Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-01T00:38:19.520Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The People's Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

John P. Burns
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

After 50 years of revolutionary transformation and uneven consolidation, and a generation of economic re-structuring, the political institutions of the People's Republic of China remain essentially Leninist. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to enjoy monopoly power, and independent media, autonomous trade unions and other manifestations of civil society are almost wholly absent. Yet the environment within which the Party now operates has changed fundamentally. Marxist-Leninist parties in power around the world have collapsed and to stay in power the CCP has abandoned central planning for market economics. Living standards and literacy rates have improved dramatically and ordinary people now have more control over their own lives. Some analysts have suggested that as a result of these changes, the regime is facing imminent institutional collapse. Others have suggested that the regime cannot but democratize. This article argues that the regime is more resilient than either of these interpretations allows. In spite of the formal trappings of Leninism and its neo-authoritarian political reform programme, the CCP has adapted to the new situation. The reforms, which date from the early 1980s, have considerably strengthened the country's political institutions. Although there is disagreement on the content and pace of reform, China's elite with few exceptions appears to agree that further political reform is necessary. Yet the Party is caught in a dilemma: if it moves too slowly, it could fail because it cannot meet the demands of the people; if it moves too quickly, it could fail because it further undermines its already weakened position.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 159 , September 1999 , pp. 580 - 594
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. See especially, Minxin, Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).Google Scholar See also Shiping, Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).Google Scholar Andrew Walder writes of the party-state's political decline brought about by the CCP's abandonment of the command economy on which Leninist party rule was based. See Walder, Andrew, “The quiet revolution from within: economic reform as a source of political decline,” in Walder, Andrew (ed.), The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 1–26.Google Scholar

2. See, for example, Friedman, Edward, National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).Google Scholar

3. See Wenhui bao (Hong Kong) 16 01 1999.Google Scholar

4. Kau, Ying-Mao, “Patterns of recruitment and mobility of urban cadres,” in Lewis, John W. (ed.). The City in Communist China (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1971), p. 109.Google Scholar

5. See a survey conducted among university students in Shanghai, in which 81% expressed a desire to apply for Party membership. Xinhua, 12 May 1998, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report – China (FBIS-CHI-98–132), 12 05 1998.Google Scholar

6. Xinhua, 2 August 1998, FBIS-CHI-98–223, 11 August 1998.

7. There have been significant lapses of Party discipline, usually associated with leadership disputes, such as during the Cultural Revolution.

8. In 1949 the party grew by 50%. Growth rates declined in 1950 and 1951 (to 11 and 16% respectively) but they were still high. Only in 1952 in the wake of severe discipline problems did the CCP cut back recruitment to 4%. It shot up again in 1954 to 23%. Shiping, Zheng, Party vs. State, p. 268.Google Scholar

9. See Lieberthal, Kenneth, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 155–182Google Scholar for a discussion of the Party's formal organization. Party committees also routinely established investigation departments until 1983 (thanks to David Shambaugh).

10. Shanghai shi bianzhi weiyuanhui bangongshi (ed.), Shanghai dang zheng jigou yange (Evolution of Shanghai Party and Government Organizations) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 69–70 and 207.Google Scholar See also Sniping, Zheng, Party vs. State, pp. 86–88.Google Scholar

11. Zhifeng, Liu (ed.), Di-qi zi gaige: 1998. Zhongguo zhengfu jigou gaige beiwanlu (The Seventh Reform: Background to the 1998 Organization Reform of the Chinese Government) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998).Google Scholar According to Liu, earlier reforms occurred in 1952–53, 1958–59, 1960–65, 1982, 1988 and 1993.

12. The role of the CCP Secretariat has changed, however.

13. Burns, J. P., “Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (06 1994), pp. 458–491.Google Scholar

14. Such as Party committees in the PLA, the General Political Department and the discipline inspection system. See Shambaugh, David. “The soldier and the state in China: the political work system in the People's Liberation Army,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (09 1991), pp. 527–568.Google Scholar

15. See SCMP, 1 11 1998 for a list of banned titles.Google Scholar

16. See, for example, Jiang Zemin's report to the 15th Party Congress, summarized in Xinhua, 11 September 1997, FBIS-CHI-97–254, 12 September 1997.

17. See the literature on emerging civil society in reformist China. White, Gordon, Riding the Tiger. The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), ch. 8Google Scholar, and Howell, Jude, China Opens Its Doors: The Politics of Economic Transition (London: Lynne Rienner, 1993).Google Scholar

18. State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1998 (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998), p. 324.Google Scholar

19. SCMP, 18 01 1999.Google Scholar See also Xinhua, , 15 01 1999.Google Scholar

20. China Statistical Yearbook 1998, p. 324.Google Scholar

21. Ibid. p. 105.

22. Ibid. p. 132.

23. SCMP, 25 11 1998.Google Scholar

24. On the relaxation of the household registration system, see Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth), No. 1 (01 1997)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-97–046, 1 January 1997.

25. See Renkou yu jingji (Population and Economy), No. 101 (25 03 1997)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-97–121, 25 March 1997.

26. China Statistical Yearbook 1998, p. 127.Google Scholar

27. Liaowang (Outlook), No. 4 (26 01 1998)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–057, 26 February 1998.

28. Gongren ribao (Workers Daily), 10 12 1997Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–042, 11 February 1998 and Renkou yu jingji, No. 107 (25 03 1998)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–174, 23 June 1998.

29. Reported in Zhongguo qingnian bao, 13 02 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–160, 9 June 1998.

30. See Ming bao (Hong Kong), 7 06 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–159, 8 June 1998; SCMP, 12 11 1998Google Scholar, 8 November 1998, 10 November 1998, 15 October 1998, 2 October 1998, 22 November 1998; Zhengming, No. 243 (1 01 1998)Google Scholar in FBIS-CHI-98–135, 15 May 1998; and Hong Kong AFP, 7 September 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–250, 7 September 1998.

31. SCMP, 8 11 1998.Google Scholar

32. See Townsend, James R., Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 103–144.Google Scholar During the Cultural Revolution authorities re-structured the State Council and established revolutionary committees.

33. Xiaoping, Deng, “On the reform of the system of Party and state leadership” (18 08 1980)Google Scholar, in Xiaoping, Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975–1982 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 302–325.Google Scholar

34. Ziyang, Zhao, “Advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Beijing Review, No. 30, Vol. 45 (9–15 11 1987) (insert).Google Scholar

35. Xinhua, , 12 09 1997Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-97–254, 12 September 1997. In the wake of the 4 June 1989 episode, the Party abandoned “separating Party and government functions” and revised its proposals for separate management methods for “political” and “professional” civil servants.

36. Xinhua, , 12 09 1997Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-97–254, 12 September 1997.

37. See Dickson, Bruce, Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (London: Oxford University Press, 1997).Google Scholar

38. Lee, Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 56–57.Google Scholar

39. Shiping, Zheng, Party vs. State, p. 268.Google Scholar

40. See Robison, Richard and Goodman, David S. G. (eds.), New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds, and Middle Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996).Google Scholar

41. See Zhengming, No. 255 (1 10 1998)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–290, 17 October 1998, which argues that collective leadership was “harmonious” in mid-1998.

42. Manion, Melanie, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. Cheng, Li and White, Lynn T. III, “Elite transformation and modern change in mainland China and Taiwan: empirical data and the theory of technocracy,” The China Quarterly, No. 121 (03 1990), p. 15.Google Scholar

44. In one random sample survey carried out in Nanjing, respondents were asked to rank occupations according to prestige. Civil servants ranked 24th out of 50 occupations. The top positions went to university teachers, mathematicians, middle school teachers, engineers, doctors, architects and so forth. Individual traders (getihu) and prostitutes scored at the bottom. Shehui, No. 1 (01 1997), p. 8.Google Scholar Other surveys, such as one carried out among Peking University students in 1997, indicated that 27% of respondents hoped to work for “Party or government units,” 23% for joint venture enterprises (sanzi qiye), 13% for institutes of higher learning, 10% for research institutes, 8% for state-owned enterprises, and 1% for middle schools. A further 16% were reported as “other.” Zhongguo qingnian bao, 5–10 06 1997.Google Scholar

45. Interview, Ministry of Personnel, 22 July 1996.

46. Liaowang, No. 10 (03 1997)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-97–071, 10 March 1997; Renmin ribao, 24 03 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–097, 7 April 1998 Xinhua, 23 June 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–179, 28 June 1998; Renmin ribao, 17 01 1996Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-96–034, 17 January 1996; and SCMP, 22 09 1998.Google Scholar The problem is so serious that it has received Politburo attention. See Ming bao (Hong Kong), 28 10 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–301, 28 October 1998.

47. See the case of Guangdong's Yu Fei in Xin bao (Hong Kong), 16 10 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–296, 23 October 1998.

48. Liaowang, No. 4 (25 01 1998)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–057, 26 February 1998.

49. Xinhua, , 24 03 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97–083, 24 March 1997.Google Scholar

50. Xinhua, , 7 08 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96–162, 7 August 1996.Google Scholar

51. See Burns, J. P., “Restructuring the Chinese government: 1993–1996: a preliminary assessment” (unpublished paper).Google Scholar

52. According to one view attributed to Lord Dicey, the rule of law means that the state is treated as just another actor.

53. Xinhua, , 31 03 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97–139, 19 May 1997.Google Scholar

54. Xinhua, , 31 03 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97–139, 19 May 1997.Google Scholar

55. SCMP, 6 01 1994.Google Scholar

56. Survey carried out in urban areas by the State Economic Structure Reform Commission and reported in Zhongguo qingnian bao, 13 02 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–160, 9 June 1998.

57. See Tanner, M. Scott, “The erosion of Communist Party control over lawmaking in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (06 1994), pp. 381–403.Google Scholar

58. See Chen, Albert H.Y., An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1992), p. 109.Google Scholar See also Xinhua, , 15 04 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–106, 16 April 1998.Google Scholar

59. See Xinhua, , 15 07 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–196, 15 July 1998.Google Scholar

60. Xinhua, , 31 07 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–217, 5 August 1998.Google Scholar

61. Liaowang, No. 7 (17 02 1998)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–044, 17 February 1998, and Zheng-fa luntan (Politics and Law Forum), No. 73 (02 1997)Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-97–115, 1 February 1997.

62. Guangzhou ribao reported in SCMP, 1 04 1998.Google Scholar According to the head of the Guangzhou Municipal Court, in 1997 verdicts in 6,000 cases were not enforced, an increase of 31% over 1996. The judge also reported cases of government bodies intimidating the court and of police lobbying to overturn criminal convictions. In one case, a procuratorate official turned up to pay the debts of a convicted criminal.

63. Xinhua, , 25 06 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–176, 25 June 1998.Google Scholar

64. The press reports that cases of “self-nomination” are growing in village elections. “This has helped ordinary farmers, who are not CCP members and never served as a village cadre to become strong competitors for membership in the villagers' committee,” said Xinhua, 22 April 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97–112, 22 April 1997.

65. Tianjian, Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 176–77 and 278–79.Google Scholar

66. SCMP, 16 11 1998.Google Scholar

67. CCP circular on “wild-cat unions” quoted in SCMP, 4 06 1996.Google Scholar

68. SCMP, 4 06 1996, 2 11 1998 and 28 12 1998Google Scholar; AFP (Hong Kong), 29 March 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–088, 29 March 1998.

69. Xin bao (Hong Kong), 10 11 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–314, 10 November 1998. In October, activists set up an Anti Corruption Watchdog Group in Henan, which was promptly banned. AFP (Hong Kong), 14 October 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–287, 14 October 1998.

70. Xinhua, , 3 11 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–309, 5 November 1998.

71. SCMP, 23 and 28 12 1998.Google Scholar

72. The countries were Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, Austria and Italy in Nathan, Andrew J. and Tianjian, Shi, “Cultural requisites for democracy in China: findings from a survey,” Daedalus, Vol. 122, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 112.Google Scholar

73. Dagong bao (Hong Kong), 17 04 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–110, 20 April 1998.

74. See Bums, , “Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection,” pp. 465–66.Google Scholar

75. Hong Kong Standard, 11 10 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–286, 13 October 1998. See also Ming bao, 12 09 1998Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI-98–255, 12 September 1998, and AFP (Hong Kong), 14 September 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98–257, 14 September 1998.

76. Xinhua, , 26 01 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97–018, 26 January 1997.Google Scholar