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The Limits of ‘Securitization’: Power, Politics and Process in US Foreign Economic Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Nicola Phillips
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Abstract

The concept of ‘securitization’ has become particularly influential in the post-9/11 world. This paper aims to scrutinize and, ultimately, reject an emerging set of claims about political economy which draw upon this framework. The contention that US foreign economic policy is increasingly subject to a process of securitization misrepresents the substance of contemporary US foreign policy, the political environment in which it is articulated and the process by which it is made. Pursuing this argument, the paper sets out a framework within which to understand the evolution of contemporary US policy, paying attention to distinctive forms of the economic–security nexus; the form of ‘ad hoc reactivism’ that has consistently characterized US foreign economic policy; the set of commercial and wider economic goals to which policy responds; and the dynamics of competition for leadership in key regions.

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Articles
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Government and Opposition , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , 2007 , pp. 158 - 189
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2007

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