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Fixed or Variable Needs? Public Support and Welfare State Reform

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Carsten Jensen
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Abstract

The study of welfare state reform has in the last decade been strongly influenced by the ‘new politics’ literature. A fundamental assumption of this literature is that the public has fixed attitudes concerning welfare benefits; however, this may be hard to sustain empirically. Instead, this article argues that public support differs depending on whether a welfare programme aims at relieving fixed or variable needs. By analysing reforms of old-age pension schemes and the introduction of workfare strategies in the United States, France and Denmark, the fruitfulness of this approach is indicated.

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Articles
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Government and Opposition , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , 2007 , pp. 139 - 157
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2007

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References

1 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous referees for helpful comments.Google Scholar

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