Inherence is an important component of psychological essentialism. By drawing on vitalism as a way in which to explain this link, however, the authors appear to conflate causal explanations based on fixed features with those based on general causal forces. The disjuncture between these two types of explanatory principles highlights potential new avenues for the inherence heuristic.

Language production is a multilevel phenomenon, and human capacities to communicate vocally progress from early forms, based on projections of motor cortex to brainstem nuclei, to complex elaborations, mediated by high-order cognition and fostered by socially mediated feedback.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) carry out an extremely sharp and static distinction between conscious and unconscious decisions, ignoring a process that dynamically transfers decisions and actions between the conscious and unconscious domains of the mind: habitual decision making. We propose a new categorisation and discuss the main characteristics of this process from a philosophical and neuroscientific perspective.

We agree that emergent group-level properties are important; however, we disagree that current approaches, especially culture-gene coevolutionary (CGC) approaches, have neglected them. We explain how CGC helps demystify the tumult of humans' group-level complexity by “starting at the start,” and why (a) assuming undifferentiated individuals and (b) focusing on cooperation are actually powerful tools to this end.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) argue that an explanation for blindsight need not appeal to unconscious brain processes, citing research indicating that the condition merely reflects degraded visual experience. We reply that other evidence suggests blindsighters' predictive behavior under forced choice reflects cognitive access to low-level visual information that does not correlate with visual consciousness. Therefore, while we grant that visual consciousness may be required for full visual experience, we argue that it may not be needed for decision making and judgment.

Building upon Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) theory, we propose a complementary view that goal formation and selection are both supported by affect. We suggest that goals may form when affect “tags” discrete behaviors and their outcomes. Further, we propose that goal-associated affect may help guide selection between competing goals, for example, in the case of short-term and long-term goals.

Ackermann et al. briefly point out the potential significance of coordinated vocal behavior in the dual pathway model of acoustic communication. Rhythmically entrained and articulated pre-linguistic vocal activity in early hominins might have set the evolutionary stage for later refinements that manifest in modern humans as language-based conversational turn-taking, joint music-making, and other behaviors associated with prosociality.

Smaldino's proposed extension of the theory of cultural evolution embraces emergent group-level traits. We argue, instead, that group-level traits reduce to the traits of individuals, particularly when it comes to the question of how group-level traits are inherited or transmitted, and that this metaphysical fact is integral to the theory of cultural evolution.

Prior work has detailed the constructivist processes that lead individuals to categorize others along particular dimensions (e.g., gender) and generate the content (e.g., stereotypes) and affect (e.g., prejudices) associated with social groups. The inherence heuristic is a novel mechanism that appears to shape the content and rigidity of children's social stereotypes and prejudices.

Lankford makes many useful points regarding the myths and shibboleths underlying our understanding of self-destructive killers and suicide bombers. He has collated an impressive data set on such offenders. However, his classification scheme is not built on sufficient evidence to support his proposed discrete categories of conventional, coerced, escapist, and indirect suicide terrorists. It would be straightforward to analyse the data, but it is unlikely that the resulting model would reflect that anticipated.

Newell and Shanks provide a useful critique on unconscious decision making. However, they do not consider an important set of functional brain imaging studies of unconscious processes. Here we review briefly the relevant brain imaging and psychobiological literature and its implications for understanding unconscious decision making.

Understanding the cultural evolution of complicated group-level traits requires the mathematical formulation of a dynamical system with birth and death events at multiple levels, that is, at the level of individual humans and at the level of groups of humans. Both levels are characterized by cultural traits that have complicated transmission, innovation, and inheritance mechanisms and that can undergo a form of Lamarckian evolution.

FOXP2 expression in the evolution of language derives from its role in allowing vocal articulation that is sensitive to its consequences. The discrete verbal discourse it allows must have evolved recently relative to affective features of vocal behavior such as tone of voice. Because all organ systems must have evolved in the service of behavior, attention is given to ways in which environments may have driven brain organization.

Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) appear to characterize the inherence heuristic and essentialism as unwise or childish aspects of human reasoning. But actually, these cognitive modes lie at the core of statistical analysis across all of the quantitative sciences, including the developmental cognitive psychology in which the argument here is couched. Their whole argument is as much an example of its topic as an analysis of it.

This commentary offers a friendly extension of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) account. Not only do active goals sometimes operate unconsciously to dominate or preempt others, but simultaneously active goals can also collaborate or compromise in shaping behavior. Because neither goal wins complete control of behavior, the result may be that each is only partly satisfied.

Suicide attacks and terrorism are characterized by cognitive simplicity, which is related to self-deception. In justifying violence in pursuit of ideologically and/or politically driven commitment, people with high religious commitment may be particularly prone to mechanisms of self-deception. Related megalomania and glorious self-perception are typical of self-deception, and are thus crucial in the emergence and expression of (suicide) terrorism.

Cimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) proposal comes unstuck on precisely the claim that inherence is an heuristic, able to deliver simple, shallow outputs that are right most of the time. Instead, the inherence heuristic delivers outputs that imply it is not an heuristic after all, and is simply too fast and too easy a mechanism to do the job of explaining categorisations.

An explicit role for emergent group-level traits, social role diversification, and coordination makes good sense when thinking about human evolution. To most effectively understand these and other facets, we need to move toward an integrative model that assumes niche construction and encompasses positive feedback systems at individual, subgroup and larger group levels, demographic processes, and local ecologies.

Conceptually integrating Selfish Goal Theory with modern evolutionary psychology amplifies theoretical power. Inconsistency, a key principle of Selfish Goal Theory, illustrates this insight. Conflicting goals of seeking sexual variety and successful mate retention furnish one example. Siblings have evolved goals to cooperate and compete, a second example. Integrating Selfish Goal Theory with evolutionary theory can explain much inconsistent goal-directed behavior.

This commentary focuses on the bidirectional links between unconscious influences and decision making. In particular, it examines the extent to which awareness is (not) necessary to the impact of decisions on psychological processes such as preferences. This analysis might help researchers to gain an extended perspective of Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) concerns regarding the role of unconscious influences in theories of decision making.