Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
On the basis of an analysis of the European Union's common definition of the post-9/11 terrorist threat, this article provides a critical assessment of the EU's response. The EU has arrived at a reasonably specific definition of the common threat that avoids simplistic reductions and is a response that is sufficiently multidimensional to address the different aspects – internal and external, legislative and operational, repressive and preventive – of this threat. Yet the definition is undermined by differences between national threat perceptions. The preference for instruments of cooperation and coordination rather than integration, and poor implementation are having a negative impact on the effectiveness of the common response, the legitimacy of which is also weakened by limited parliamentary and judicial control.
1 TREVI stood officially for ‘Terrorisme, radicalisme et violence international’ but its real background seems to have been a play on words linked to the name of the Dutch minister Fonteijn (Dutch ‘fountain’) who chaired the meeting which established TREVI and a dinner the ministers had close to the Trevi Fountain in Rome.Google Scholar
2 Article 29 of the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU) establishes the objective of providing citizens with a ‘high level of safety’ within the AFSJ and Article 61(e) of the TEC links police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to the aim of ‘a high level of security by preventing and combating crime within the European Union’.Google Scholar
3 See the Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting of 21 September 2001, which also defined terrorism – rather philosophically – as ‘a challenge to the conscience of every human being’ (EU Council document SN 140/01).Google Scholar
4 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 164/3, 22 June 2002, paragraphs 1 and 2.Google Scholar
5 Ibid., Article 1.Google Scholar
6 Titles V and VI TEU respectively.Google Scholar
7 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003.Google Scholar
8 Ibid., paragraphs 4–6 and 8.Google Scholar
9 EU Council document 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 November 2005.Google Scholar
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11 Ibid., paragraph 2.Google Scholar
12 Ibid., paragraph 6 (‘terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda’).Google Scholar
13 Council document 14781/1/05, 24 November 2005, paragraph 3.Google Scholar
14 Europol, Terrorist Activity in the European Union. Situation and Trends Report (TE-SAT) 2004–2005, The Hague, Europol, 2006 (Europol #174172).Google Scholar
15 Ibid.Google Scholar
16 Council document 14781/1/05, 24 November 2005, paragraphs 10–11.Google Scholar
17 The Spanish police have estimated the total cost of the Madrid terrorist attacks at between €41,000 and €55,000. See Jordan, Javier and Wesley, Robert, ‘The Madrid Attacks: Results of Investigations Two Years Later’, Terrorism Monitor, 4: 4 (2006) pp. 1–4.Google Scholar
18 The flight of Osman Hussain, one of the suspected July 2005 London terrorists, from London to Rome might otherwise have been more difficult.Google Scholar
19 Standard Eurobarometer 65, First Results (field work: March–April 2006), July 2006, p. 5960.Google Scholar
20 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City, USA, at http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=10097.Google Scholar
21 Data from the MIPT database, at http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=10086, accessed 20 August 2006. For the definitions used see http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page=method. It is important to note that the RAND/MIPT counting methodology does not include failed or foiled terrorist attacks.Google Scholar
22 Ibid. and Standard Eurobarometer 65, First Results (field work: March–April 2006), July 2006, pp. 59–60.Google Scholar
23 See Marianne van Leeuwen (ed.), Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions, and Policies, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003.Google Scholar
24 In 2005 the author conducted a number of interviews with officials of the interior ministries of new EU member states (who wished to remain anonymous) that generally asserted that anti-terrorism measures were regarded as a much lower priority than, for instance, the fight against organized crime, money-laundering and corruption, with some even conceding that there was more rhetoric than concrete action in national anti-terrorism plans.Google Scholar
25 Europol produces the already mentioned annual Situation and Trends Report (TE-SAT) on terrorist activity in the EU and additional analytical file-based reports on specific networks and issues.Google Scholar
26 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy: July 2006, London, HMSO, 2006, paragraphs 3–4 and 25–40.Google Scholar
27 Ibid.Google Scholar
28 Latest version is the Revised Action Plan on Terrorism: Update June 2006 (Commission document SEC(2006) 686, EU Council document 10043/06, 31 May 2006.Google Scholar
29 Agreement of 6 December 2001, at http://www.europol.eu.int/legal/agreements/Agreements/16268-2.pdf, allowing for the exchange of strategic data, and agreement of 20 December 2002, at http://www.europol.eu.int/legal/agreements/Agreements/16268-1.pdf, allowing for the exchange of personal data.Google Scholar
30 EU Council document 9153/03, 3 June 2003.Google Scholar
31 On the various aspects of EU cooperation with the USA in the internal security field after the 9/11 attacks see Wyn Rees, Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. The New Imperative, Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 79–104.Google Scholar
32 For these other examples see Council document 10043/06, 31 May 2006, pp. 28–32.Google Scholar
33 See Oli Brown, EU Trade Policy and Conflict, Winnipeg, International Institute for Sustainable Development Publications, 2005, p. 7.Google Scholar
34 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 164/3, 22 June 2002, paragraphs 1 and 2.Google Scholar
35 See Dumitriu, Eugenia, ‘The E.U.'s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism’, German Law Journal, 5: 1 (2004), pp. 585–602.Google Scholar
36 Official Journal of the European Union, L 196, 2 August 2003.Google Scholar
37 Official Journal of the European Union, L 309, 25 November 2005.Google Scholar
38 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 190, 18 July 2002.Google Scholar
39 Its provisions are now part of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters that has entered into force on 23 August 2005 (Official Journal of the European Communites, C 197, 12 July 2000.Google Scholar
40 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 16, 22 January 2003.Google Scholar
41 Official Journal of the European Union, L 253, 29 September 2005.Google Scholar
42 Official Journal of the European Union, L 322, 9 December 2005.Google Scholar
43 Official Journal of the European Union, L 105, 13 April 2006. (although this is a more general instruments it has been partially motivated by anti-terrorism objectives, see paragraphs 8 and 9 of the preamble).Google Scholar
44 Council document 14781/1/05, 24 November 2005.Google Scholar
45 Ibid., in particular paragraphs 11, 13 and 15.Google Scholar
46 ‘Commission Activities in the Fight Against Terrorism’, European Commission Memo 06/269, 6 July 2006.Google Scholar
47 A typical example is the inclusion of terrorism in the risk analysis function of FRONTEX as regards the EU's external borders (EU Council document 10043/06, 31 May 2006, point 2.5.8).Google Scholar
48 Reformed unit D/1 in the Directorate General Justice Freedom and Security.Google Scholar
49 See European Commission press release IP/05/1031, 2 August 2005. Much more substantial funding allocations to the fight against terrorism are currently under discussion in the Council for the financial perspective 2007–13.Google Scholar
50 On Europol's information problems see the summary of the Chairman of the Council's Article 36 Committee of the High-Level Conference on the Future of Europol of 23/24 February 2006 (Council document 7868/06, 29 March 2006).Google Scholar
51 Council document 9589/06, 19 May 2006, paragraphs 26 and 31.Google Scholar
52 On these and other missed implementation deadlines see Council document 9589/06 ADD 1, 19 May 2006.Google Scholar
53 With the possible exception of the potential infringement of data-protection rights by its agencies, in particular Europol and Eurojust, and of the inclusion of persons and entities in the Council's ‘terrorist list’ for the purpose of freezing their assets. On 12 December 2006 the Court of First Instance ruled for the first time in favour of an appeal against an inclusion in this list on grounds of insufficient reasons given by the Council (Case T-228/02).Google Scholar
54 Some examples are given – from a very critical perspective – in the ‘Statewatch Scoreboard on post-Madrid Counter-Terrorism Plans’ of March 2004, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/swscoreboard.pdf#search=%22Statewatch%20EU%20action%20plan%20terrorism%22.Google Scholar
55 The Parliament needs only to be consulted on such legislation – which gives it no power of amendment or rejection – and the Court of Justice's jurisdiction is limited by several member states not accepting preliminary rulings in this domain and by a more extensive public security exemption (Article 35 TEU). See on this issue European Parliament Policy Unit: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, ‘The Fight Against Terrorism: How to Improve Effectiveness with Due Regard for Fundamental Rights’, note prepared for the Joint Parliamentary Meeting between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments on 2/3 October 2006 in Brussels (EP document NT\630666EN.doc).Google Scholar