This article considers the principal changes in family law in the People's Republic of China during the post-Deng period. The developments that have occurred during the period of review have been notable for their pace and their contribution to a growing legal sophistication in China's corpus of family law. They expand on a series of major reforms in family law documented in my earlier China Quarterly article. Overall, it is in the area of divorce that the most dramatic changes have taken place in family law over the past decade.

Over the past two decades China's international relations (IR) think tanks have come to play increasingly important roles in China's foreign policy making and intelligence analysis, as well as serving as an increasingly important liaison to officials and specialists in foreign countries. During this period China's IR think tanks have expanded in quantity as well as improving the quality of personnel and analytical product. Publications by, and discussions with, these think tanks often offer important indications of broader policy debates and competition among institutes and their staff. This article surveys the current organization and state of research in China's IR think tanks, offers historical perspectives on the evolution of this community, and provides current information of relevance to those who interact with these institutions and read their publications.

The post-Mao reform era in China has seen the demise of utopianism. Where once the rhetoric of an unfolding socialist utopia worked to spur on the masses in their subjugation to a national cause, since the 1980s the rhetoric has entailed varying degrees of hedonism with the proliferation of consumerism, individualism, self-reliance and personal responsibility devolved to the individual or family. This has produced Chinese worlds increasingly riven with anachronisms represented by the apparent contradictions of a “planned market” or “socialist market” economy. The realm of media production in the 1990s has found itself caught in the middle of this sphere of social and rhetorical contention, engendering its own contradictions. Indeed the contradictions exhibited there may be more exaggerated than elsewhere; most notably in how Party control of the media has continued alongside increasing pressures on media organizations to compete for readerships, audiences and advertisers on an open market. Characteristic of this situation has been the emergence of new forms of media populism.

This article explores the development of local religious traditions in post-war Taiwan, particularly since the ending of martial law in 1987. It focuses on the factors underlying the ongoing popularity of temple cults to local deities such as Mazu (originally the goddess of the sea, now worshipped as an all-powerful protective deity) and the Royal Lords (Wangye; plague deities now invoked to counter all manner of calamities). Special attention is devoted to the complex relationship between local community-based religious traditions and the state, including the loosening of restrictions on festivals, the use of temples as sites for political rallies during local elections, and the recent controversy over attempts to stage direct pilgrimages to mainland China. Other issues include debates over the “indigenization” of religious traditions in Taiwan and the growth of academic organizations devoted to the study of Taiwanese religion.

This paper presents an analysis of the adoption and implementation of Chinese environmental policies and pollution abatement measures. It sketches the role of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and the recently adopted Five-Year Plan for the years 1996–2000 in coping with China's increasing problems of water, air and soil pollution. Remedial measures, which could be legal, administrative or economic, are analysed both as part of more general programmes of legal and economic reform, and as specific designs for local or sectoral problems. In previous articles, I have discussed several major environmental concerns: environmental damages, scarcity of water, control over emissions by township and village enterprises (TVEs), investments and management methods. The present contribution will focus on wider political issues, such as participatory policies, differences in implementation between regions and sectors, and most recent developments in industrial pollution problems and abatement measures. This survey cannot be complete: the limitations of space and the need to give some concrete examples make it necessary to be selective. Therefore, while some problems will be highlighted – such as water treatment in the Huai River basin, sulphur dioxide emissions, and pollution by TVEs – other problems such as noise pollution will be omitted.

This yellow river, it so happens, bred a nation identified by its yellow skin pigment. Moreover, this nation also refers to its earliest ancestor as the Yellow Emperor. Today, on the face of the earth, of every five human beings there is one that is a descendant of the Yellow Emperor.

Ten years after the handover, Hong Kong's media faced multiple pressures. There were few cases of outright prosecution of the media, but there were subtle political and economic pressures. Co-optation of media bosses, fear of losing advertising revenue and media takeovers by pro-Beijing figures brought some of the media into line. This brought editorial shift and self-censorship, as the media systematically shied away from stories that might antagonize Beijing, underplayed negative news for the government and gave the democrats less favourable coverage. Interviews with journalists showed little evidence of ostensible intervention from government officials or media bosses, but newsroom socialization and editorial gatekeeping are effective constraints. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and the moral force of professional ethics lent the media the room to defend and negotiate their freedom, but the pervasive fear induced by the political environment invariably overpowered the resistance and constrained press freedom in Hong Kong.

This article draws on Party and government documents, Chinese-language books and articles, interviews and firsthand observation, and electoral outcome data to contribute to the emerging literature on the changing role of people's congresses in mainland China. It focuses on the crucially important but neglected relationship between local congresses and local Communist Party committees in the selection of congress and government leaders. It analyses the 1995 reforms to Party regulations and the law, which resulted in electoral losses of more than 17,000 Communist Party candidates in the first set of elections after 1995. It concludes that the reforms created the conditions for local congress delegates to matter – and delegates responded. More broadly, it concludes that congressional assertiveness has significant (although not radical) implications for the relationship between the congresses and Party committees. The winners in the broader (not narrowly electoral) sense of the term are both the congresses and the ruling Communist Party, strengthened as an organization with selection of leaders opened up to more players.

The object of this article is to take a new look at what has been called the “great debate” between Chinese leaders during 1965 and the first half of 1966 arising out of American escalation in Vietnam.

The conversion of land to non-agricultural use in China has often been attributed to the demand for land arising from urbanization, that is, a growing urban population and the shift from agricultural to industrial activity. With a focus on Sihui 四会, a county in Guangdong, this study explains land use conversion from an alternative perspective: by looking at the supply of agricultural land for conversion and what determines this supply. It gives precedence to the role of the central actors in the process – local officials – and suggests that the extent to which agricultural land is converted for non-agricultural purposes is determined by an array of structural and agential factors, including the fiscal and land resources at the disposal of local officials, the incentive structure and macro-processes which influence their decision.

This article examines the significance of the Legislation Law (lifa fa), passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) in March 2000. The Legislation Law represents an attempt by the NPC to rationalize China's legal system, establish a uniform legislative hierarchy and consolidate its authority over other important lawmaking institutions. The politics behind the Law's development therefore offer insight into the balance of power in China's lawmaking arena, revealing how key institutions – the NPC, the State Council and local people's congresses – engaged in bureaucratic bargaining over fundamental questions of their existence and authority within an evolving system. While the promulgated Law reveals the mixed results of this complex process, it also makes possible a more open and consultative legislative process by sanctioning the emergence of public legislative hearings. Now gaining currency around China, hearings are a new development and could be an important step in institutionalizing more meaningful citizen participation in the legislative process.

From a regulatory perspective, philanthropy in China has been officially modernized. Since the government established a legal framework in 2004 based on models from overseas, the number of private foundations in China has grown more than six-fold. Drawing on a nationally representative survey of 214 private foundations conducted in 2012, we present a landscape view of these new philanthropic institutions, discussing both who begins foundations and how their monies are used. We find that despite the rise of new private wealth in China and the adoption of the private foundation form, government priorities are structuring the field of Chinese philanthropy in key and consequential ways. We conclude with some considerations of the implications of these findings for the development of broader civil society.

In the spring of 1957, a strike wave of monumental proportions rolled across the city of Shanghai. The strikes in Shanghai represented the climax of a national outpouring of labour protest that had been gaining momentum for more than a year. The magnitude of the 1957 strike wave is especially impressive when placed in historical perspective. Major labour disturbances (naoshi) erupted at 587 Shanghai enterprises in the spring of 1957, involving nearly 30,000 workers. More than 200 of these incidents included factory walkouts, while another 100 or so involved organized slowdowns of production. Additionally, more than 700 enterprises experienced less serious forms of labour unrest (maoyari). These figures are extraordinary even by comparison with Republican-period Shanghai when the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925, the Shanghai Workers' Three Armed Uprisings of 1926–27 and the protests of the Civil War years gave rise to one of the most aggressive labour movements in world history. In 1919, Shanghai experienced only 56 strikes, 33 of which were connected with May Fourth. In 1925, it saw 175, of which 100 were in conjunction with May Thirtieth. The year of greatest strike activity in Republican-period Shanghai, 1946, saw a total of 280.

This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China. It was conducted by compiling a database of all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002 and 2012 that codes the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I find that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years. This casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on “local protectionism.” I interpret this as a result of firms' need to connect with powerful and stable institutions. I test this by examining the impact of the fall of Chen Liangyu on firms in Shanghai.

The decentralization of fiscal and administrative powers to lower echelons of government is arguably the most outstanding facet of the economic reforms of the past decade and a half. Following this move, the relationship between the centralgovernment and the localities – which has certainly undergone shifts of some sort since 1980 – has been the subject of endless analysis and conjecture, both scholarly and in the press.

Following a series of high-profile attacks in Beijing, Kunming and Urumqi by Uyghur militants, the Chinese party-state declared a “war on terror” in 2014. Since then, China's Xinjiang region has witnessed an unprecedented build-up of what we describe as a multi-tiered police force, turning it into one of the most heavily policed regions in the world. This article investigates the securitization of Xinjiang through an analysis of official police recruitment documents. Informal police jobs, which represent the backbone of recent recruitment drives, have historically carried inferior pay levels. Yet, advertised assistant police positions in Xinjiang now offer high salaries despite low educational requirements, thereby attracting lesser-educated applicants, many of whom are ethnic minorities. Besides co-opting Uyghurs into policing their own people, the resulting employment is in itself a significant stability maintenance strategy. While the known numbers of violent attacks have subsided, China's heavy-handed securitization approach risks alienating both minority and Han populations.

This paper examines the nature of China's current research climate and its effects on foreign scholarship. Drawing on an original survey of over 500 China scholars, we find that repressive research experiences are a rare but real phenomenon and collectively present a barrier to the conduct of research in China. Roughly 9 per cent of China scholars report that they have been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past ten years; 26 per cent of scholars who conduct archival research report being denied access; and 5 per cent of researchers report some difficulty obtaining a visa. The paper provides descriptive information on the nature of these experiences and their determinants. It concludes with a discussion of self-censorship and strategies for conducting research on China.

Are the values and attitudes of ordinary people in the People's Republic of China (PRC) compatible with behaviour necessary for a liberal democracy to evolve? Or are they likely to obstruct such evolution? Some surveys conducted in recent years within the PRC asked people of different backgrounds and residential areas if they were interested in politics and governance issues, if they conversed with others about their political interests, and if they believed they had some control over their political life. These and other related questions produced survey findings which are discussed and interpreted below to provide some conjectures about the questions posed above.

This article examines the challenges faced by Beijing in managing this increasingly complex relationship, reflecting upon the structural factors that encourage harmony and introduce discord in China–Africa ties. It examines how various policy solutions being considered by China, ranging from increasing participants in the policy-making process to tentative engagement with international development regimes, may still not address the most difficult issues involving adverse reactions to the Chinese presence from African civil societies and political opposition groups. In particular the lack of a strong civil society inside China inhibits the ability of its policy makers to draw on the expertise of the kind of independent pressure groups and NGOs that are available to traditional donor/investor states. The article concludes by asking how the Chinese system can make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing models and practices of the developed countries.