During the past few years there has been a rapid growth of interest in the sociological history of psychiatry. Prior to this, the history of psychiatry had been left largely to the psychiatric historian, who tended to proceed, as Thomas Szasz claimed, ‘as a socially neutral person, discovering the historical “facts” when in truth, he is a psychiatric propagandist, actively shaping the image of his discipline’ (1). Writers such as Michel Foucault, Vieda Skultans, Andrew Scull, David Rothman, Klaus Doerner, and Szasz himself have attempted to underline, as Skultans says, ‘the specific uses to which psychiatry has been put in the past, in order to make a more general claim about the nature of psychiatry as such’ (2). This aim, however, is not always made fully explicit (3). In this paper it will be argued that psychiatry, viewed as a historically constituted social activity, was characterised by a dualism. It was constituted by a medical or curative model of practice, in that psychiatry developed as a branch of medicine. Yet the ‘diseases’ which psychiatrists have historically come to regard as part of their field competence are distinguished by at least two criteria: first, their symptoms consist primarily of actions that are highly inappropriate to their social context; secondly, that their etiology is ambiguous. It will be argued here that an ambiguity regarding the etiology of mental disorder, which is often seen as both physically and psychologically caused, was central to psychiatric discourse.

A General theory of secularisation is closer to realisation in the sociology of religion than might be expected, in spite of the field being poorly developed. However, the sociology of religion has the advantage of being able to draw in a synthesising manner on neighbouring areas which are more developed, and in so doing will be able in return to suggest broad schemata of interpretation for use in those fields, especially political sociology. No doubt the notion of a general theory of secularisation remains premature, but premature statements do elicit more precise or even alternative formulations incorporating and subsuming wider ranges of material. In any case what follows is less a complete statement of a general theory than a specification of some of its components. Yet in another sense it is a theory, since it could be reduced to sets of overarching propositions and their integrally related sub-propositions, with appropriate qualifications and marginal rubrics.

The upheavals in the Eastern European countries have demonstrated to the social sciences in a painful manner that they do not dispose of any adequate theory suited to grasp the dynamics and scope of the processes taking place there. Western sociology has won its categories from analysing Western societies and, in a premature manner, come to a generalised concept of society as such. Absorbed by the problems of advanced capitalism, it was not prepared for the collapse of the Easterns systems. Exploring socialist societies has, until recently, pre-eminently been a topic of specialised disciplines, such as Eastern European Studies, Soviet Studies, the Theory of International Relations, Comparative Economics and Development Studies. Its theory-building has remained too closely tied to pre-defined questions, to official documents, uncertain and precarious data or to ideological givens, to be able to assess realistically the developmental dynamics of Eastern societies. The exchange of information between Eastern and Western scholars has been highly selective, hence seldom resulting in mutual fertilisation.

Maoist insurgent or Naxalite activity has expanded markedly in India over the past three decades, especially in the central tribal belt. This paper first uses a unique, district-level dataset to demonstrate that insurgency does not, as is widely argued, occur where tribals or Adivasis have been dispossessed of their land and forced to work as landless labourers. Rather, insurgent activity is most likely to take place in areas where Adivasis retain control of their land. The second part is an in-depth analysis of the Dantewara district. It shows that the Adivasis’ grievances are intimately related to the colonial encounter and neo-colonial state’s desire to control forests and forest resources. While the insurgent leaders are non-Adivasis, they strive to frame the insurgency in terms that are meaningful to Adivasis, and to provide a combination of collective and selective incentives. Nevertheless, some Adivasis oppose the insurgency because it undermines their status, while others do so because of short-term processes operating during the course of the insurgency. A syncretic theoretical approach, which concentrates on the complex and dynamic relationship between insurgents and their support base, and includes insights from Marxian, Weberian and Durkheimian theory, is best suited to explaining Adivasis’ involvement in the insurgency.

This study intends to reread Max Weber's Protestant Ethic with the following question in mind: where is the Catholic ethic with respect to “the spirit of capitalism”? The few short comments that Weber makes on this topic nevertheless suggest an interesting notion which he had developed in earlier texts, i.e., the “religious ethic of brotherhood”. I intend to show here that this notion could be further illuminated by the findings of the anthropology of gift giving since Marcel Mauss. This would enable us to understand how the problem of grace, so central to the debate between Protestants and Catholics, is linked to the history of the transformations in the gift giving practices; we will also discover that this problem was at the origin of the schism. While such a hypothesis leads to a different reading of Weber, it is confirmed by a work of the historian B. Clavero which brings out the complex links that existed in 16th century Catholic Spain between the order of business and that of charity. Besides the antagonism that has marked the two Christian traditions in the West, what seems to be at issue is the way in which economic practices weight on the social bond. These questions invite us to rethink the connections between them.

Nationalism in the modern world began in European metropoles but spread throughout the world system in the form of anticolonial nationalism. While many studies have explored the former, this essay systematically examines the latter. Based upon an original database of 124 cases, we test multiple theories that might account for the origins and spread of anticolonial nationalism. We adjudicate between cultural-cognitive approaches emphasizing the discursive bases for national imaginings on the one hand and, on the other, theories that emphasize political-economic dynamics and elite conflict. Our time-series regression analysis suggests that while cultural-cognitive approaches best account for the initial wave of anticolonial nationalism, from 1700 to 1878, theories stressing political-economic dynamics and elite conflict explain anticolonial nationalism in the later wave, from 1879 to 1990. The analysis suggests that theories of nationalism need to be attentive to the historical specificity of their claims.

This article contributes to the broader scientific debate on how the state generates and modifies life chances of individuals and social groups by highlighting a specific way of institutional (re-)production of social inequalities: it explores the nature and impact of immigrant-specific state intervention. Building on the concept of “modes of incorporation” by Portes and colleagues, a theoretical section explicates how specific contexts of reception by the host government may impact on integration outcomes. An empirical study applies this model to Germany – an example of moderate socio-economic immigrant selection, but extensive legal stratification. I demonstrate substantial effects of differential government reception and legal status on socio-economic outcomes among adult immigrants and their children. A concluding section outlines how the model presented here could help advance comparative studies of immigrant incorporation.

Looking for new ways to interpret the failings of the neo-liberal economy, this article argues that financialised capitalism at the eve of the 2008 financial crisis showed striking analogies with the characteristic combination of oligopoly and informality of the Soviet economy at the eve of its collapse. State capture by oligopolists, a large "virtual economy", the inability of agencies to obtain insight into economic and financial operations, the short term orientations of managers not coinciding with enterprise viability, and a "mystification of risk" by high science are some of the analogies to be discussed. It is argued that not only the origins but also the aftermath of the crisis may show significant analogies.

For a good many years now the distribution of effort in the field of social stratification has been noticeably biased in the direction of analysis and description of the position of the working class. Much theoretical discussion has revolved around the possible changes that may have taken place in advanced industrial societies as a result of the relative prosperity of the post-war years. Investigators have examined political sympathies and ideologies, consumption patterns, aspirations, and relational patterns of groups within these societies and attempted to relate these to broad structural changes. But, influenced by Marxian writers and their opponents, both theoretical and empirical work has been directed very largely to change as it affects the working class. In consequence we now have a good deal of data on and discussion of sociological problems concerned with the working class, but no comparable corpus of data obtains for other classes nor, in this country at least, has very much attention been given to the identification of theoretical problems relating primarily to these other classes (1).

By looking at the history of the Polish lustration — the policy of checking the past of candidates for important positions — this article argues that although the lustration law has been finally passed at the end of 1998, Poland's dealing with the past is still full of unresolved and deeply ambivalent problems due to the nature of its postcommunist transition and the nature of the newly constructed political institutions. These conditions were shaped by the relative strength of the Polish anti-communist opposition, which credibility within the society permitted it to accept a compromise with the old regime. The undetermined character of many of Poland's political institutions have accelerated the use of the issue of retrospective justice in the partisan politics, which in turn has limited the opportunity for consensual policy, and therefore has reduced societal trust of the political parties, while at the same time increased the demand for the purification of the political system.

Despite the certainty with which our theories of industrial society chorused the demise of the small-scale economy, Italy'ssmall producers have not merely refused to disappear but have continued to nourish, multiply and predominate in the postwar economy. Most explanations for this phenomenon have centred oneconomic factors—whether the old linear notions of delayed development and backwardness (Fuà 1976; Sereni 1966), or the more fashionable centre-periphery model which attributes the survival of small-scale production to Italy's ‘latecomer’ status within the international division of labour (see, e.g., Paci 1979; Bagnasco 1977). In this paper I shall attempt to provide a non-economic explanation for the persistence and reproduction of Italy's small business stratum. The weight and importance of small enterprise in a given economy is not entirely explained by economic factors, since comparative statistics tell us that in many advanced economies petty production is by no means a marginal organisational form. Indeed they indicate that the processes of industrialism, far from generating homogenous and purgative effects, produce a diversity of conditions in which small firms can survive. On these and other empirical grounds, the paper argues that the differences observable in the Italian case are the product of particular social and institutional factors.

ThisPaper has a fairly clear overall argument: that the relationship between State and Society in large-scale societies changed dramatically with the advent of industrial capitalism. Prior to that development, the State and the state bureaucracy played a substantially autonomous role vis-à-vis the class structure of civil society. After that its autonomy has been negligible: indeed, for most analytic purposes the State can be reduced to class structure. Such an argument is by no means original. For example, its outlines were commonplace among eighteenth and nineteenth-century theorists. In this paper I draw somewhat on Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer. For one particular argument I am indebted to the contemporary sinologist Owen Lattimore. The idea of such a dramatic shift in the history of society is nowadays extremely unfashionable, however. Today theorists usually present essentially the same view of state-society relations throughout human history. Most Marxists reduce the state to being contingent upon the ‘determining’ categories of ‘mode of production’ and ‘class struggle’. Functionalists present a theory of structural differentiation which occurs so early in human evolution that in all recorded history the relationship between, and relative autonomy of, economy and polity are essentially unchanging. Weberians, in arguing for the autonomy of each element of ‘the structure of social action’, also give a picture of the mutual independence of state and economy throughout history. In all three cases, the caution and specificity of the theory of the ‘founding fathers’—Marx, Spencer and Weber—is thrown to the wind.

Data from 1991 surveys, from elections, and from elite discourse in Estonia and Bashkortostan are presented. Despite significant historical and demographic differences in these two post-Soviet republics, the Russian population in both places had similar reactions in regard to the collapse of the Union. In both republics, Russians were wary of assimilation, yet they neither planned to exit in large numbers nor to organise politically as Russians. Furthermore, in both republics, elite discourse was framing a new identity, which can be called the ‘Russian-speaking nationality’. This nationality is likely to be secular, Soviet, and includes all non-titulars whose primary language is Russian. While it is unlikely that this emergent nationality will be the same in all post-Soviet republics, in large part because incentives from the titulars will be markedly different, the data show in the early period after the Soviet collapse, in two ‘most different cases’, the dynamics of Russian identity re-formation have been quite similar.

This paper argues that conceptualizing Western state citizenship from the vantage point of advancing liberalism is insufficient. Instead, recently restrictive trends may be summarized under the umbrella of earned citizenship. Conceived of as privilege not right, this is a citizenship that is simultaneously more difficult to get and easier to lose, and it inheres elements of neoliberalism and of nationalism in tandem. One could even call it an instance of neoliberal nationalism, which is neither ethnic nor civic but including on the basis of merit and desert. The rise of earned citizenship is a convergent trend across Western Europe and the classic immigrant nations of North America and Australia.

Research institutes are nearly as varied as the results they produce. The term itself generally implies the continuing cooperation of two or more persons in order to conduct research of one kind or another. Beyond these minimal conditions, however, innumerable variations are possible. The research institute as such is a recent phenomenon, one that did not arise, or at any rate did not become widespread, until the nineteenth century. Research institutes grew with the idea of research and while, of course, research has been conducted for centuries, the idea that academic scholarship should be combined with creative research became widespread only in the nineteenth century.

This paper seeks to locate Adam Ferguson (17231816), a leading light of the Scottish Enlightenment, within a tradition. Ferguson's work seems to straddle two traditions: classical civic humanism, on the one hand, and liberalism on the other. The claims of those scholars who have perceived in Ferguson's work prescient anticipations of nineteenth and twentieth century social thought are of particular relevance here. It is the contention of this paper that although Ferguson's work must be understood as classically and theologically inspired, there are, nevertheless, clear anticipations of modern social science in it. The dimensions of Ferguson's work focussed on are: his historiography, his theories of spontaneous order, habit and conflict, and his anticipatory detection otanomie and alienation effects. Ferguson's unique contribution lays in his ability to give ancient insights a sociological twist thereby bridging the gap between modern and classical traditions.

This article investigates the relationship of ordinary Neapolitans' morals of legitimacy to legality, semi-legality and crime. It argues that addressing this relationship empirically serves much more than the purpose of making suggestions to be translated into law or policy. Raising key questions about control, value and representation, the analysis brings to light the significance of individual morality and action to the complex relation of domination to authority in civil society.