Despite the central government's efforts in reducing fiscal burdens on peasants through fiscal reforms in the early 2000s, collective petitions in rural China remain. Complementary to the arbitrary and weak government explanations of state–society conflict, this article reveals the role of village cadres as activists in collective petition. Drawn from extensive fieldwork, I argue that by reducing local government revenues and recentralizing fiscal autonomy to the county level, central fiscal reforms have unintentionally induced a new force of resistance: village cadres. Being disenfranchised from previous privileges, village cadres are now allies rather than adversaries of peasant petitions. This article advances existing literature on China's contentious politics in two ways. First, it recognizes a new group of activists whose savoir-faire improves peasant knowledge of the state capacity in containing state–society conflict. Second, it proposes a dynamic understanding of contentious politics by highlighting the shifting boundaries between the state and society.

This article investigates the similarities between the organizational innovation of one underground Protestant house church in China and the rise of early communist parties. Much like the spread of communism, the organizational tactics of the church are designed to protect it in a hostile political environment. The different levels are insulated from each other, with limited knowledge of the members above and below. In this way, if anyone is raided by the authorities, the others can continue to function with little interruption. Thus, the highly touted “organizational weapon” developed by the Bolsheviks and recycled, for example, by the Chinese Communist Party in their struggle for power, has resurfaced many years later. However, this time it has been adopted by a religious “vanguard.”

A prevalent image of China, both historically and in recent times, has been that of a civilization spared the malady of too many lawyers that is said to beset the United States and growing numbers of other nations. For better or worse, so such thinking goes, China has sought to address its problems primarily through reliance upon morality, custom, kinship or politics, rather than formal legality, with the result that there has been relatively little need for individuals whose work lies in the law. No wonder that it was Shakespeare, rather than a Chinese author, who gave voice to the much-cited, if arguably misunderstood, call to “kill all the lawyers first.”

Using data from three provinces as part of a joint study by Monash University in Australia and China's Institute of Labour Science, an affiliate body of the national Ministry of Labour and Social Security, this article examines the extension of social rights and social security coverage to intra-national migrants in China as a public governance issue. More specifically, it analyses how central government regulations on improving the situation of migrant workers are being interpreted and implemented by local governments. In this regard, it offers a unique case study of difficulties encountered in the local implementation of policy directives issued by the central government.

In this paper, we examine how the Chinese state controls social media. While social media companies are responsible for censoring their platforms, they also selectively report certain users to the government. This article focuses on understanding the logic behind media platforms’ decisions to report users or content to the government. We find that content is less relevant than commonly thought. Information control efforts often focus on who is posting rather than on what they are posting. The state permits open discussion and debate on social media while controlling and managing influential social forces that may challenge the party-state's hegemonic position. We build on Schurmann's “ideology and organization,” emphasizing the Party's goals of embedding itself in all social structures and limiting the ability of non-Party individuals, networks or groups to carve out a separate space for leadership and social status. In the virtual public sphere, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to apply these principles to co-opt, repress and limit the reach of influential non-Party “thought leaders.” We find evidence to support this logic through qualitative and quantitative analysis of leaked censorship documents from a social media company and government documents on information control.

Vague and often somewhat contradictory impressions of equality and inequality in China abound. Some recent visitors to China have reported that income differentials there have been reduced to nominal levels. At the same time the recurring themes of the class struggle and the dangers of revisionism alert us to the continuing conflict within China over the inequalities that still exist. In this paper I try to draw together the scattered pieces of information already available in order to examine, first, the kinds of inequalities that do continue to exist in China, and then the policies designed to affect the transmission of these inequalities over time and from generation to generation, or, in other words, stratification. Although the available information is not precise enough to permit any systematic comparisons with other countries, I hope to be able to arrive at some rough impressions of the extent to which the Chinese elite has been successful in producing a society with more equality and less stratification than is generally the case elsewhere.

During the past decade China's leaders have called repeatedly for reductions in administrative interventions in the economy, for greater reliance on economic “levers,” for decentralization of economic decision-making, and for an increased role of markets. Although the need for liberalization is fairly widely accepted, debate over how far and how fast to proceed has continued. One view initially proposed by Chen Yun sees China moving towards a system where a “planned economy is primary, and markets are supplementary” (jihua jingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie wei bu). Others advocate moving beyond Chen Yun's vision to a system where, in fact if not in name, allocation takes place primarily through markets. Li Peng's government work report to the first session of the Seventh National People's Congress suggests that the current consensus leans towards the latter, more progressive view:

The focus of reform of the planning system is to transform the function of state planning organs, gradually reduce mandatory planning and expand guidance planning, … use economic instruments, and gradually establish a new economic mechanism where “the state regulates markets, and markets guide enterprises” (guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye).

Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 China's leaders have moved decisively to restructure the nation's economy. However, it now appears that while the decollectivization of agriculture has dramatically reoriented rural society, entrenched urban bureaucracy prevents a comparable change in the cities. Analysis of personnel policy, and in particular examination of expanded pension programmes, further articulates the nature of these entrenched interests, revealing in detail why post-Mao urban reforms have maintained, even intensified, privileges which rural reforms have transcended or eliminated.

How does guanxi facilitate corrupt transactions? Utilizing fieldwork data and published materials, this paper investigates how guanxi practices distort the formal military promotion system and facilitate the buying and selling of military positions in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It identifies the three key functions of guanxi in facilitating corrupt transactions: communication, exchange and neutralization. Guanxi enables effective and safe communication among corrupt military officers, holds transaction partners to their word, and neutralizes their guilt about committing corrupt acts.

Thirty years ago, in his landmark study of how “a bill becomes a law” in the United States, Daniel Berman reminded constitutional scholars that policy-making processes have an enormous impact on the content of the laws they produce, and are not mere “technical devices” designed to permit orderly Congressional lawmaking. This article begins from the assertion that 16 years after the beginning of China's post-Mao political and legal reforms, scholars of Chinese politics and law need to pay greater attention to the impact which lawmaking processes have on the content of the laws and policies that this system produces. Specifically, it asks the following questions. First, how are national-level laws drafted in post-Mao China, and what are the politics of the lawmaking process? Secondly, what factors in the process affect the “life chances” of a particular draft law? That is, why do some laws win a place on the legislative agenda, while most drafts languish in obscurity, and still others emerge briefly, only to disappear later into the bureaucratic swamp? And finally, what systematic impact, if any, do the politics of the lawmaking process have on the content of the laws which the system produces?

A more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic policy-making process have increased the opportunities for China's civilian research institutes to affect foreign policy. Beijing's growing involvement in the international community has created increased demand for research and analysis to aid Chinese leaders in making informed decisions. A more pluralistic and competitive policy environment has given analysts at think tanks more influence, but has also created new competition from analysts and authors working outside the traditional research institute system. This article examines the evolving role of Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutes, their relationships to policy makers, and the pathways through which they provide input into Chinese foreign policy formulation. It provides an overview of the key civilian research institutes, identifies important trends affecting them, and examines the roles and functions they play. The article concludes with an assessment of sources of policy influence within the Chinese foreign policy process.

the import of illegal, cut cds from the west (dakou cds) in the mid-1990s marked the revitalization of chinese rock culture. this article analyses the rise of dakou culture in the context of the interrelated processes of globalization and marketization of chinese culture. contrary to accounts that proclaim the crisis or death of chinese rock, this article describes the re-emergence of rock since the mid-1990s. it presents an overview on three different scenes, part of the dakou culture among chinese youth. the fashionable bands are inspired by a cosmopolitan aspiration, the underground bands signify the return of the political and the urban folk singers express a nostalgic longing. all three scenes attest to the current diversity of popular music cultures in china, and are interpreted as sonic tactics employed by chinese youth to carve out their own space amidst an increasingly commercialized and globalized society.

After 50 years of revolutionary transformation and uneven consolidation, and a generation of economic re-structuring, the political institutions of the People's Republic of China remain essentially Leninist. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to enjoy monopoly power, and independent media, autonomous trade unions and other manifestations of civil society are almost wholly absent. Yet the environment within which the Party now operates has changed fundamentally. Marxist-Leninist parties in power around the world have collapsed and to stay in power the CCP has abandoned central planning for market economics. Living standards and literacy rates have improved dramatically and ordinary people now have more control over their own lives. Some analysts have suggested that as a result of these changes, the regime is facing imminent institutional collapse. Others have suggested that the regime cannot but democratize. This article argues that the regime is more resilient than either of these interpretations allows. In spite of the formal trappings of Leninism and its neo-authoritarian political reform programme, the CCP has adapted to the new situation. The reforms, which date from the early 1980s, have considerably strengthened the country's political institutions. Although there is disagreement on the content and pace of reform, China's elite with few exceptions appears to agree that further political reform is necessary. Yet the Party is caught in a dilemma: if it moves too slowly, it could fail because it cannot meet the demands of the people; if it moves too quickly, it could fail because it further undermines its already weakened position.

Recent writings on China's achievements during the last quarter of the 20th century stress, almost without exception, the enormity of change. But, for both universal and particular reasons, this survey of the country's energy resources and uses will stress continuity as much as change. Taking the inertia of complex energy systems as the key universal given, the most important particular explanation lies in peculiarities of China's resource endowment.

A Communist party is not a mass party. It is rather, by its own definition, a party of elites, the most advanced members of a single class. The Communist Party in China is proportionally the smallest of all ruling Communist parties, never having comprised as much as three per cent. of the population. Such a small leadership group, lacking the direct involvement of the masses in its membership, must rely on other organs to engage the bulk of the population on its behalf. These are the mass organizations. Operating through these mass organizations, the Party maintains leadership and control over the various sectors of society; at the same time, the organizations, staffed by Party members, educate the masses in communism and provide grass roots listening posts which help the Party to maintain its legitimacy.

Rural markets and peasant marketing did not fare well during the Maoist era, which extended from well before the consolidation of communist power in China to the triumphal return of Deng Xiaoping as the central political figure in 1977. Maoist radicals, who in broad perspective may be said to have held the political initiative throughout the era, can be fairly characterized as having an anti-market mentality. While this set of attitudes derives in part from Marxism, it is also rooted in the ideological preconceptions of late-imperial Confucian bureaucrats. The Maoist elite in the People's Republic and the traditional bureaucratic elite of the late empire were equally unhappy with market exchange, and both showed a preference for redistribution.

Following the publication of Ma Licheng's provocative article “New thinking on relations with Japan,” 2003 China witnessed a remarkable public debate on Japan policy. Academics tangled with internet nationalists, and heavy pressure was put on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take a tough line on Japan. The crushing defeat of the “new thinking” and a spate of anti-Japanese protests on the Chinese street and in Chinese cyberspace portends trouble in East Asia.

Although China has had difficulty improving the performance of its banks and stock markets, it has struggled even more to develop a credit rating industry. Credit rating agencies (CRA), which provide bond ratings, are vital to financial markets in advanced capitalist countries, but China's credit rating companies are weak and have had little influence over the behaviour of those who issue or invest in bonds. Some argue that CRAs gain authority through their strong reputation in the eyes of market participants, but the experience of rating agencies in China supports evidence from elsewhere that their private authority is largely dependent on government mandate, a benefit China's CRAs have only recently begun to enjoy. Many private actors, from trade associations to charity groups, are struggling to gain public influence in China, but credit rating agencies may be the best barometer to measure the Chinese government's general stance towards private authority.

Can one man dominate the Chinese Communist Party? This has been a much debated issue in the field of Chinese politics. Using a novel database that tracks the biographies of all Central Committee (CC) members from 1921 to 2007, we derive a measure of top CCP leaders' factional strength in the CC. We show that Mao could not maintain a commanding presence in the Party elite after the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, although the Party chairman enjoyed a prolonged period of consolidated support in the CC at a time when the CCP faced grave external threats. No Chinese leader, not even Mao himself, could regain the level of influence that he had enjoyed in the late 1940s. Our results, however, do not suggest that a “code of civility” has developed among Chinese leaders. The Cultural Revolution saw the destruction of Liu Shaoqi's faction. Although violent purges ended after the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders continued to promote followers into the CC and to remove rivals' followers.

The uniqueness of Taiwan's industrialization is that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) had been the major contributors to exports. What has been responsible for the success of the SMEs? How far and in what ways did the state contribute to their success: can it be attributed to the government's industrial policy? The statist account of Taiwan's development, a dominant approach to explain its economic growth, is weak in answering these questions. This article argues that the existence of a unique industrial structure was key in the explanation of Taiwan's SME-led exports. The industrial structure was basically a consequence of the state's political strategies that determined its public policy towards the private sector. It argues that the market rather than industrial policy was the explanation of the industrial success of SMEs; the economic bureaucracy was a world of politics rather than a range of monolithic institutions; and strongman tactics rather than institutions were the source of state steering capacity and were responsible for the success of industrial policy. It concludes that Taiwan's development was a “politically inspired industrial success” rather than a state-led development.