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After the Fall: Prospects for Political and Institutional Reform in Post‐Crisis Thailand and the Philippines
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
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Since the late-1980s, efforts to consolidate democracy in Thailand and the Philippines have been accompanied by marked contrasts both in levels of developmental success and degrees of subsequent economic decline. In Thailand, extraordinary rates of growth in the decade prior to 1997 were followed by dramatic contraction; in the Philippines, the more modest and short-lived gains of the mid-1990s have been followed by economic standstill but not cataclysmic crash. Despite the major differences in the political economic foundations and economic performance of these two economies, Thailand and the Philippines currently face many common challenges of supplementing earlier neoliberal economic reform with the more daunting tasks of political and institutional reform. In particular, this brief and synoptic analysis will argue, both confront the need to enhance the quality of their democracies and the capacity of key bureaucratic agencies.
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References
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18 In other contexts, the term ‘political reform’ may be used to denote the promotion of political stability or the installation and consolidation of democratic institutions.
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25 FEER, 21 May 1998, pp. 62–3 and 3 June 1999, pp. 44–5; Doner and Ramsay, ‘Thailand’; Suchit, ‘Economic Crisis’.
26 On the limitations of Ramos’s ‘social reform agenda’, see Solita Collas-Monsod, ‘The War Against Poverty: A Status Report’, in Timberman (ed.), p. 98; and Edmund Martinez, ‘Fidel Ramos’s Unfinished Business’, Politik, 2 (February 1996), pp. 39–40. Thanks to the crisis, average Philippine incomes are now back to levels prevailing in 1982. Emmanuel S. de Dios, ‘Crisis Without Consequence, Recovery Without Reform’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25–26 August 1999.
27 Both Thai and Philippine parties are notably lacking in cohesion, but as David Würfel points out, parliamentary government ‘forces parties to negotiate with each other to form cabinets’ and thus may encourage more party organization in Thailand than in the Philippines. Würfel, , ‘Convergence and Divergence’, Philippine Journal of Political Science, 20: 43 (1999), p. 34.Google Scholar
28 Joel Rocamora, ‘Dodging the Authoritarian Temptation’, Politik, (November 1995), p. 42; New York Times, 19 September 1997.
29 Fernando T. Aldaba, ‘Erapeconomics: The Feasibility of a Pro-Market and Pro-Poor Strategy’, Politik, pp. 14–17. Quite incredibly, Estrada’s National Anti-Poverty Commission has decided to target its efforts toward the poorest 100 families in each province, and thus assist only 7,800 families out of the 4.5 million poor families in the country. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1999.
30 As Wurfel exclaims (and de Dios concurs), ‘old-style politics have not only survived a crisis, but have reappeared with new vigor’. Wurfel, ‘Convergence and Divergence’, p. 29; de Dios, ‘Crisis Without Consequence’. See also FEER, 12 August 1999, pp. 38–40; Asian Wall Street Journal, 24 September 1998.
31 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 August 1999; New York Times, 21 August 1999. The rally also protested about cronyism and press harassment.
32 Joel Rocamora, ‘Cha Cha is Not a Two Step Dance’, Institute for Popular Democracy, 16 August 1999. Analysis of various specific types of political reform are beyond the scope of this article, but Rocamora favours parliamentary government and a strong component of proportional representation. An excellent argument in favour of the latter is found in Montinda, Gabriella R., ‘Parties and Accountability in the Philippines’, Journal of Democracy, 10: 1 (01 1999), pp. 126–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
33 The author would like to thank Bruce Cumings, Don Emmerson, Edna Labra Hutchcroft, Bill Liddle, Manuel Montes, john Sidel and anonymous readers for offering valuable comments on, and assistance with, this article. All errors, of course, are his own.
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