ON 21 MAY 1998, INDONESIA'S AUTHORITARIAN PRESIDENT SUHARTO, in power since 1966, abruptly resigned from office and was succeeded by his vice-president, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) Habibie. Though retired for decades, Suharto was an army general and relied heavily on the support of the armed forces to rule this vast archipelago, the world's fourth largest country. Habibie is a civilian with long government service as minister of research and industry. President Suharto, Habibie often claimed, taught him everything he knew about politics.

This article observes a transformation in the largely essentializing, decontextualized form of identity politics that long defined political cosmology in Turkey, now in the process of negotiating accession to the European Union (EU). Accordingly, identity politics – not only the bread and butter of both Kurdish nationalism and Islamism, but also a justification for exhortations towards a limited, authoritarian democracy by Kemalists, the major power holders – is receding in favour of a civic, non-divisive political culture enabled by the EU anchorage. In danger of losing the longstanding centre–periphery configuration in an enhanced, participatory democracy and, concomitant with it, the periphery clientelism created by the waning identity politics, Kemalist nationalists, Islamists and Kurdish separatists appear to have stopped squabbling among themselves and joined forces against Turkey's EU bid.

While there is widespread agreement in the ministerial promotion and resignation literature that experience matters, experience has typically been defined as the length of time a legislator has worked in politics or served in a legislature. This approach fails to account for the different kinds of experience legislators accumulate as they progress through their political careers prior to appointment to cabinet. We demonstrate how researchers can use sequence and cluster analysis to obtain a more complete understanding of ministerial appointment. We identify four data-driven archetypes of political careers in Canada for the period 1968–2015. We find that MPs with diverse political careers are more likely to be appointed to cabinet, while MPs with opposition experience are more successful than MPs with government experience. We also find that parliamentary secretary is not necessarily a stepping stone to a full cabinet position, calling into question traditional conceptions of parliamentary politics as a ‘ladder’.

Interviews have been the basis for some of the greatest insights in many disciplines but have largely been on the backstage of comparative political inquiry. I first rely on bibliometric data to show the limited use of interviews in research published by major journals in the past 30 years. I then focus on how interviews are used to study a hard-to-reach population: far-right actors. Using the extant literature and reflecting on my field experience with far-right leaders and functionaries, I examine in detail how interviews help investigate this phenomenon; I analyse challenges related to interview access, rapport, analysis and ethics and offer remedies. I argue that comparativists using interviews need to address these challenges by explicating and reflecting on the process through which they collect interview data rather than solely focusing on the data itself.

NO OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRY COULD MATCH THE TURBULENT post-independence history that Syria has experienced. Gaining its independence from France in April 1946, Syria moved uncertainly through the bewildering web of inter-Arab politics until the first military coup in March 1949 propelled it towards the long period of instability that was to follow. Indeed, the coup of November 1970, popularly known as the ‘Corrective Movement’, which installed the Asad regime in power constituted the twenty-first change of government in the twenty-four years of the country's independence. This persistent political turmoil, particularly during the fifties and sixties, contrasts sharply with the stability that Syria enjoyed in the first eight years of this decade.

A CURIOUS PHENOMENON MAY BE NOTED WITHIN THE EUROPEAN Community, and also in the negotiations on the entry of other European countries into it. This is the absence of any move towards European integration among the political parties in the member states. Rather surprisingly, an obstinate silence prevails in Europe and within the national political parties regarding this deficiency. One cannot help wondering what is the reason for this and what can be done to break this silence.

Outwardly the process of European integration presents in the main an economic aspect. The EEC Treaty is a classic example of this. The goal striven for is a customs union with a common policy in the economic sphere. Thus the first steps are being taken in the Community towards a common policy in a number of sectors (agriculture, transport, energy, external trade). Recently attempts have been made to link this sector-by-sector policy through the inauguration of a common economic and monetary policy.

THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA REMAIN ONE OF THE MOST compelling questions both for scholarly analysis and in international politics. But in attempting to survey the prospects for a democratic future in post-communist Russia, all too often we are blinded by the dramas of the moment. Conflict between president and legislature, the success first of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and then of the communists in successive legislative elections, the Chechen war and the president's health – are all issues which have tended to crowd out analysis of more long-term structural considerations which will underpin the course of future Russian development. These major events in the day-today life of Russian politics can have a significant effect upon such development, but a focus upon them exclusively risks not only missing the importance of the deeper structural factors, but also misunderstanding the context within which these events occur. These events are shaped fundamentally by the structures which underpin the political system: broad structural changes within the society will give shape to the arena within which political activity takes place.

‘Good losers’, legislators willing to play by parliamentary rules, even at the cost of defeat, are a microfoundation of democracy. Yet how they are created has not been adequately explained. Theories focusing on institutions, evolving norms, electoral incentives and ideology do not account for the case of post-war Japan, where deliberate disorder was common in the 1950s and 1960s, absent in the 1970s and 1980s, and returned in the 1990s. This paper highlights the importance of the legislative majority's behaviour in encouraging procedural compliance through the provision of informal mechanisms of consultation and compromise. The lack of such mechanisms also explains periods of parliamentary disorder in other countries.

Commissioning A Series On ‘Identity Politics’ Inevitably involves making contentious, if hopefully defensible, editorial choices about what each of these terms involves. Issues relating to ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ have figured ever more prominently on both the political and academic agendas over the past thirty years. These terms are often employed to describe a wide range of somewhat heterogeneous phenomena. For example, a recent UK Economic and Social Research Council Programme on ‘Identity and Choice’ lists under this rubric everything from ethnicity, nationality, gender and religion, to class, disability, shopping and musical preferences. However, such usage risks broadening the concept of identity to the point of vacuity. Therefore, the scope of this series is somewhat narrower: namely, political identity. Of course, the concept of the ‘political’ is itself contested and likewise seemingly infinitely expandable to all issues and areas of life. Consequently, a more restricted meaning applies here too, with politics limited to the making of collectively binding decisions amongst people holding divergent opinions and interests.

In this article, we introduce a unique data set containing all written communication published by the German Bundestag between 1949 and 2017. Increasing numbers of scholars make use of protocols of parliamentary speeches, parliamentary questions or the texts of legislative drafts in various fields of comparative politics including representation, responsiveness, professionalization and political careers or parliamentary agenda studies. Since preparing parliamentary documents is rather resource intensive, these studies remain limited to single points in time, types of documents and/or policy areas. The long time horizon and various types of documents covered by our new comprehensive data set will enable scholars interested in parliaments, parties and representatives to answer various innovative research questions related to legislative studies.

IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WE ARE CONCERNED WITH tolerance, not as a physical problem, but as a problem of human relations. In this context, ‘to tolerate’ generally means to endure, suffer or put up with a person, activity, idea or organization of which or whom one does not really approve. One can ‘put up with’ an item both when one can and cannot do anything about it. For example, one can ‘put up with’ the excesses of a ruler whose behaviour one has no power to amend. Equally, one can ‘put up with’ the excesses of a child even where one has no need to do so. In the second case, one has control; in the first, one does not. Both cases could be advanced as instances of ‘tolerance’. But cases of the first sort (powerlessness) I shall label as instances of ‘acquiescence’ or ‘sufferance’ or ‘endurance’, since it is obvious that acquiescence typically flows from powerlessness. I shall label cases of the second sort (powerfulness) as instances of tolerance. It is clear in any event that these two types of case are distinct, and, for the purposes of this discussion, at least, differential labelling is essential. In this context, an agent will be said to ‘tolerate’ an item where the item is disliked or disapproved and is yet voluntarily endured. On this definition it is plain that tolerance requires some form of self-restraint by the tolerator.

ALL INVITATIONS TO WRITE SOMETHING THAT COME WITH FAR distant deadlines are a subtle exercise in entrapment (and I speak here from experience as both hunter and quarry) resting on the usual tendency to discount the future. How could anyone resist the temptation to talk about everybody's favourite subject – themselves – when it is enhanced by the flattery implicit in the suggestion that other people might be interested? So easy too: just a few thousand words about changes in the discipline in the last twenty-five years and the way in which one sees it.

This article sheds light on the Greek trigger of the eurozone's fiscal crisis. Using Ostrom's institutional theory of collective action it argues that Europe's predicament is rooted in the failings of political leadership and institutional design at both the European Union and Greek levels. The findings have implications for Ostrom's framework, Europeanization and the future of European integration.

Governments’ decisions to delegate policy decisions to non-majoritarian agencies have been both criticized as attempts at blame avoidance or depoliticization and defended as enhancing the rationality and credibility of decisions. This article focuses not on the decision to delegate, but on the decisions of how and to whom to delegate. We argue that strategic motives are relevant not only in the decision to delegate, but equally, and perhaps more importantly, in the selection of the institutional properties of these non-majoritarian agencies. We present two case studies of health care priority-setting, in England and Germany, to illustrate how governments proceed strategically in institutional design choices and how their decisions affect outcomes.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THE British Conservative Party is a matter of crucial importance which is relatively neglected in the existing literature. The basic theme of this article is that this relationship is more problematic and tenuous than is often assumed to be the case. Relations between business interests and the Conservative Government elected in 1979 are likely to be characterized by recurrent tensions on questions of economic and industrial policy.

Countermobilization has been a common strategy for autocrats to counteract the threat of opposition. Although the use of countermobilization has drawn scholarly attention, research on the mechanisms that enable countermobilization remains limited. This article underscores the role of political institutions in allowing autocrats to carry out countermobilization through incentivizing elites to serve as a bridge between the state and the masses. Focusing on the case of Hong Kong, where pro-government countermobilization is rising along with pro-democracy challenges against the hybrid regime, the article argues that countermobilization is enabled because societal elites are incentivized through political institutions to organize the masses and develop mobilization capacity through grassroots organizations. Using original elite biographical data and organizational data, the article shows that elites with more ties with grassroots organizations are more likely to remain in office in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The findings offer an institutionalist explanation of how authoritarian rulers enact countermobilization by leveraging elite intermediaries and their grassroots networks. In this light, political institutions can serve as a conduit for the state to extend social control.

This article analyses the Erdoğan government's policy response to the coronavirus pandemic. Despite the abundant use of moral antagonisms in his discourse, Erdoğan did not attempt to politicize the pandemic, instead framing it as a global health crisis and presenting the government's public health policies as expert-driven and competent. However, this expert-driven approach was largely a performance. Without a system of democratic oversight or a free media to scrutinize government policies, the Erdoğan government could systematically undercount COVID-19 cases and disregard its own public health restrictions, all the while spreading its narrative of competence and success. Competitive policymaking by opposition-controlled municipalities and criticism from a strong doctors' association had relatively limited ability to discredit the government. The public opinion data we present reveal broad-based support for the government's COVID policies. Our article highlights how authoritarian institutions allow governments to sustain a gap between performance and actuality, granting their leaders greater possibilities to claim policy success.

This article compares the patterns of breakdown of communist rule and the processes by which power was transferred to new ruling groups in four countries: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. In the countries covered in this paper, two paths to systemic crisis and breakdown are identified: the path of failed reform in Hungary and Poland, and the path of intransigent resistance to reform in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. The lesson of the Czechoslovak and East German experience was clearly that those regimes which totally rejected reform, because they saw it as incompatible with communist power, faced total and rapid collapse when confronted with the challenge of Gorbachev's perestroika and when deprived of the support of the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’; but the experience of Poland and Hungary suggests that those regimes which embarked on reform were no more successful in preserving communist power — half-way reform turned out in many ways to be even worse than no reform at all, while radical reform, that is, reform which would bring about the intended economic results, in the end could not be achieved without sweeping away communist power. Gorbachev himself now seems to be impaled on the horns of this same dilemma in the Soviet Union.

Interactions between ruling and opposition parties in India have long been sorely neglected by political analysts. This study finds clear contrasts between interactions at national and state levels in this federal system, and further, often marked variations across the 28 states – each of which has its own Westminster-style legislature. Government–opposition relations range from semi-civilized to caustic, although most cases are situated some at distance from those extremes. So, despite a recent confrontation in the Indian Parliament, there are no strong trends towards either deterioration or greater accommodation. This is a study in ambiguity.