Commentators suggest that the UK is entering a period in which general election results are unlikely to produce a clear winner. In such a situation, how and where the constituency boundaries are drawn is crucial, as different configurations of seats in particular places could have a significant impact on an election outcome. Although those configurations are recommended to Parliament by non-partisan Boundary Commissions, research has shown that Labour has been significantly advantaged by their recent proposals because they incorporated the equivalents of two well-known American electoral abuses – malapportionment and gerrymandering. This article illustrates how and why they have operated and discusses how the Conservatives’ failed attempt to remove one of them (malapportionment) and influence the other (gerrymandering) might have impacted on its position prior to the 2015 general election.

As described by T. H. Marshall sixty years ago, the Western itinerary to modern democracy and the welfare state followed the sequence of civil, political and social citizenship rights. We demonstrate that Marshall's sequence is no longer the prevalent one in the developing and transformation countries of the contemporary era. Instead, political rights are generally at least as effective as civil liberties which are at least as effective as social rights. This new sequencing is attributable to the combination of ‘liberal hegemony’ and inauspicious structural constraints. More generally, our results suggest that the historical route to liberal democracy and the welfare state – beginning with liberal constitutionalism – is unlikely in today's world.

THAT THIS ESSAY SHOULD HAVE TURNED OUT TO BE AS MUCH a matter of introspection as of retrospection should not, after all, have surprised me. As Pascal said, ‘la dernière chose qu'on trouve en faisant un ouvrage est de savoir qu'il faut mettre la première’. If the study of politics has changed over the last half century, why then, so have I. ‘You cannot step into the same river twice’. This is my apologia for starting off, not with my subject matter, but with myself!

WE LIVE IN A TERRORISTIC AGE. FEW, EVEN AMONG THE MOST favoured and secure, can fail to be haunted by the ugly sights and ghastly dreams of terroristic murder, massacre, and torture and the suffering of the innocents. Numerous international organizations and the mass media at least agree in characterizing our era as one ‘full of dismal terror’. There have been repeated calls for serious scientific study of the nature and causes of terrorism culminating in the recent decision of the UN General Assembly to establish a special committee for this purpose. Many students of politics will suspect that the creation of ‘study committees’ by such organizations as the UN and the Socialist International will simply serve to reflect the self-interest of the national participants, or that they will simply turn into propaganda exercises.

Political analysts are variously divided over the prospects for South Africa's democracy. This article both explores and explains their great diversity of opinion. It investigates the implications, both positive and negative, of African National Congress one-party electoral dominance. The paper goes on to assess the reliability of the mechanisms through which an electorally dominant government can be rendered politically accountable. It then explores the implications of political challenges — concerning capital and skills flight, HIV/AIDS, and corruption — that have licensed further speculation about South Africa's future, and concludes that a cohesive ruling alliance offers the best hope of entrenching the country's imperfect democracy.

COMPARED TO OTHER COMMUNIST STATES IN EAST-CENTRAL Europe, Romania offers a fascinating case of neo-Stalinist radicalism cloaked in nationalistic language. A hyper-centralized model of leadership, based on clan instead of party dictatorship, an obedient, corrupt and strikingly incompetent political class, a marked preference for coercive rather than persuasive methods of domination, and stubborn opposition to reforms have contributed to the development of a deep and potentially explosive social, political, and economic crisis. But the price for this unabated commitment to the Stalinist model has been a gradual institutional erosion, the growing deterioration of the social fabric, the heightening of economic tensions, and intellectual asphyxiation. The conflict between state and society has been exacerbated by president Nicolae CeauSescu's wilful and increasingly idiosyncratic behaviour.

This article tests the claim that government cooperation between mainstream parties and radical right parties can be explained by coalition theory. It does so by analysing three Swedish cases of coalition formation where the radical right Sweden Democrats (SD) have remained excluded despite holding a pivotal position in the parliament. It argues that, with the right analytical tools, this exclusion can be explained by coalition theory: cooperation with the SD has been unattractive in terms of policy, and unnecessary because the mainstream parties have been able to form viable minority governments. This argument requires three things: first, that we consider the two-dimensional nature of Swedish politics; second, that we shift the focus from majority government to viable government; and third, that we acknowledge strategic time horizons that extend well into the future. The findings contribute to our understanding of coalition formation and of how mainstream parties respond strategically to the radical right.

How do ethnically divided countries create inclusive and stable democratic institutions? Why do some kinds of federalism fail while others evolve? Scholars looking for answers to these kinds of questions have tended to focus on the West. Yet there are important lessons arising from the substantial democratic and federal reforms that have taken place in Asia over the last few decades. These reforms signal a new model of federal democracy in Asia, comprising multilevel ethnoterritorial federalism, mixed-majoritarianism and a party system that includes both ethnic and multi-ethnic parties. This model has emerged as a response to ethnic conflict and secession risks and reflects the high diversity of clustered communities and cross-cutting cleavages. Despite its overarching majoritarianism, the federal model has led to highly fragmented party systems and coalition governments, with positive implications for democratic stability. Together, these features go some way towards blending otherwise conflicting consociational and centripetal paradigms.

Despite their stated commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention, liberal democratic states routinely interdict refugees, such as through the use of visa requirements, effectively blocking them from reaching their borders. How do liberal democratic states navigate this contradictory terrain? To answer this question, this article explores situations where normally routine and often invisible interdiction practices break down. Canada's approach to Roma arriving from the Czech Republic and Hungary between 1997 and 2001 is an illuminating example of such breakdown and repair, providing a rare glimpse into how one liberal democratic state manages its own interdiction contradictions.

In 1989 The Reserve Bank Of New Zealand Act Gave The Rbnz the operational independence to vary monetary instruments, in particular to control the level of short-term money market rates, in such a way as to hold inf lation within a stated range over a stated period of time. That numerical range and period were to be agreed in a contractual arrangement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor, and the Governor was to be held personally responsible for achieving those agreed objectives.

With The Inauguration Of The Socialist President, Ricardo Lagos, in March 2000 it would appear that the Chilean party system had come full circle since the 1973 coup that unseated the last Socialist President, Salvador Allende. Despite the Chilean military's efforts to eradicate the left during its almost seventeen years in power, a Socialist assumed the presidency only a dozen years after the electoral defeat of the military regime in 1988. In one sense, this success is a testament to the perseverance of the party of Allende, and the party system in general. Nonetheless, the Socialist Party, and indeed the Chilean party system, are quite distinct from the ethos of the Allende years of the early 1970s. At the same time, it is undeniable that there are striking continuities in terms of the number of political parties and patterns of partisan competition. Thus, how should one interpret the extent of transformation and continuity in the Chilean party system?

SURELY IN THE MANUFACTURE OF VARIETIES OF PEACEABLE AND legitimate political opposition the American political system leads the world, and from a comparative perspective the United States is therefore extremely atypical. This essay will review briefly some of the more familiar ways in which political opposition in the United States is expressed and encouraged, will consider some of the consequences for a political system so rich in opportunities for opposition, and in conclusion will discuss changes in patterns of opposition over the last 30 years.

The Success of The Movement For Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) is too recent an event to permit any firm assessment of changes taking place in the Zambian political system. These are, however, probably weighted in favour of a more democratic regime. A situation has arisen in which the powers of the President and those of a parliamentary opposition hang in the balance. In Africa presidents have tended to gain the upper hand but this may prove not to be the case in Zambia.

THE TRANSITION FROM COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM TO a democratic socio-political organization and to a market economy system depends on several economic factors (capital, technology, skilled labour force, competent management) and also on political and cultural elements. The political speeches, whether delivered by government or opposition in Romania, underline almost exclusively the financial, technological or political aspects, neglecting quite completely the psycho-sociological dimension of this transitory period. The fact that the economic reforms somehow failed is only partly due to the lack of economic resources or to organizational setbacks. These are, of course, significant and undeniable reasons, but there is one more explanation rather forgotten, and that is the attitude of the Romanian population itself towards economic, social and political changes.

I SHOULD LIKE TO START WITH AN EXTREMELY SIMPLE STATEment about the French Revolution. This is that there are many historical arguments among historians on many subjects, but that none of these arguments is so intense and so heated as the one which takes place in every generation about the French Revolution. It is as though the historical interpretation of this particular subject and the arguments of specialists directly reflect the political struggles and the gamble for power. It is true that we are all aware today that there are no unbiased historical interpretations: the selection of facts which provide the raw material for the historian's work is already the result of a choice, even although that choice is not an explicit one. To some extent, history is always the result of a relationship between the present and the past and more specifically between the characteristics of an individual and the vast realm of his possible roots in the past. But, nevertheless, even within this relative framework, not all the themes of history are equally relevant to the present interests of the historian and to the passions of his public. The subject of Clovis, for example, and of the Frankish invasions was of burning interest in the eighteenth century, because historians of that era thought that the Frankish invasions were the source of the division between the nobility and the common people: the conquerors having evolved into the nobility and the conquered having become the commoners. Today, the Germanic invasions are no longer considered to contain or reveal any secret about French society: they have become once again a subject for historiography, left to scholars and to the arguments of specialists.

The security discourses and practices that grew exponentially in Europe after 9/11 facilitated the elaboration of a counter-discourse on identity and security among many Muslim communities. In this context, the state's attempts to ‘discipline’ the Muslim communities produced an instrumental alliance between officials and those Islamic leaders deemed moderate enough to represent the ‘Muslim community’. Undermining this alliance of convenience are not primarily the global terror networks that triggered the securitization overdrive but rather those ‘amateur jihadists’ whose individualized approaches to religiosity increasingly undermine the political efforts to organize and institutionalize Islamic authority inside the framework of the nation-state.

An energetic scholarly debate discusses possible reforms of representative democracy. Some support participatory forms of democracy, others a more elite-driven or technocratic democracy. This study contributes to the growing literature on the subject by emphasizing political sophistication as a theoretically relevant predictor of attitudes to democracy: different models of democracy make different demands regarding the political sophistication of citizens. The analysis includes two dimensions and three measures of sophistication: personal sophistication measured as political knowledge and internal efficacy, and impersonal sophistication measured as assessment of others’ political competence. Using the 2011 Finnish National Election Study, we find that perceptions of the sophistication of others have a substantial impact on preferences for political decision-making, and that politically sophisticated people support representative democracy. The analysis shows that perceptions of others’ political competence, which has been largely neglected by previous research, is a both theoretically and empirically relevant predictor of preferences for political decision-making processes.