In their moral disciplining theory (MDT), Fitouchi et al. argue that people moralize victimless transgressions because such activities are perceived to diminish self-control – a necessary skill for building and maintaining long-term cooperative relationships. We agree with the authors' argument and commend them for their comprehensive, interdisciplinary review and innovative theorizing. In this commentary, we offer three considerations for extending MDT and suggest how MDT may help us understand fundamental tensions between core moral intuitions and liberal democracy.
First, we submit that the perceived causal arrow between puritanical violations and self-control is likely bidirectional. The authors convincingly argue that people perceive puritanical violations (like gluttony) as causing people to have lower self-control. However, people likely also perceive low self-control as causing self-indulgent behaviors. Puritanical violations may thus be perceived as either diminishing future self-control or simply signaling already low self-control. Puritanical norms put individuals' self-control to the test; the more stringent the puritanical requirements, the more stringent the test of one's self-control. Imposing puritanical norms can help reveal who within a partner market possesses suitable discipline. Consequently, puritanical norms may enable the most self-disciplined individuals in a market to be “choosier” and select more comparably cooperative partners (by avoiding transgressors), a form of assortative matching that can optimize cooperative dynamics (Geoffroy, Baumard, & André, Reference Geoffroy, Baumard and André2019). Even if puritanical norms do not alter people's capacities for self-control, they may nonetheless alter the dynamics of cooperation by changing who pairs with whom. We would like to see future work on MDT further consider how signaling contributes to the evolution of puritanism.
Second, although the authors describe instances of both proscriptive puritanism (behaviors that should be inhibited) and prescriptive puritanism (behaviors that should be encouraged; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, Reference Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp2009), their theorizing focuses on the former. It is important to recognize that self-control can be caused or signaled not just by the inhibition of apparently “victimless” pleasures, like masturbating and overeating, but also through the expression of apparently “beneficiary-less” virtues. We have theorized that the expenditure of needless or redundant effort is one such perceived virtue (Celniker et al., Reference Celniker, Gregory, Koo, Piff, Ditto and Shariff2023). Specifically, we have found that people who exert more effort are seen as more moral and are more often chosen as cooperation partners, even when those efforts produce nothing of material value. As with restraint from bodily pleasures, voluntary exertion of effort is perceived as evidence of self-control and discipline. Investigating the distinction between proscriptive and prescriptive moral intuitions, and integrating such findings into MDT, may foster a more precise understanding of puritanism and its social functions.
As an example, there are reasons to suspect that the dynamics of signaling work differently with proscriptive and prescriptive forms of moral disciplining. In a partner choice market, it is often not enough for people to show an absolute level of morality; they must compete to demonstrate their superior moral standing relative to others (Barclay, Reference Barclay2013). As a result, both proscriptive and prescriptive norms can lead to spirals of one-upmanship as people outdo each other to demonstrate their prosocial superiority. Yet one key difference is that, with proscriptive puritanical norms, the downward pressure on victimless self-indulgences is limited by a floor: total abstinence. In contrast, for prescriptive puritanical norms, the upward pressure on virtue signaling has no obvious ceiling. Prescriptive puritanism may thus contribute to destructive “arms races” of discipline signaling, such as exerting more and more effort, or working longer and longer hours, even when these efforts do not clearly provide greater value (Celniker et al., Reference Celniker, Gregory, Koo, Piff, Ditto and Shariff2023; Markovits, Reference Markovits2019). These arms races may be limited only by reaching the point at which the costs of self-discipline outweigh the cooperative benefits reaped on the partner choice market – or by exhaustion. An admitted limitation of some prior work on runaway cooperation was the omission of signaling and reputation management variables (Geoffroy et al., Reference Geoffroy, Baumard and André2019). Incorporating signaling into such models, and MDT generally, may be made more tractable by exploring the differences engendered by proscriptive and prescriptive self-discipline.
Finally, the authors showed admirable restraint in detailing the wider implications of their theory. Lacking this restraint, we will briefly speculate about how MDT may help explain and address challenges to economic and social progress. We have argued that our work on effort moralization (Celniker et al., Reference Celniker, Gregory, Koo, Piff, Ditto and Shariff2023) reveals fundamental tensions between folk-economic intuitions (e.g., unproductive effort is morally commendable) and basic economic principles (e.g., unproductive effort is inefficient and should be minimized) that may lead to moralistic resistance to certain public policies (e.g., universal basic income). The research reviewed by the authors revealed similar tensions, this time between puritanical intuitions (e.g., austere demands on speech, dress, and conduct) and the ideals of classical liberalism (e.g., freedom of expression, the right to privacy, and other guarantees on civil liberties). The inherent conflict between puritanical morals and norms of liberal democracy may help explain why the “end of history” (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama1989) is so elusive: Authoritarian appeals are often fueled by puritanical morals that are deeply intuitive and easily evoked. This perspective may help shed light on the current era of democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence (Inglehart & Norris, Reference Inglehart and Norris2017). Recognizing conflicts between our moral intuitions and liberal ideals, and refining our understanding of the situational and ecological contexts in which puritanical intuitions are more readily indulged, may improve our grasp of the conditions that enable our authoritarian impulses and those that reign them in.
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In their moral disciplining theory (MDT), Fitouchi et al. argue that people moralize victimless transgressions because such activities are perceived to diminish self-control – a necessary skill for building and maintaining long-term cooperative relationships. We agree with the authors' argument and commend them for their comprehensive, interdisciplinary review and innovative theorizing. In this commentary, we offer three considerations for extending MDT and suggest how MDT may help us understand fundamental tensions between core moral intuitions and liberal democracy.
First, we submit that the perceived causal arrow between puritanical violations and self-control is likely bidirectional. The authors convincingly argue that people perceive puritanical violations (like gluttony) as causing people to have lower self-control. However, people likely also perceive low self-control as causing self-indulgent behaviors. Puritanical violations may thus be perceived as either diminishing future self-control or simply signaling already low self-control. Puritanical norms put individuals' self-control to the test; the more stringent the puritanical requirements, the more stringent the test of one's self-control. Imposing puritanical norms can help reveal who within a partner market possesses suitable discipline. Consequently, puritanical norms may enable the most self-disciplined individuals in a market to be “choosier” and select more comparably cooperative partners (by avoiding transgressors), a form of assortative matching that can optimize cooperative dynamics (Geoffroy, Baumard, & André, Reference Geoffroy, Baumard and André2019). Even if puritanical norms do not alter people's capacities for self-control, they may nonetheless alter the dynamics of cooperation by changing who pairs with whom. We would like to see future work on MDT further consider how signaling contributes to the evolution of puritanism.
Second, although the authors describe instances of both proscriptive puritanism (behaviors that should be inhibited) and prescriptive puritanism (behaviors that should be encouraged; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, Reference Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp2009), their theorizing focuses on the former. It is important to recognize that self-control can be caused or signaled not just by the inhibition of apparently “victimless” pleasures, like masturbating and overeating, but also through the expression of apparently “beneficiary-less” virtues. We have theorized that the expenditure of needless or redundant effort is one such perceived virtue (Celniker et al., Reference Celniker, Gregory, Koo, Piff, Ditto and Shariff2023). Specifically, we have found that people who exert more effort are seen as more moral and are more often chosen as cooperation partners, even when those efforts produce nothing of material value. As with restraint from bodily pleasures, voluntary exertion of effort is perceived as evidence of self-control and discipline. Investigating the distinction between proscriptive and prescriptive moral intuitions, and integrating such findings into MDT, may foster a more precise understanding of puritanism and its social functions.
As an example, there are reasons to suspect that the dynamics of signaling work differently with proscriptive and prescriptive forms of moral disciplining. In a partner choice market, it is often not enough for people to show an absolute level of morality; they must compete to demonstrate their superior moral standing relative to others (Barclay, Reference Barclay2013). As a result, both proscriptive and prescriptive norms can lead to spirals of one-upmanship as people outdo each other to demonstrate their prosocial superiority. Yet one key difference is that, with proscriptive puritanical norms, the downward pressure on victimless self-indulgences is limited by a floor: total abstinence. In contrast, for prescriptive puritanical norms, the upward pressure on virtue signaling has no obvious ceiling. Prescriptive puritanism may thus contribute to destructive “arms races” of discipline signaling, such as exerting more and more effort, or working longer and longer hours, even when these efforts do not clearly provide greater value (Celniker et al., Reference Celniker, Gregory, Koo, Piff, Ditto and Shariff2023; Markovits, Reference Markovits2019). These arms races may be limited only by reaching the point at which the costs of self-discipline outweigh the cooperative benefits reaped on the partner choice market – or by exhaustion. An admitted limitation of some prior work on runaway cooperation was the omission of signaling and reputation management variables (Geoffroy et al., Reference Geoffroy, Baumard and André2019). Incorporating signaling into such models, and MDT generally, may be made more tractable by exploring the differences engendered by proscriptive and prescriptive self-discipline.
Finally, the authors showed admirable restraint in detailing the wider implications of their theory. Lacking this restraint, we will briefly speculate about how MDT may help explain and address challenges to economic and social progress. We have argued that our work on effort moralization (Celniker et al., Reference Celniker, Gregory, Koo, Piff, Ditto and Shariff2023) reveals fundamental tensions between folk-economic intuitions (e.g., unproductive effort is morally commendable) and basic economic principles (e.g., unproductive effort is inefficient and should be minimized) that may lead to moralistic resistance to certain public policies (e.g., universal basic income). The research reviewed by the authors revealed similar tensions, this time between puritanical intuitions (e.g., austere demands on speech, dress, and conduct) and the ideals of classical liberalism (e.g., freedom of expression, the right to privacy, and other guarantees on civil liberties). The inherent conflict between puritanical morals and norms of liberal democracy may help explain why the “end of history” (Fukuyama, Reference Fukuyama1989) is so elusive: Authoritarian appeals are often fueled by puritanical morals that are deeply intuitive and easily evoked. This perspective may help shed light on the current era of democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence (Inglehart & Norris, Reference Inglehart and Norris2017). Recognizing conflicts between our moral intuitions and liberal ideals, and refining our understanding of the situational and ecological contexts in which puritanical intuitions are more readily indulged, may improve our grasp of the conditions that enable our authoritarian impulses and those that reign them in.
Acknowledgments
J.B. Celniker thanks Nathan Ballantyne and Melody Moore for their helpful discussions related to this article.
Financial support
This work was supported by a Canada 150 Research Chair from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (to A.F. Shariff).
Competing interest
None.