The ‘war on terror’– perhaps how it has led to an ‘age of terror’– has come to dominate many aspects of international relations and indeed of relations between the state and the citizen since the ‘defining moment’ of the 2001 attacks. This special issue examines whether there is an ‘age of terror’, and if so, how that ‘age of terror’ has led to new approaches and to new thinking on the part of Western states and establishments by drawing on the UK's experience in Northern Ireland, the nature of collaboration on counter-terrorism across the European Union and in thinking about the implications of terrorism for strategy. State approaches are critiqued, and alternatives suggested, in thinking about the relationship between human rights and the ‘war on terror’, and indeed in reconceptualizing the study of terrorism. In the final articles of this issue alternative and non-state critiques, approaches and analyses are developed.

Preserving Northern Ireland's peace process in the midst of a war against international terrorism has presented the British government with a series of dilemmas at the level of political rhetoric, policy-making and legislation. The peace process demands adherence to human rights standards to provide a foundation for the new political dispensation, while an implication of the necessity for a war against terrorism is that restrictions on liberty are justifiable in the name of security against the backdrop of the existence of an emergency. These conflicting conceptions for addressing political violence at the national and international level are addressed.

On the basis of an analysis of the European Union's common definition of the post-9/11 terrorist threat, this article provides a critical assessment of the EU's response. The EU has arrived at a reasonably specific definition of the common threat that avoids simplistic reductions and is a response that is sufficiently multidimensional to address the different aspects – internal and external, legislative and operational, repressive and preventive – of this threat. Yet the definition is undermined by differences between national threat perceptions. The preference for instruments of cooperation and coordination rather than integration, and poor implementation are having a negative impact on the effectiveness of the common response, the legitimacy of which is also weakened by limited parliamentary and judicial control.

In this article I discuss terrorism as a problem in the study of strategy rather than strategy as a problem in the study of terrorism. There is a developing literature now asserting that terrorist activity should be evaluated as strategy, so that dealing with the phenomenon requires not only denouncing it for its warped morality and inhumanity but also understanding motives and methods, treating it as purposive and instrumental and not just wicked. In this article I take it for granted that terrorism is strategic activity; my question is, what does this type of activity tell us about strategy? The case is interesting because terrorism is strategically generally demanding and prone to failure. Certainly when used on its own it is a poor support for political objectives, and may be counter-productive even when used with other methods. By looking at strategy at the fringes it is possible to illuminate aspects of strategic activity that have a wider application.

Since the formal invocation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, much global discourse has been shaped by those principles, to the extent that one could without exaggeration describe the period as an ‘age of human rights’. But will and indeed can that survive the perceived danger arising from violent acts of terrorism? Is this now an ‘age of terrorism’– or at least, an ‘age of counter-terrorism’– in which human rights are being accorded a secondary status? This article considers those contentions and also advocates particular roles for those who work in the human rights field.

That ‘terrorism research’ is mired by epistemological, methodological and political-normative problems is well established. What is usually overlooked is that, beyond the difficulties inherent in ‘terrorism research’, these problems are exacerbated by two further factors: the predominance of what Cox called a ‘problem-solving’ approach, and the dispersed nature of much of the more rigorous, ‘critical’ and conceptually innovative research on ‘terrorism’ in cognate fields that, for ideological, theoretical or practical reasons, are reluctant to engage with ‘terrorism studies’. A ‘critical turn’ is needed to reverse both these trends, but it must be inclusive and seek to be policy relevant.

The term ‘Islamic terrorism’ has become a ubiquitous feature of Western political and academic counter-terrorism discourse in recent years. Examining over 300 political and academic texts and employing a discourse analytic approach, this article attempts to describe and dissect the central terms, assumptions, labels, narratives and genealogical roots of the language and knowledge of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and to reflect on its practical and normative consequences. It concludes that for the most part, political and academic discourses of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not least because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and practically counter-productive.

Despite an investigation lasting almost a year there is still no clarity as to why the perpetrators of the London bombings of 2005 acted as they did. Many commentators projected their own views into the vacuum left by the terrorists. These ideas, ranging from revenge for British foreign policy to the logical outcome of social exclusion, may shape security and community-related policies adversely. This article suggests that the bombers reflected a wider sense of disgruntlement in contemporary culture, one that is largely home grown and inculcated. Exploring the recent development of this politics of alienation, and a concomitant search for identity and meaning, it is proposed that the biggest danger is to live in a society with no clear sense of direction or purpose.

The security discourses and practices that grew exponentially in Europe after 9/11 facilitated the elaboration of a counter-discourse on identity and security among many Muslim communities. In this context, the state's attempts to ‘discipline’ the Muslim communities produced an instrumental alliance between officials and those Islamic leaders deemed moderate enough to represent the ‘Muslim community’. Undermining this alliance of convenience are not primarily the global terror networks that triggered the securitization overdrive but rather those ‘amateur jihadists’ whose individualized approaches to religiosity increasingly undermine the political efforts to organize and institutionalize Islamic authority inside the framework of the nation-state.