This article examines the parent–child relations within rural-to-urban migrant households to explore the continuations and changes in the patrilineal family system under the forces of migration and urbanization in late-socialist China. Based on ethnographic data collected between 2008 and 2015 in Shanghai, it takes a processual approach to understand son preference as a contextualized family practice and examines four aspects of parent–child relations in migrant households: reproductive strategy, childrearing practices, educational investment, and parental expectation of adult children. Through exploring intimate negotiations between migrant parents and their children over material and emotional resources at different life stages, this article demonstrates how the gendered parent–child relations in migrant households in Shanghai have been shifting away from the traditional focus on sons and gradually giving way to pragmatic adjustments and emotional redefinition under the forces of socialist institutions and capitalist markets.

This article has three goals. The first is to characterize the nature of the current Chinese political system, culminating at the 16th Party Congress, as a combination of economic, domestic political and foreign policy reform. Economically, it represents a continuation of marketization, privatization and globalization under more centrally controlled auspices. Politically, it represents a continuation of Dengist emphases on elite civility and administrative institutionalization. And in foreign policy, it brings China to the threshold of great power status, as the old ambivalence between overthrowing the international system and assuming an important role within it nears resolution. The second purpose, viewing “Jiangism” in comparative developmental terms, conceives political development in terms of both state-building and nation-building: the greatest emphasis has been on the former. The third goal is to subject Jiangism to immanent critique by pointing out the most conspicuous emergent contradictions. These seem to include gaps between rich and poor and between east and west, a largely unsuccessful attempt to reform the nation's industrial core and its attendant financial system, and a paradoxical inability to police the state even while increasing state capacity.

Since 1980, in their pursuit of economic development, reformist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have decentralized personnel administration and transferred formal authority over some personnel matters to state institutions. To manage its more complex economy, Party authorities have been forced to select professionals and specialists based in part on their technical qualifications and job performance. To a limited extent, the Party has begun to place personnel management in the hands of experts who are competent to assess the qualifications and work of their peers, and directly in the hands of employing institutions. The CCP has beat a limited, if unsteady retreat.

This article examines developments in the family law of post-Mao China. The expansion of the legal regime governing Chinese family life during the past 15 years has been extremely rapid and represents an important legal advance, although to some extent the developments are old wine in new bottles - a reconstruction in legislative form of pre-existing administrative norms already governing family life. In addition, the article necessarily considers a number of significant tensions or contradictions that have become apparent in PRC family law over the past decade or so.

At one level the post-Mao growth in the corpus of family law has a fairly clear meaning. The 1950 Marriage Law and the system of family law which it attempted to put into place were important elements in the generation of political support for the new regime. However, in the post-Mao era the rapid codification of family law has been in large part prompted by the leadership's concern to ensure stability, order and continuity in social life. In addition, the family has once more been installed as the basic unit of social life, a position enhanced by the declining social significance of the danwei or unit. The law has therefore been used to reshape the family in order to make it more consistent with the new economic and social orders being created in the era of reform. There is also a concern to strengthen the rights and interests of the socially vulnerable, and this too has influenced certain areas of family law.

With the rapid decline of traditional media in China, the party-state faces the growing challenge of shaping public opinion online. This article engages with one response to this challenge – a state-sanctioned digital media experiment aimed at creating a new form of journalism that appeals to the public and helps to disseminate Party propaganda. We analyse the emergence of a national success story, Shanghai-based model media outlet Pengpai, and its diffusion across different regions. We argue that the synergy between local officials and media entrepreneurs has propelled Pengpai’s national fame. We further demonstrate that while there has been a cross-national attempt to diffuse this model, it has produced mixed results owing to a number of factors, including the superficial commitment of local officials and media professionals. These findings demonstrate that state-sanctioned decentralized experimentation can deliver unpredictable results in the sphere of media policy, and they further question the capacity of the party-state to effectively reinvent public persuasion in the digital age.

Until recent years, scholars of modern China had generally assumed that in the Cultural Revolution violence of 1966–68 young people were almost arbitrarily joining one or the other of the opposing Red Guard groups. Only within the past few years have researchers begun to unveil the antagonism among students early in the Cultural Revolution over “class” issues and the resulting differences in the composition, tactics and goals of the Red Guard factions.

The Chinese Communist Party has recently unveiled its new agenda for state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform. Most attention to date has focused on structural reform through the so-called “mixed ownership” policy. This article is to direct attention to a critically important yet much less analysed item on the SOE reform agenda: the professionalization of the SOE executive personnel. This article provides an empirical study on the managerial elite of China's financial and non-financial SOEs. The findings suggest a politically constrained management approach in the Chinese state-owned sector. Moreover, an innovative analysis of the SOE executive career patterns reveals that the state-controlled banks and industrial SOEs employ divergent human resource management methods. The anatomy of the SOE managerial elite in this article provides a timely evaluation of the recent SOE reform policy and a richer understanding of China's state-owned sector from a comparative capitalism perspective.

Involuntary resettlement programmes have not only become an increasingly important and separate component of development projects within China but the movement of more than a million persons within the Three Gorges project has generated a new international interest in Chinese resettlement experiences. With a view to examining prior resettlement projects in China, this article is based on interviews with national and provincial bodies responsible for resettlement and on field investigations of linear resettlement attached to the Jiqing highway in Shandong province and of reservoir resettlement within a hydro-electric power project in Guangxi Autonomous Region.

In their concerted and ardent efforts to industrialise and develop the economy rapidly, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have given work incentives an important role—a role which operates narrowly within the limits set by economic necessity and ideology. The pendulum has swung from an emphasis on material incentives (First Five-Year Plan, 1953–57) to a stress on non-material incentives (1957–60) and back again (1960 on). These major changes in incentive policy have reflected the significant turns in the grand socio-economic strategy of the Chinese Communist Party.

A prevalent image of China, both historically and in recent times, has been that of a civilization spared the malady of too many lawyers that is said to beset the United States and growing numbers of other nations. For better or worse, so such thinking goes, China has sought to address its problems primarily through reliance upon morality, custom, kinship or politics, rather than formal legality, with the result that there has been relatively little need for individuals whose work lies in the law. No wonder that it was Shakespeare, rather than a Chinese author, who gave voice to the much-cited, if arguably misunderstood, call to “kill all the lawyers first.”

Using data from three provinces as part of a joint study by Monash University in Australia and China's Institute of Labour Science, an affiliate body of the national Ministry of Labour and Social Security, this article examines the extension of social rights and social security coverage to intra-national migrants in China as a public governance issue. More specifically, it analyses how central government regulations on improving the situation of migrant workers are being interpreted and implemented by local governments. In this regard, it offers a unique case study of difficulties encountered in the local implementation of policy directives issued by the central government.

China has developed a more consequential role in Sudan over the past two decades, during which it has become bound up in the combination of enduring violent internal instability and protracted external adversity that has characterized the politics of the central state since the 1989 Islamist revolution. Two inter-related political trajectories of China's Sudan engagement are examined here. The first concerns Beijing's relations with the ruling National Congress party in incorporating China into its domestic politics and foreign relations amidst war in Darfur, to which Beijing has responded through a more engaged political role. The second confronts the practical limitations of China's sovereignty doctrine and exclusive reliance upon relations with the central state. Following the peace agreement of 2005 that ended the North–South war, and motivated by political imperatives linked to investment protection concerns, China has developed new relations with the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, thus seeking to position itself to navigate Sudan's uncertain political future.

Using nationally representative household survey data and a revealing statistical method, this article investigates the redistributive nature of the Chinese social benefit system within urban and rural areas respectively and in the national context. Like many other dimensions of Chinese society, the redistributive nature of social benefits appeared to be a two-sided story: urban social benefits were much more generous and predominantly progressive, while rural social benefits were minimal and consistently regressive. The national social benefit system was redistributed regressively, but the extent of its regressivity decreased over time, suggesting an equity-oriented policy direction echoed by several recent government initiatives to support rural residents, migrants and the urban poor. The outcomes of these initiatives, especially their redistributive effects, require close observation and await evaluation.

Xi Jinping's rise to power in late 2012 brought immediate political realignments in China, but the extent of these shifts has remained unclear. In this paper, we evaluate whether the perceived changes associated with Xi Jinping's ascent – increased personalization of power, centralization of authority, Party dominance and anti-Western sentiment – were reflected in the content of provincial-level official media. As past research makes clear, media in China have strong signalling functions, and media coverage patterns can reveal which actors are up and down in politics. Applying innovations in automated text analysis to nearly two million newspaper articles published between 2011 and 2014, we identify and tabulate the individuals and organizations appearing in official media coverage in order to help characterize political shifts in the early years of Xi Jinping's leadership. We find substantively mixed and regionally varied trends in the media coverage of political actors, qualifying the prevailing picture of China's “new normal.” Provincial media coverage reflects increases in the personalization and centralization of political authority, but we find a drop in the media profile of Party organizations and see uneven declines in the media profile of foreign actors. More generally, we highlight marked variation across provinces in coverage trends.

A more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic policy-making process have increased the opportunities for China's civilian research institutes to affect foreign policy. Beijing's growing involvement in the international community has created increased demand for research and analysis to aid Chinese leaders in making informed decisions. A more pluralistic and competitive policy environment has given analysts at think tanks more influence, but has also created new competition from analysts and authors working outside the traditional research institute system. This article examines the evolving role of Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutes, their relationships to policy makers, and the pathways through which they provide input into Chinese foreign policy formulation. It provides an overview of the key civilian research institutes, identifies important trends affecting them, and examines the roles and functions they play. The article concludes with an assessment of sources of policy influence within the Chinese foreign policy process.

Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978 China's leaders have moved decisively to restructure the nation's economy. However, it now appears that while the decollectivization of agriculture has dramatically reoriented rural society, entrenched urban bureaucracy prevents a comparable change in the cities. Analysis of personnel policy, and in particular examination of expanded pension programmes, further articulates the nature of these entrenched interests, revealing in detail why post-Mao urban reforms have maintained, even intensified, privileges which rural reforms have transcended or eliminated.

Many areas of China's economy stand to see change from WTO accession, from agriculture to insurance and banking to telecommunications. Among the sectors affected, the automobile industry, as an old-line heavy industry, seems one of the most open to a global challenge. Since its reorganization in the post-Mao Zedong reform era, China's auto industry has been nurtured in a protectionist environment. Joint venture companies have satisfied domestic passenger car vehicle needs, but price and quality problems have left the industry open to some challenge in a free market post-WTO world.

Thirty years ago, in his landmark study of how “a bill becomes a law” in the United States, Daniel Berman reminded constitutional scholars that policy-making processes have an enormous impact on the content of the laws they produce, and are not mere “technical devices” designed to permit orderly Congressional lawmaking. This article begins from the assertion that 16 years after the beginning of China's post-Mao political and legal reforms, scholars of Chinese politics and law need to pay greater attention to the impact which lawmaking processes have on the content of the laws and policies that this system produces. Specifically, it asks the following questions. First, how are national-level laws drafted in post-Mao China, and what are the politics of the lawmaking process? Secondly, what factors in the process affect the “life chances” of a particular draft law? That is, why do some laws win a place on the legislative agenda, while most drafts languish in obscurity, and still others emerge briefly, only to disappear later into the bureaucratic swamp? And finally, what systematic impact, if any, do the politics of the lawmaking process have on the content of the laws which the system produces?

During the past decade China's leaders have called repeatedly for reductions in administrative interventions in the economy, for greater reliance on economic “levers,” for decentralization of economic decision-making, and for an increased role of markets. Although the need for liberalization is fairly widely accepted, debate over how far and how fast to proceed has continued. One view initially proposed by Chen Yun sees China moving towards a system where a “planned economy is primary, and markets are supplementary” (jihua jingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie wei bu). Others advocate moving beyond Chen Yun's vision to a system where, in fact if not in name, allocation takes place primarily through markets. Li Peng's government work report to the first session of the Seventh National People's Congress suggests that the current consensus leans towards the latter, more progressive view:

The focus of reform of the planning system is to transform the function of state planning organs, gradually reduce mandatory planning and expand guidance planning, … use economic instruments, and gradually establish a new economic mechanism where “the state regulates markets, and markets guide enterprises” (guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye).

Recent writings on China's achievements during the last quarter of the 20th century stress, almost without exception, the enormity of change. But, for both universal and particular reasons, this survey of the country's energy resources and uses will stress continuity as much as change. Taking the inertia of complex energy systems as the key universal given, the most important particular explanation lies in peculiarities of China's resource endowment.