This paper aims to show how insurance mechanisms that historically propelled a conception of fairness based on solidarity and a collective approach shifted along the 20th century towards an idealistic adjustment to individual risk. Insurance originally assumed that, while individual hazards remained unknown, risk could be measured and managed on the aggregate. An examination of the proceedings of the American Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) during the 20th century demonstrates the slow crystallization of another conception of fairness, that aims at a scientific adjustment of insurance premiums to actual “individual risks.” I argue that this conception of fairness deconstructs the one based on solidarity. Big data technologies have further radicalized this shift. By aiming at predictive individual risk scores rather than average costs estimated on the aggregate, the algorithms contribute to replacing fairness as solidarity by the correctness of a computation.

TheComplex ranking systems of South Asia and Polynesia offer a special challenge and a special trap to the anthropologist or historian attempting to explain their development. He will inevitably trace the political and economic development of the state and link those to the appearance of new types of power groups and new structures of stratification. The danger lies in identifying and correlating directly the actors' concept of stratification, the distinctions and associations made in the emic system with interest groups identified by analyses of the political or economic structures. This may be done consciously or by implication by translating actors' category terms by words such as ‘nobility’, ‘ruling class’, ‘bourgeoisie’. This is likely to lead to gross ethnocentric assumptions and obscure the specific nature of the ethnographic example. The danger of such an approach has been demonstrated well by Dumont and Pocock for the most complex and the most famous of such hierarchical systems. They point out how the Indian caste system does not fit either in structural form or in ideological content models borrowed from feudal or class systems. Indeed such comparisons obscure the essentially religious aspect of Hindu ideology contained in the scheme (Dumont and Pocock 1958, Dumont 1966). Similar criticisms would also be pertinent to the way the hierarchical systems of Central Madagascar have been analyzed and for very similar reasons.

Focusing upon donations to monasteries in the medieval Western world, this paper expands upon extant discussions of religious gift-giving in the ‘great traditions’ , and of its relation to more archaic forms of gift-exchange, hitherto largely based on non-Western and mostly Asian anthropological material. While displaying many of the social functions familiarly associated with the gift in archaic or primitive societies, donations to monasteries are shown to have also entailed a process of immobilisation of wealth not extant in the gift circuit of ‘simpler’ societies. While donations to monasteries clearly attested to the impact of otber-wordly religious orientations, they also entailed a range of symbolic dynamics very different from, and even incompatible with, those analysed by Jonathan Parry with regard to the other-wordly ‘pure’ gift. The paper then brings into relief the precise constellation of ideological ‘gift-theory’, socio-economic ‘gift-circuit’, and macrosocietal context, which enabled this specific variant of the gift-mechanism to operate as a ‘total’ social phenomenon in the two senses of that term suggested, though not clearly distinguished and equally not developed, in Mauss’ pathbreaking essay on the gift.

I will begin by telling some of the history of the book and of its misleading title. In i9601 was invited to open a discussion on “The Logic of the Social Sciences” at a congress of German sociologists in Tubingen. I accepted, and I heard that my opening address would be followed by a reply from Professor Theodor W. Adorno of Frankfurt. It was suggested to me by the organizers that, in order to make a fruitful discussion possible, I should formulate my views in a number of definite theses. This I did: my opening address to that discussion, delivered in 1961, consisted of twenty-seven sharply formulated theses, plus a programmatic formulation of the task of the theoretical social sciences. Of course, I formulated these theses so as to make it difficult for any Hegelian and Marxist (such as Adorno) to accept them; and I supported them as well as I could by arguments. Owing to the limited time available, I confined myself to fundamentals, and I tried to avoid repeating what I had said elsewhere.

“Illiberalism” has assumed an invigorated if unanticipated significance in the 21st century. Aspects of illiberalism populate not only states long known as indifferent to such principles as personal liberty, human equality and the rule of law but have expanded in “liberal” democracies as their rulers employ purportedly “illiberal” practices more frequently than in the recent past. Indeed, the term “illiberal” seems to have lost its negative aura in the context of state action. We contend that illiberalism represents either an opposition to procedural democratic norms—as disruptive illiberalism—or an ideological struggle—termed ideological illiberalism. We first discuss the term as used in the vast literature on regime types in the debate on authoritarian/democratic hybrid-regimes. We then turn to the key puzzle in what one may call “illiberalism studies”: the rise of illiberal practices and policies in liberal democracies. To inform our analysis empirically, we investigate the ways in which illiberal arguments and institutions (notably camps) were deployed historically and in immigration policy. We conclude with an example of illiberal policy from modern day Hungary.

Cette étude pourrait s'appeler : la crise contemporaine de la mort, si ce titre n'avait déjà été donné par Edgar Morin à l'un des chapitres de son livre, L'homme et la mort devant l'histoire (1). Ce sont bien les mêmes mots, et la même chose aussi : ≪ affrontement panique dans un climat d'angoisse, de névrose, de nihilisme ≫, qui prend ≪ figure de véritable crise de l'individualité devant la mort ≫, et sans doute, nous le verrons in fine, de l'individualité tout court.

The story is therefore restricted to a period, as well as to persons. It is restricted, too, to a short essay which is not a ‘researched’ history but a personal appraisal of past events; not a complete account but an answer to particular questions about those who graduated from L.S.E. in the early 'fifties to be dispersed by professional success during the 'sixties.

Comparative welfare and production regime literature has so far neglected the considerable cross-country differences in the sphere of housing. The United States became a country of homeowners living in cities of single-family houses in the twentieth century. Its housing policy was focused on supporting private mortgage indebtedness with only residual public housing. Germany, on the contrary, remained a tenant-dominated country with cities of multi-unit buildings. Its housing policy has been focused on construction subsidies to non-profit housing associations and incentives for savings earmarked for financing housing. The article claims that these differences are the outcome of different housing institutions that had already emerged in the nineteenth century. Germany developed non-profit housing associations and financed housing through mortgage banks, both privileging the construction of rental apartments. In the United States, savings and loan associations favored mortgages for owner-occupied, single-family house construction. When governments intervened during housing crises in the 1920/1930s, they aimed their subsidies at these existing institutions. Thus, US housing policy became finance-biased in favor of savings and loan associations, while Germany supported the housing cooperatives.

Between 1870 and 1914, a great deal of creative sociological research was completed in France. But this activity did not follow any sort of regular, coherent process of development; there were several quite separate lines of investigation which generally corresponded to distinct social groupings. And while the term “school” may imply too rigid a demarcation, there were at this time a number of what we may term “clusters” of researchers.

Since the early or mid-1980s important changes have taken place in economic sociology. New topics have been added to its agenda, and interesting advances have been made in analyzing problems that were initiated during the 1980s when “new economic sociology” was born. As to theory, it appears that the embeddedness approach is still the most popular approach – but it is also increasingly criticized and a few other theoretical alternatives exist today. The three topics of networks, markets and firms continue to be central, and some important advances have been made during the last decade. New topics include finance, law, stratification and comparative-historical studies. New economic sociology is still suspicious of mainstream economics but has good relations with the other social sciences as well as with other subfields in sociology. If there is one weakness to recent economic sociology, the article concludes, it is the lack of new ideas. Economic sociology still lives very much on the ideas from the 1980s, which is worrisome.

American higher education is currently undergoing an enormous and rapid expansion. Between 1939 and 1961 the number of students enrolled in colleges and universities and earning credits toward degrees rose from about 1.3 million to over 3.9 million (1). This three-fold increase has resulted almost completely from increasing rates of enrollment, since the population of college age—that is, the 18 to 21 year olds—was almost exactly as large in 1939 as in 1960 (2). The difference is that in 1939 college and university enrollments comprised about 14% of the 18–21 year old population, while by 1961 that figure was about 38%. This rate has been increasing at an average of 1% a year since the end of World War II.

The capability approach has been developed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and others as a human-centred normative framework for the evaluation of individual and group well-being, quality of life and social justice. Sen and Nussbaum’s ideas have influenced global, national and local policy and have been further developed in a number of academic disciplines, but so far have remained largely unnoticed in sociology. This article examines recent capability-informed theories and empirical applications in the sociology of human rights and other academic fields adjacent to sociology, focussing on examples of social policy studies in the fields of welfare, the labour market, health and disability, and education. The article outlines several potential areas in which capability-informed frameworks are relevant for critical social theory, public sociology and global sociology.

The article seeks to revitalize the concept of tradition and re-claim its usefulness for contemporary sociological thought and research. Instead of ontological entity, tradition is defined here as an assigned temporal meaning, i.e., a symbolic activity in which various social groups attribute traditional qualities to certain sectors of life that are understood as binding together different times. The article analyzes two incompatible approaches with which tradition was hitherto conceptualized in sociology: (1) tradition as the anti-modern, and (2) tradition as synonymous with “culture.” The analysis introduces a few middle-ground options that support the theory of tradition as assigned meaning.

A General theory of secularisation is closer to realisation in the sociology of religion than might be expected, in spite of the field being poorly developed. However, the sociology of religion has the advantage of being able to draw in a synthesising manner on neighbouring areas which are more developed, and in so doing will be able in return to suggest broad schemata of interpretation for use in those fields, especially political sociology. No doubt the notion of a general theory of secularisation remains premature, but premature statements do elicit more precise or even alternative formulations incorporating and subsuming wider ranges of material. In any case what follows is less a complete statement of a general theory than a specification of some of its components. Yet in another sense it is a theory, since it could be reduced to sets of overarching propositions and their integrally related sub-propositions, with appropriate qualifications and marginal rubrics.

During the past few years there has been a rapid growth of interest in the sociological history of psychiatry. Prior to this, the history of psychiatry had been left largely to the psychiatric historian, who tended to proceed, as Thomas Szasz claimed, ‘as a socially neutral person, discovering the historical “facts” when in truth, he is a psychiatric propagandist, actively shaping the image of his discipline’ (1). Writers such as Michel Foucault, Vieda Skultans, Andrew Scull, David Rothman, Klaus Doerner, and Szasz himself have attempted to underline, as Skultans says, ‘the specific uses to which psychiatry has been put in the past, in order to make a more general claim about the nature of psychiatry as such’ (2). This aim, however, is not always made fully explicit (3). In this paper it will be argued that psychiatry, viewed as a historically constituted social activity, was characterised by a dualism. It was constituted by a medical or curative model of practice, in that psychiatry developed as a branch of medicine. Yet the ‘diseases’ which psychiatrists have historically come to regard as part of their field competence are distinguished by at least two criteria: first, their symptoms consist primarily of actions that are highly inappropriate to their social context; secondly, that their etiology is ambiguous. It will be argued here that an ambiguity regarding the etiology of mental disorder, which is often seen as both physically and psychologically caused, was central to psychiatric discourse.

Dr. D.R. Ambedkar (18911956) was not just a politician of grand stature and from the untouchable caste. He was also a scholar, whose consistent and innovative thinking has hitherto been neglected. Ambedkar's lines of force are presented here, both in relation to his analytical critique of the organic metaphor of the social body as developed in brahmin texts, and of his definition of graduated inequality, a specific Hindu form, for which he developed the psychological as well as the political implications.

The upheavals in the Eastern European countries have demonstrated to the social sciences in a painful manner that they do not dispose of any adequate theory suited to grasp the dynamics and scope of the processes taking place there. Western sociology has won its categories from analysing Western societies and, in a premature manner, come to a generalised concept of society as such. Absorbed by the problems of advanced capitalism, it was not prepared for the collapse of the Easterns systems. Exploring socialist societies has, until recently, pre-eminently been a topic of specialised disciplines, such as Eastern European Studies, Soviet Studies, the Theory of International Relations, Comparative Economics and Development Studies. Its theory-building has remained too closely tied to pre-defined questions, to official documents, uncertain and precarious data or to ideological givens, to be able to assess realistically the developmental dynamics of Eastern societies. The exchange of information between Eastern and Western scholars has been highly selective, hence seldom resulting in mutual fertilisation.

Maoist insurgent or Naxalite activity has expanded markedly in India over the past three decades, especially in the central tribal belt. This paper first uses a unique, district-level dataset to demonstrate that insurgency does not, as is widely argued, occur where tribals or Adivasis have been dispossessed of their land and forced to work as landless labourers. Rather, insurgent activity is most likely to take place in areas where Adivasis retain control of their land. The second part is an in-depth analysis of the Dantewara district. It shows that the Adivasis’ grievances are intimately related to the colonial encounter and neo-colonial state’s desire to control forests and forest resources. While the insurgent leaders are non-Adivasis, they strive to frame the insurgency in terms that are meaningful to Adivasis, and to provide a combination of collective and selective incentives. Nevertheless, some Adivasis oppose the insurgency because it undermines their status, while others do so because of short-term processes operating during the course of the insurgency. A syncretic theoretical approach, which concentrates on the complex and dynamic relationship between insurgents and their support base, and includes insights from Marxian, Weberian and Durkheimian theory, is best suited to explaining Adivasis’ involvement in the insurgency.