THE THIRD MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), held in Seattle from 30 November to 3 December 1999, was a resounding failure. It was intended to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, in succession to the Uruguay Round which had ended seven years before. But even before it could begin, the proceedings were disrupted by massive demonstrations. Central Seattle became a war zone, with tear gas and rubber bullets, and then a ghost town, with empty streets and boarded-up windows. Inside the conference hall the atmosphere was little better. The conference chair (Charlene Barshefsky, US Special Trade Representative) and the WTO Director-General (Mike Moore, new in office) were booed in open session. In the end, the ministerial meeting was suspended with nothing agreed, only an exhortation from the chair ‘to take time out’ in the hope of resolving disagreements and reconvening later.

This article looks at what went wrong and why and what will be needed in future. It contrasts the failure at Seattle with the undoubted achievements of the international trade system in the 1990s. It examines three possible causes of failure: disruption by NGOs; organizational weakness in the WTO; and errors of government. Of these three, it finds governments most to blame. Governments generally, but especially the United States and the European Union, have not grasped the full extent of the demands placed on them by the advance of globalization. Seattle was a setback but need not be a disaster – provided governments correct the errors that allowed it to happen.

THE NINETEEN YEARS DURING WHICH THE TREATY OF PARIS HAS been in force and the thirteen years of the Treaties of Rome have led to a development in the Communities which, in its extent, variety and depth, exceeds anything the signatories could have hoped for. The volume of derived Community legislation has increased considerably and it now governs important sectors of economic activity. The enlargement of the Communities provides the best confirmation of this success.

Furthermore, the dynamic force of the Community system has been such that the deepening of the Communities has extended far further than the areas delimited by the Treaty. More and more action has been undertaken in sectors at or beyond the limit of the Communities’ responsibilities – not to speak of decisions taken on ‘foreign policy’, which, since 1970, have led to the introduction of procedures for political co-operation.

This article examines the role played by national history in generating and sustaining the popularity of British Eurosceptic arguments. The core argument advanced is that the modernist approach to history prevalent among British historians and the society in which they work has to be considered the key reason for Euroscepticism retaining such a popular appeal in Britain. The overly reverential attitude to recent martial history on the part of the British, and an almost total neglect of the peacetime dimensions of modern European history since 1945, both serve to exaggerate the tendency in the country to fall back on glib images of Britain as a great power with a ‘special relationship’ across the Atlantic and Europe as a hostile ‘other’ to be confronted rather than engaged with constructively.

Does cabinet size have an impact on economic policy in Africa? The average number of ministers has increased steadily for four decades, yet we know little about the economic effects of new portfolios, despite popular complaints about costly cabinets. Comparative studies generate conflicting expectations, either blaming coalition governments for patronage or crediting them with economic restraint. Using data on 45 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1971 and 2006, our empirical analysis links parties and portfolios to budgetary policy performance. We show that cabinets with more ministries are associated with budget surpluses, but they are also slightly more likely to engage in patronage spending. Next, we find that cabinets governing through multiparty coalitions have no consistent impact on budget surpluses. However, they are strongly associated with less extractive government and lower rates of patronage spending compared with single-party cabinets. These results hold after controlling for the type of colonial legacy, economic conditions, population size, constraints on executives, level of democracy, oil income, type of party system and ethnic and religious fractionalization. We conclude that parties and portfolios are both important but they have different effects: adding portfolios to the cabinet may improve economic outcomes by enhancing specialization, but governance through multiparty cabinets generates incentives to both limit extraction and restrain patronage spending.

THIS STUDY IS ONE OF COMPARATIVE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS deliberately avoiding a sociological definition of the situation. It is assumed that two societies had existed in Czechoslovakia for some time and the difference between them, and possible analogies, are examined. There is also an assumption that the division of Czechoslovakia occurred especially because ‘Czechoslovak society’ as such had not yet been established; this was in spite of the fact that the two societies, at the time of the split, had substantially more in common than they had had at the time of Czechoslovakia's formation. There exists the view, which we want to verify, that during the decline of the federation the following factors were significant:

• 1. The differences in economic, social, cultural and dispositional structures;

• 2. The asynchronous and differing processes of modernization in both societies;

• 3. The different consequences of the formation of societies of Soviet type in the Czech Lands in Slovakia;

• 4. The differing processes for rectification of political, economic and cultural institutions in both republics after November 1989.

Recent referendums show that autocratic regimes consult voters even if the outcome is a foregone conclusion. They have been doing so with increasing frequency since Napoleon consulted French citizens in 1800. Why and when do dictatorial regimes hold referendums they are certain they will win? Analysing the 162 referendums held in autocratic and non-free states in the period 1800–2012, the article shows that referendums with a 99% yes-vote tend to occur in autocracies with high ethnic fractionalization and, in part, in sultanistic (tinpot or tyrannical) regimes, but generally not in communist (totalitarian) states. An explanation is proposed for this variation.

IN JUNE 1971, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND WAS NARROWLY ELECTED, after a bitter contest, to the leadership of the French Socialist Party. By the end of 1973 he was in command of the party. There is nothing new about an ambitious politician taking over and attempting to transform an existing party. Mendts France in the 1950s and Servan-Schreiber, more recently, tried to reshape a weak and divided Radical Party. They failed as a result of their own tactlessness and because of the perverse obduracy of the party's opportunistic notables who saw little virtue in ideological purity and disciplined organization. Nor is there anything new about a party of the left being dominated by a strong personality. No study of the French Communist Party would be complete without an analysis of the commanding roles played by the tight-lipped Thorez, the jovial Waldeck-Rochet or the circumspect Marchais. The Socialist Party has been no less immune to the cult of personality; it would be impossible to write the history of the party without constant reference to the dynamism of Jaures, the moral persuasiveness of Blum and the organizational genius of Mollet, three men who dominated long periods of the party's history.

The article sheds light on tutelary regimes, which have so far been left out in the discussion of contemporary authoritarian regimes. It uses a configurative approach to conceptualize tutelary regimes according to the three dimensions of tutelary interference, electoral competitiveness and civil liberties. Tutelary interference is conceived of as a spectrum of possible and not mutually exclusive roles which tutelary powers perform – depending on their position in the political system. Empirically, the article uses a case study of Myanmar's tutelary regime to illustrate how the armed forces’ institutionalized powers and prerogatives have helped the country evade substantial democracy. The results show a high degree of regime heterogeneity, with a functioning electoral regime in place but substantial weaknesses in civil liberties. Both are (partly) rooted in the tutelary interference of the military, which is pervasive. The military's position straitjackets the government; the military vetoes certain policies and structural reforms and guards the political system and its prerogatives from a position of strength. Politicians have so far not come up with successful strategies to bring the military under civil control.

CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS FINDS that the distribution of power between presidents and assemblies can vary significantly from one presidential polity to the next, and can even change within the same presidential regime over a relatively short period of time. Presidents are shown to exercise different levels of control over the law-making process according to the de jure legislative powers at their disposal – initiation, veto, veto override, budgetary and decree powers– and their de facto partisan power – the level of disciplined party support that they command within assemblies. Different combinations of these powers can have strikingly different institutional, behavioural and policy effects. Indeed, such variation has led some analysts to question the usefulness of models of executive–legislative relations that are based solely on the traditional distinction between presidential and parliamentary political systems.

By the early 1990s, the core executive was established as the ‘new orthodoxy’ in the study of British government at the centre. Thirty years on, this article avers that its main assumptions are increasingly questionable in the light of more recent empirical evidence. The core executive approach may well have outlived its usefulness. This claim is derived from analysis of the Cameron premiership from 2010 to 2016. The focus is on how Whitehall reform radically altered the relationship between politicians and civil servants, reshaping prevailing public service bargains and rules of the game. Ministers identified mechanisms to rebuild political capacity, augmenting partisan control of the bureaucracy. They drew on resources from outside the core executive while politicians increased their sway over civil service appointments. As a result, officials felt they should be ‘responsive’ to ministers. The cumulative effect was to replace interpersonal and institutional resource dependency with a ‘them and us’ model. Consequently, the risk of policy disasters and fiascos grew.

I MUST CONFESS THAT I DID NOT CHOOSE THE SUBJECT OF this article out of theoretical or scientific interest. My dreams have not been peopled by the merits of replacing one team by another in government. It was FranGois Mitterrand's election to the Presidency of the French Republic to which I reacted in a way that I shall not conceal from you: alternation in government is not in itself a blessing. Let us admit that it is desirable in general and in the abstract that, where a country is divided between two blocs, each of them should some day come to power, one of them should not be condemned to the ungrateful role of a perpetual opposition. But having said that, we should not change government unless the new oneholds out more hope than the old.

Since the late-1980s, efforts to consolidate democracy in Thailand and the Philippines have been accompanied by marked contrasts both in levels of developmental success and degrees of subsequent economic decline. In Thailand, extraordinary rates of growth in the decade prior to 1997 were followed by dramatic contraction; in the Philippines, the more modest and short-lived gains of the mid-1990s have been followed by economic standstill but not cataclysmic crash. Despite the major differences in the political economic foundations and economic performance of these two economies, Thailand and the Philippines currently face many common challenges of supplementing earlier neoliberal economic reform with the more daunting tasks of political and institutional reform. In particular, this brief and synoptic analysis will argue, both confront the need to enhance the quality of their democracies and the capacity of key bureaucratic agencies.

Following scandals concerning extensive corruption, electoral fraud and manipulation by the security services, Alberto Fujimori's authoritarian regime collapsed in November 2000, throwing Peru into political turmoil. A fresh ballot organised in 2001 led to the election of Alejandro Toledo as president. Assessments of the Toledo administration's performance and the health of Peruvian democracy in the post-Fujimori period have been overwhelmingly pessimistic. Recent political developments are analysed to argue that such negativity is mistaken. Apart from recording strong economic growth, under Toledo civilian control over the military and intelligence services has increased markedly. Greater horizontal and vertical accountability has produced a more open polity. Citizen's rights are better secured. Despite ongoing problems, post-Fujimori a process of democratic ‘deepening’ has occurred.

This article has three aims. First, it aims to explain how media framing forms a central soft power tool utilized by states for the political control of social groups antagonistic to the states' dominant ideology. For that purpose it addresses Israeli state efforts to penetrate the native Arab community that remained within its borders after the 1948 war, seeking to create submissive ‘quiet Arab’ citizens. Second, it examines the role of Jewish-Arab (Mizrahi) professional opinion-makers in creating and maintaining this framing. Third, it demonstrates that efforts made by states to influence ‘captive audiences’ by media outlets in the global age can be successful only if they meet the needs of the target community.

THE PUBLIC REACTION OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND commentators to the suspension of the electoral process in Algeria following President Chadli's resignation on 11 January was profoundly mixed. Relief at the fact that Algeria was not about to become ‘a second Iran’ very quickly gave way to disapproval of the manner in which this prospect had been conjured away at the last moment, as numerous leader writers in London and Paris and no doubt elsewhere indulged themselves in vigorous criticism of what they had not hesitated to call a ‘military coup’.

ONE OF THE VERY RARE OVERVIEWS OF OPPOSITION IN THE ARAB states was published by Professor Lisa Anderson in 1987. The very title set the tone: ‘Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition’ (emphases mine), as well as the opening quotation, ‘A government which is not beholden to any law ceases to be legitimate’, by the famous Sayyid Qutb, one of the prophets of radical Islam (as it came to be named) who was executed by Nasser's government. Opposition was meant to combat a tyrant (a lawless government meaning an unjust government, unjust because disregarding the laws and the religious Law) and to restore Justice, Law and Order. Admittedly, Professor Anderson's purpose was much broader: she would stress the close relationship between the exercise of political power, and particularly the modern state as the organizational framework of political life (the independent variable, so to speak) and, on the other hand, opposition as a response or reaction to the state and the government.

WESTERN SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT IS NO LONGER A subject of interest only to welfare specialists and their students. Economic ill-fortune has had at least this one, positive effect. More — and more variegated — questions are being asked about relationships between public/social policy practice2 and economic performance, both within and between Western countries. However, the very fact that social scientists are now tackling this subject in broader fashion and from a variety of disciplinary and ideological erspectives, has served to highlight inconsistencies in the use of such supposedly standard terms as ‘social policy’, ‘social spending’ and ’welfare state’.

It will soon be forty years since Lenin decided, to ‘put the lid on opposition’, as he expressed it himself at the dramatic Tenth Congress of his party in March 1921. Much has happened since then, both in the Soviet Union and in the countries which have by imitation adopted the same pattern of one-party government. It is therefore worth reflecting on the reasons which led Lenin to adopt this drastic policy; and to pause to enquire into the results which have flowed from his action—whether he intended them or not.

The bolsheviks took power in 1917 without having (as on so many other vital questions) formulated any precise theory about their future policy towards those who disagreed with them. There was a general acceptance of the need to deal sternly with ‘enemies’ – indeed no revolutionary government could hope to survive for long if it did not do something of the kind.

Sweden used to be one of the most restrictive countries in the Organisation of Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in terms of labour immigration policy. This was drastically changed in 2008 when a very liberal immigration law was passed. Why did one of the most restrictive labour immigration countries suddenly become one of the most liberal ones? The article argues that it is necessary to consider labour market institutions and their consequences for labour migration. These factors will influence the preferences, strategies and chances of success for various policy actors. A decline in union power and corporatism in Sweden had important consequences for its labour immigration. Following this decline, employers and centre-right parties became more active and adopted more liberal policy positions than previously. The article analyses policy developments since the 1960s and draws on official documents, position statements, party manifestos, media coverage and original elite interviews.