Heyes suggests that selective social learning comes in two varieties. One is common, domain general, and associative. The other is rare, domain specific, and metacognitive. We argue that this binary distinction cannot quite do the work she assigns it and sketch a framework in which additional strategies for selective social learning might be accommodated.

Autistic, developmental, and nonhuman primate populations fail tasks that are thought to involve attributing beliefs, but not those thought to reflect the representation of knowledge. Instead of knowledge representations being more basic than belief representations, relational mentalizing may explain these observations: The tasks referred to as reflecting “belief” representation, but not the “knowledge” representation tasks, are social conflict designs. They involve mental conflict monitoring after another's mental state is represented – with effects that need to be accounted for.

We extend Tomasello's discussion of children's developing sense of obligation to testimonial learning. First, we review a battery of behaviors in testimonial exchanges that parallel those described by Tomasello. Second, we explore the variable ways in which children hold others accountable, suggestive that children's evaluations of moral and epistemic responsibilities in joint collaborative activities are distinct.

The critique of the genetics of complex social outcomes is partly well-founded, insofar as social outcomes sometimes have unreliable relations with cognitive traits. But the correct conclusion is not to dismiss the entire field altogether. Rather, the implication is to redirect geneticists' attention to the stable cognitive phenotypes that are natural candidates for genetic analysis.

According to Marr, explanations of perceptual behavior should address multiple levels of analysis. Rahnev & Denison (R&D) are perhaps overly dismissive of optimality considerations at the computational level. Also, an exclusive reliance on standard observer models may cause neglect of many other plausible hypotheses at the algorithmic level. Therefore, as far as explanation goes, standard observer modeling is no panacea.

Defense of reproductive choice is an important motivation in women's self-protection psychology for which the “staying alive theory” cannot fully account. Evidence indicates that some elements of women's self-protection psychology function to protect reproductive choice rather than survival, or may be equally well explained by either motivation. Integrating perspectives will result in greater explanatory breadth and precision in theory testing.

Apparently inconsistent with the CLASH model, animal research relates predictable environments to rigid routine behaviors and aggression. However, our work on evolutionary and neural adaptations to (un)predictable environments may be able to reconcile the CLASH model with the animal research, but also suggests complexities beyond the dichotomous approach of CLASH.

Leibovich et al. hypothesize that the absence of visual object individuation limits infants' numerical skills and necessitates a reliance on continuous magnitudes. We argue that parallels between infants' numerical discrimination in the visual and auditory modalities, their abilities to match numerosities across modalities, and their greater ability to discriminate changes in number compared with continuous magnitudes contradict the authors' assumptions.

Bermúdez claims that agents think about framed outcomes, not outcomes themselves; and that seemingly incoherent preferences can be rational, once defined over framed outcomes. However, the agents in his examples know that alternative frames describe the same outcome, neutrally understood. This undermines the restriction of their preferences to framed outcomes and, in turn, the argument for rational framing effects.

Structural priming data are sometimes compatible with several theoretical views, as shown here for three key theoretical claims. One reason is that prime sentences affect multiple representational levels driving syntactic choice. Additionally, priming is affected by further cognitive functions (e.g., memory). We therefore see priming as a useful tool for the investigation of linguistic representation but not the only tool.

The search for a deep, multileveled understanding of human intelligence is perhaps the grand challenge for 21st-century science, with broad implications for technology. The project of building machines that think like humans is central to meeting this challenge and critical to efforts to craft new technologies for human benefit.

We emphasize the importance of a neuroevolutionary perspective in moving beyond the cognition-emotion dichotomy. Cognitive behavior depends on cortical structures firmly rooted in the emotional brain from which they have evolved. As such, there cannot be cognition without emotion. Endocrine regulation of amygdala connectivity, a neural “switch” between impulsivity and deliberation, further underscores the phylogenetic impossibility of a cognition-emotion dichotomy.

Are grounded procedures such as cleansing value-neutral main effects? Culture-as-situated-cognition theory suggests otherwise. Societies differ in how frequently they trigger membership and individualizing cultural mindsets and their linked mental-procedures – connecting and separating, respectively. Commonly triggered mindsets (and their linked mental-procedures) feel fluent. Fluency feels good. Cleansing can separate from but also connect to others in the form of membership-based rituals.

We agree with Clarke and Beck that the approximate number system represents rational numbers, and we demonstrate our support by highlighting the case of the empty set – the non-symbolic manifestation of zero. It is particularly interesting because of its perceptual and semantic uniqueness, and its exploration reveals fundamental new insights about how numerical information is represented.

The music and social bonding (MSB) hypothesis proposes that human musicality has evolved as mechanisms supporting social bonding. We consider the MSB hypothesis under the lens of amnesia by arguing how patients with amnesia, especially those with Alzheimer's disease, can benefit from music, not only to retrieve personal memories, but also to use them for social bonding.

While the metarepresentational structure of ostensive communication may explain the unleashing of human expression, it neither explains the open-endedness of the thoughts expressed/communicated, nor how the multiply embedded nature of the metarepresentational structure invoked arose. These both require the recursivity of human language, a capacity which must be distinguished from external (public) languages and their use in communication.

This commentary makes three points: (1) the existing evidence does not consistently favor the proposed sex difference in attractiveness preferences, nor the fitness-related outcomes of attractiveness; (2) the neglected association of perceived attractiveness and trustworthiness allowed the authors to incorrectly attribute many findings solely to attractiveness, and (3) the importance accorded attractiveness in mate preferences is culturally shaped and likely evolutionarily novel.

Does general intelligence exist across species, and has it been a target of natural selection? These questions can be addressed with genomic data, which can rule out artifacts by demonstrating that distinct cognitive abilities are genetically correlated and thus share a biological substrate. This work has begun with data from humans and can be extended to other species; it should focus not only on general intelligence but also specific capacities like language and spatial ability.

Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on examples from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition.

We identify three “working edges” for fruitful elaboration of the Chunk-and-Pass proposal: (a) accounting for the earliest phases of language acquisition, (b) explaining diversity in the stability and plasticity of different representational types, and (c) propelling investigation of action processing.