile differences and safeguard peace in contemporary post-industrial society. Three Dutch policy sectors – integration, welfare and child protection – are examined to see how these concepts have taken shape in public policy.

The concept of ‘securitization’ has become particularly influential in the post-9/11 world. This paper aims to scrutinize and, ultimately, reject an emerging set of claims about political economy which draw upon this framework. The contention that US foreign economic policy is increasingly subject to a process of securitization misrepresents the substance of contemporary US foreign policy, the political environment in which it is articulated and the process by which it is made. Pursuing this argument, the paper sets out a framework within which to understand the evolution of contemporary US policy, paying attention to distinctive forms of the economic–security nexus; the form of ‘ad hoc reactivism’ that has consistently characterized US foreign economic policy; the set of commercial and wider economic goals to which policy responds; and the dynamics of competition for leadership in key regions.

This paper presents an argument as to why democratic states are unable to delegate authority to international organizations. Influential attempts to justify democratically such international bodies as the European Union by means of delegation are found to be untenable. At a more general level of theorization, it argues that the theory of delegation as involving the recoverability of delegated authority leaves us unable to identify democratic reforms for international organizations. As a remedy to the latter problem, the article proposes an alternative theory of democratic ‘delegation’– one that applies equally well to national and to international politics.

Preserving Northern Ireland's peace process in the midst of a war against international terrorism has presented the British government with a series of dilemmas at the level of political rhetoric, policy-making and legislation. The peace process demands adherence to human rights standards to provide a foundation for the new political dispensation, while an implication of the necessity for a war against terrorism is that restrictions on liberty are justifiable in the name of security against the backdrop of the existence of an emergency. These conflicting conceptions for addressing political violence at the national and international level are addressed.

In recent years much debate has been generated over the reshaping of the European airline industry and the restructuring of many of the heavily indebted national flag-carriers across the European Union. The European Commission has sought to orchestrate this reform process by the gradual break up of monopolies in air travel and its associated services and a much tighter policing of state aid practices. The EU's liberalizing agenda in air transport, however, has met with strong domestic opposition in the member states. Nowhere else has the resistance to reform been stronger than in Greece, where for a decade successive attempts to restructure or privatize Olympic Airways have yielded very limited success. By focusing, in particular, on the initiative of the Greek government in 2003 to create a new ‘Olympic Airlines’, the article examines how domestic pressures prompted the Greek government to shift away from cooperation with the Commission and invite conflict. The Greek government lost an ECJ case and both Athens and the Commission were left with a sub-optimal outcome. By linking the narrative to the conceptual literature on Europeanization and compliance, the article addresses a number of themes including: the contestation of European competition rules and the ability of national governments to manipulate them, policy entrepreneurship and complex problem-solving, as well as the Commission's role as a stimulus, but potentially also an obstacle to domestic reform.

On the basis of an analysis of the European Union's common definition of the post-9/11 terrorist threat, this article provides a critical assessment of the EU's response. The EU has arrived at a reasonably specific definition of the common threat that avoids simplistic reductions and is a response that is sufficiently multidimensional to address the different aspects – internal and external, legislative and operational, repressive and preventive – of this threat. Yet the definition is undermined by differences between national threat perceptions. The preference for instruments of cooperation and coordination rather than integration, and poor implementation are having a negative impact on the effectiveness of the common response, the legitimacy of which is also weakened by limited parliamentary and judicial control.

The article analyses the so-called ‘bra wars’ trade dispute that took place between the EU and China in 2005. This dispute raised a number of important questions linked, not only to the textiles and clothing (T&C) trade regime, but to the broader conduct of the EU in relation to the developing world. Over the years, the EU has attempted to construct a discourse towards developing countries that has sought to articulate a distinctively ‘European’ approach to issues like preferential trade, equitable growth, poverty reduction and so on. This article thus centres on the broader analytical question raised by ‘bra wars’: namely, the mounting incongruity between the theory and practice of the development policies of the EU.

On one hand, NGOs are seen as experts because of their proximity to the problems they address. They provide knowledge relevant to the solution of these problems and can bring this into the political process. They are able to increase the efficiency of global governance by participating in the policy-formation processes of international organizations. In this paper I will explain the role and functions of NGOs as described in the debate about their legitimacy and theorize – while applying Ernst Haas's theory of organizational learning – on the mechanisms likely to lead to their increasing integration into international institutions as well as the implications of this integration.

Using Sartori's and Mainwaring and Scully's work on consolidation and institutionalization of party systems as touchstones, this article analyses the evolution of party systems with regard to stability and fluidity of legislative party configurations in Africa's democratic states. It examines the key issue of whether there is any stabilization of party systems in Africa today, and if so, under what circumstances such stabilization occurs. This article questions previous studies, arguing that we have not yet sufficiently solved the question of whether party systems as stable interactions exist in Africa. Providing a detailed analysis of elections in Africa's established and emerging democracies, and making a distinction between democratic and undemocratic countries, this study classifies Africa's 21 electoral democracies as fluid, de-stabilized, or stable party systems. A key finding is that institutionalization of these party systems has not occurred over an extended period, but rather, institutionalized party system configurations have been stable from the onset of multiparty elections. Conversely, the other large group of countries with non-institutionalized party systems seems to be perpetually fluid systems despite, in many cases, several successive multiparty elections.

Global market integration is widely perceived as presenting a major challenge to the sustainability of many national economic regulatory systems. There is far less agreement, however, about precisely how these pressures feed into the politics of reform and reshape national public policy. This article will seek to cast light on this relationship by identifying four influential ‘models of linkage’ between global pressures and regulatory change. It will then comparatively assess their capacity to elucidate the progress of shareholder protection reform in Germany and Italy. While no single model proves fully satisfactory, it will be argued that the weaknesses of two of them can be largely overcome through a process of refinement and integration.

Besides seat maximization, what factors motivate an incumbent regime in the grey zone between democracy and dictatorship to alter a relatively institutionalized parliamentary electoral system? To answer this question, this article seeks to uncover the rationale guiding the 2005 changes to Russia's electoral system. It presents evidence to suggest that the same strategies that allowed Russia's current party of power to use the existing electoral system to its advantage in the 2003 Duma election, threatened to spoil the fruits of that advantage in the years to come. Yet it also points out that moving from a mixed electoral system to a purely proportional system could be good for Russian democracy in the future. As a result, the work contends that seemingly authoritarian incumbents will promote reforms that aid the future cause of democracy when these same reforms serve their more immediate interests.

In this article I discuss terrorism as a problem in the study of strategy rather than strategy as a problem in the study of terrorism. There is a developing literature now asserting that terrorist activity should be evaluated as strategy, so that dealing with the phenomenon requires not only denouncing it for its warped morality and inhumanity but also understanding motives and methods, treating it as purposive and instrumental and not just wicked. In this article I take it for granted that terrorism is strategic activity; my question is, what does this type of activity tell us about strategy? The case is interesting because terrorism is strategically generally demanding and prone to failure. Certainly when used on its own it is a poor support for political objectives, and may be counter-productive even when used with other methods. By looking at strategy at the fringes it is possible to illuminate aspects of strategic activity that have a wider application.

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is sometimes taken to have been the real pioneer of many of the policies introduced by New Labour since 1997 under the general rubric of the ‘new social democracy’. This article considers the heritage of the ALP's 13 years in power (and its subsequent 10 years in opposition). The conclusion considers the lessons that may be learnt about the past (and the future) of Labour in the UK.

Since the formal invocation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, much global discourse has been shaped by those principles, to the extent that one could without exaggeration describe the period as an ‘age of human rights’. But will and indeed can that survive the perceived danger arising from violent acts of terrorism? Is this now an ‘age of terrorism’– or at least, an ‘age of counter-terrorism’– in which human rights are being accorded a secondary status? This article considers those contentions and also advocates particular roles for those who work in the human rights field.

While there is significant anecdotal evidence that excluded political opposition parties in repressive states adopt the form of human rights organizations, there is little systematic research into this phenomenon. What does exist tends to be descriptive rather than theoretical in nature. This paper draws from collective action and resource mobilization literatures, arguing that excluded political elites respond to repression by searching for political opportunities both domestically and internationally, and then transform their organizations into units better able to take advantage of those opportunities. The politics of external funding push these organizations towards a human rights and democratization orientation. The article evaluates this argument through an analysis of human rights movements in politically repressive, post-Communist Uzbekistan and considers the impact of this phenomenon on democratization and civil society development.