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Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Jean Leca
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Extract

ONE OF THE VERY RARE OVERVIEWS OF OPPOSITION IN THE ARAB states was published by Professor Lisa Anderson in 1987. The very title set the tone: ‘Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition’ (emphases mine), as well as the opening quotation, ‘A government which is not beholden to any law ceases to be legitimate’, by the famous Sayyid Qutb, one of the prophets of radical Islam (as it came to be named) who was executed by Nasser's government. Opposition was meant to combat a tyrant (a lawless government meaning an unjust government, unjust because disregarding the laws and the religious Law) and to restore Justice, Law and Order. Admittedly, Professor Anderson's purpose was much broader: she would stress the close relationship between the exercise of political power, and particularly the modern state as the organizational framework of political life (the independent variable, so to speak) and, on the other hand, opposition as a response or reaction to the state and the government.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , October 1997 , pp. 557 - 577
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1997

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References

1 Anderson, Lisa, ‘Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring 1987, pp. 219–32.Google Scholar

2 On Sayyid Qutb see for example: Yvonne Haddad., ‘Sayyid Qutb, Ideologue of Islamic Revival’, in Esposito, J. (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 67–98;Google Scholar Olivier Carré, Mystique et Politique. Lecture révolutionnaire du Coran par Sayyid Qutb, Frère musulman radical, Paris, Presses de la FNSP/Editions du Cerf, 1984; and Ahmad Moussalli., Radical Islamic Fundamentalism. The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1992.

3 Gellner, Ernest, Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and its Rivals, London, Penguin Books, 1996, pp. 22–3.Google Scholar

4 That does not mean that the opposition turns to underground, and usually violent, activity faute de mieux because every other avenue is closed: this widely shared Whiggish view (so persistent within the Western academic communities) simply overlooks the fact that some oppositional groups (albeit not all) may share in the same outlook as the hated rulers as to what politics consists of. This may explain why the same forces that unleash social upsurges and are conducive to social mobilization, thus leading to a (provisional?) democratic opening, could prove to be a hindrance to that very solution since they may also prevent stable democratic practices from taking root. ( Hudson, Michael, ‘After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World’, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer, 1991, pp. 407–26).Google Scholar That may lead to the vicious circle of authoritarian repression, supported by some democrats, to block the anticipated victory of a popular opposition suspected of being undemocratic (on this, and other dilemmas see Leca, Jean, ‘Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy. A Tentative Conceptualization and Some Hypotheses’ in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, London, Tauris, 1994, pp. 48–84).Google Scholar

5 Tilly, Charles, ‘War Making and State Making as an Organized Crime’ in Peter Evans. et al. (eds), Bringing the State Back In, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985.Google Scholar

6 See the elegant yet embarrassed assessment of Eickelmann, and Piscatori, Dale James, ‘A Changing Political Geography’, Muslim Politics, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996, ch. 6.Google Scholar

7 As did Roy, Olivier (in the title of his book, rather than in his argument), Olivier Roy., L’échec de l’islam politique, Paris, Le Seuil, 1993.Google Scholar

8 See Salamé, Ghassan (ed.), op. cit, 1994.Google Scholar

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10 Anderson, Lisa, op.cit, p. 229.Google Scholar

11 A word of warning is in order here: most of the so‐called ‘secular’ rulers adhered (and most of the time with the utmost candour and sincerity) to the idea that Islam is the common culture of the ‘Arab nation’; besides, that a good society is a Muslim society where good Muslims practise their faith and abide by the (religious) Law (understood as a principle of interpretation and not, or not always, as a positive law). Their real ‘secularism’ (what their Islamicist foes called ‘clandestine secularism’) was that they did not feel bound to consult religious clerics in the rule‐making process and that the reverse should take place (the clerics and religious intellectuals should consult the political elites before issuing a public statement about public affairs). Thus they paved the way for both an authoritarian political process where all authorities should follow the rulers’ guidance, and an autonomization of the sphere of ‘legislative politics’ (and not only ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘palace politics’ which had always been largely autonomous) to the extent that the rule‐making activity was the province of rulers, qua rulers (‘the power of the sword’) and was not entrusted to men with superior religious knowledge or piety (‘the power of the pen’ or of ‘the saints’) which could lead to the recognition that rule‐making could be the province of citizens, qua citizens (and not law‐abiding believers) since after all autonomous rulers are (logically) opposed by autonomous citizens.

12 See Belaid, , ‘Role of Religious Institutions in Support of the State’ in Dawisha, Adeed and William, I. Zartman, Sadok (eds), Beyond Coercion: the Durability of the Arab State, London, Groom Helm, 1988;Google Scholar and Azmeh, Aziz Al, ‘Wahhabite Polity’, Islams and Modernities, London, Verso, 1993.Google Scholar On the role and rhetoric of the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, between subservience, advice, rebuke and rebellion, see Madawi Al‐Rasheed, ‘God, the King and the Nation: Political Rhetoric in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 359–71 and ‘La couronne et le turban: l’Etat saoudien à la recherche d’une nouvelle légitimité’ in Basma Kodmani‐Darwish and May Chartouni‐Dubarry, Les Etats arabes face à la contestation islamiste, Paris, Masson/IFRI, 1997; and Hrair Dekmejian., ‘The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1994, pp. 627–44.

13 The points are emphasized by Gellner, Ernest, Muslim Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981,Google Scholar and Zubeida, Sami, Islam, the People and the State, London, Tauris, 1993.Google Scholar

14 Anderson, Lisa, op.cit., pp. 232 and 229–30.Google Scholar

15 For a brief and excellent exposé of the various brands of orientalism in politics see Sadowski, Yahya, ‘The New Orientalism and Democracy’ in Beinin and Stork, op. cit., pp. 33–50.Google Scholar

16 These oppositions have not disappeared, especially when they are backed by strong ‘ethnic’ groups (Kurdistan, Southern Sudan, Algerian Kabylia), but in most of the cases they do not shape the political space as used to be so with the Iraqi communists (in 1964–65 and 1979–80), the Tunisian ‘Ben Salahists’ (in 1969–70), the Sudanese communists (in 1971), the Saudi Nasserists in 1969, etc.

17 The lack of cohesion of the Islamist and Shi’a opposition in a context heavily dominated by Syria accounts for the coexistence within a single organization of totalitarian principles of organization and participation in electoral politics (As’ad Abu Khalil, ‘Ideology and Practice of Hizbollah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principle’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1991 and Assaf Kfoury., ‘Hizb Allah and the Lebanese State’ in Beinin and Stork, op. cit., pp. 136–43). There is nothing new in such a pattern, actually.

18 Kedourie, Elie, Politics in the Middle East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, ch. 6.Google Scholar

19 Ghassan Salamé, ‘Sur la causalité d’un manque. Pourquoi le monde arabe n’estil donc pas démocratique?’, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1991, p. 339.

20 It is worth recalling that in 1929 King Ibn Saud disbanded the Ikhwan, the military religious brotherhood of Bedouin warriors and defeated the radical elements with the help of the Royal Air Force.

21 The assassin of King Faisal and numerous pro‐Iraqi enemies of the king were linked to the Shammar tribes who fought against the current dynasty until the 1930s. The ‘Nasserian’ Union of People of the Arab Peninsula was an organization almost exclusively tied to these tribes. Ghassan Salamé, ‘Political Power and the Saudi State’ in Berberoglu, B. (ed.), Power and Stability in the Middle East, London, Zed Books, 1989, pp. 70–89.Google Scholar

22 Salamé, Ghassan, ‘Sur la causalité d’un manque…’, op.cit., 1991, p. 333.Google Scholar

23 Linz, and Stepan, Alfred Juan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America and Post‐Communist Europe, London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 272.Google Scholar

24 Juan Linz. and Alfred Stepan., ibid., Table 1.1. 14.

25 In Lebanese domestic politics, Hizbollah has proved to be less violent and more accommodating than the Algerian groups on either side.

26 William Zartman, I., ‘Opposition as Support of the State’ in Dawisha and Zartman, op. cit., 1988, pp. 61–87.Google Scholar

27 Norton, Augustus Richard (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East, 2 Vols, Leiden, Brill, 1995.Google Scholar

28 Moore, Pete W., ‘The International Context of Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994, pp. 43–66.Google Scholar

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35 I am drawing on the fast‐growing literature on ‘governance’. See for example, among many others, Kooiman, Jan (ed.), Modern Governance, New Government – Society Interactions, London, Sage, 1993 and James March. and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance, New York, Free Press, 1995.Google Scholar

36 The various ontologies underlying this political theory are explored in Mansbridge, Jane, Beyond Adversary Democracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1983 and Beyond Self Interest, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990.Google Scholar

37 The main differences between the liberal constitutional view and the Islamic constitutional one lie first in the problem of established religion when religion is perceived as constitutive of the political community (‘Islam is the religion of the State’) and as embodying a specific positive law; secondly in the identification of lawful ‘minorities’ (are non‐Muslims protected communities or equal citizens part of the demos and how about the ‘renegades’?) and the meaning of a ‘political community’.

38 On the Syrian process, see Alain Chouet., ‘L’espace tribal alaouite à l’épreuve du pouvoir. La desintegration par la politique’, Maghreb‐Machrek, Vol. 47, Jan.‐March 1995, who insists on the dual strategy of the Syrian rulers, maintaining this ‘tribal’ alawi asabiyah in the higher circles and dissolving the other communities by cutting their members off from their now powerless traditional elites and ‘equalizing’ their resources. This interesting mixture of tribal and patrimonial rules accounts for the lack of effective opposition to the Syrian regime (apart from the Islamist opposition, of course). This analysis draws heavily on the framework provided by Michel Seurat., L’état de barbarie, Paris, Le Seuil, 1989.

39 Michaud, Jacob Black, Cohesive Force. Feud in Mediterranean Societies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975.Google Scholar Opposition may even be tolerated outside as in the makhzen–siba model where the ‘dissenters’ (from the territory of siba) who do not pay taxes and do not recognize the authority of the ruler still consider they belong to the same umma as the people from the makhzen (incorporated into, and submitted to, the coercive authority of the Palace).

40 Silvia Tellenbach., ‘La chum dans les nouveaux règlements des Etats du Golfe’ in Hervé Bleuchot (ed.), Les institutions traditionnelles dans le monde arabe, Paris, Karthala/IREMAM, 1996.

41 Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967.Google Scholar

42 Al‐Haj, Abdullah Juma, ‘The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council’, Middle East journal, Vol. 50, No. 4, Autumn 1996, pp. 559–71.Google Scholar

43 Bendor, Gabriel, ‘Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 01 1977.Google Scholar

44 Lisa Anderson., ‘Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach’ in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Khorany and Paul Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and Democratizaton in the Arab World. Volume I. Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 77–92.

45 Antoun, Richard, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1989.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46 On Yemen, currently one of the most fascinating cases since it displays plurality, strong but imperfect asabiyahs, stalemate of forces and ideological thrusts, see Dresch, , ‘The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis’ in Jamal, S. Al Suwaidi, Paul (ed.), The Yemeni War of 1994. Causes and Consequences, London, Sage, 1995, pp. 33–55;Google Scholar Paul Dresch. and Haykei, Bernard, ‘Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolks in Yemen’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, November 1995;Google Scholar and Franck Mermier., ‘L’Islam politique au Yemen ou “la Tradition” contre les traditions?’, Maghreb‐Machrek, Vol. 155, Jan.‐March 1997.

47 Peck, Malcom C., ‘Eastern Arabian States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman’ in David Long. and Bernard Reich, (eds), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1995, p. 140.Google Scholar

48 Crystal, Jill Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 167.Google Scholar

49 For an overview, see Roger Owen., ‘The Practice of Electoral Democracy in the Arab East and North Africa: Some Lessons from nearly a Century’s Experience’ in Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kesaba and Migdal, Joel S. (eds), Rules and Rights in the Middle East – Democracy, Law and Society, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1993.Google Scholar

50 Luciani, Giacomo, ‘The Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis and the State’ in Salamé, 1994, op. cit., pp. 130–55.Google Scholar

51 Moore, Pete W., op. cit.Google Scholar

52 Dekmedjian, Hrair, op. cit., p. 632.Google Scholar

53 Waterbury, John, ‘Democracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East’ in Salamé, 1994, op. cit., p. 29.Google Scholar

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55 Al Sayyed, Mustafa Kamil: ‘A Civil Society in Egypt?’, Middle East journal, Vol. 97, No. 2, Spring 1995 and ‘The Concept of Civil Society and the Arab World’ in Brynen, Rex, Khorany, Bahgat and Noble, Paul, 1995, op. cit., pp. 151–47.Google Scholar

56 Representatives (MPs) may play the role of the religious establishment, i.e. defend their constituency, smooth things over, petition, etc., which is not insignificant.