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Quasi-cyclical preferences in the ethics of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Adam J. Roberts Open the ORCID record for Adam J. Roberts [Opens in a new window]
Adam J. Roberts*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London WC2R 2LS, UK [email protected]
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Abstract

Bermúdez describes the extensionality principle as being “almost unquestioned.” This claim might come as a surprise to philosophers who work on agency and ethics. In Kantian deontological ethics and in Platonic or Aristotelian virtue ethics, our preferences for outcomes can be rationally affected by how those outcomes are framed in terms of maxims and character traits.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e238
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Aristotle (2012). Eudemian ethics. (B. Inwood, & R. Woolf, Trans.) Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
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Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plato (2012). Republic. (C. Rowe, Trans.) Penguin.Google Scholar