About the American tradition of individualism much has been said and written—so much, indeed, that this country has come to be regarded as the stronghold of individualism. That the ideal of the free individual has long pervaded American thought cannot, of course, be denied. Yet while it is true that this tradition is clearly discernible throughout American political development, its role has been grossly exaggerated. Along with individualism there has existed in America, from the earliest days of colonization, an equally strong and an equally significant collectivist tradition. The New Deal and its presumptive successor, the Fair Deal, regarded by so many as new and dangerous departures, actually are like their predecessors, the Square Deal and the New Freedom, the Granger and the Populist movements, merely episodes in the development of a venerable American tradition of collectivism.

Time-series cross-section (TSCS) data are prevalent in political science, yet many distinct challenges presented by TSCS data remain underaddressed. We focus on how dependence in both space and time complicates estimating either spatial or temporal dependence, dynamics, and effects. Little is known about how modeling one of temporal or cross-sectional dependence well while neglecting the other affects results in TSCS analysis. We demonstrate analytically and through simulations how misspecification of either temporal or spatial dependence inflates estimates of the other dimension’s dependence and thereby induces biased estimates and tests of other covariate effects. Therefore, we recommend the spatiotemporal autoregressive distributed lag (STADL) model with distributed lags in both space and time as an effective general starting point for TSCS model specification. We illustrate with two example reanalyses and provide R code to facilitate researchers’ implementation—from automation of common spatial-weights matrices (W) through estimated spatiotemporal effects/response calculations—for their own TSCS analyses.

How does exile affect online dissent? By internationalizing activists’ networks and removing them from day-to-day life under the regime, we argue that exile fundamentally alters activists’ political opportunities and strategic behavior. We test the effect of exile on activists’ public discourse in the case of Venezuela, through an analysis of over 5 million tweets by 357 activists spanning seven years. Our results suggest that after going into exile activists increasingly emphasize foreign-led interventions to shape their home country politics, focus less on local grievances, and become more harshly critical of the regime. This is partly due to the changes in exiles’ networks: after leaving, activists increase their interactions with foreign actors and tweet more in English. This work contributes to our understanding of the relationship between exile—one of the most ubiquitous yet understudied forms of repression—and dissent in the digital age.

In this study, we evaluate whether the increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has resulted in their increased use for foreign policy behavior by the nations of the world. This question is examined in three related ways: (1) the aggregate use of IGOs for foreign policy behavior; (2) the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use; and (3) the kinds of states that use IGOs. Our data base consists of the 35 nations in the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set for the years 1959–1968.

The main findings are that IGOs were employed over 60 percent of the time with little fluctuation on a year-by-year basis, that global and “high politics” IGOs were used more often than regional and “low politics” IGOs, that institutional membership and IGO use were generally inversely related, and that the attributes of the states had limited utility in accounting for the use of intergovernmental organizations. Some of the theoretical implications of these findings are then explored.

In his article in the June 1991 issue of this Review, Ted Hopf challenged the argument that bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar configurations of power. He reported that the international situation in sixteenth century Europe became only marginally more stable with a shift from a multipolar to a bipolar system. He argued for attention to the offensive-defensive balance, rather than systemic polarity. Manus Midlarsky accounts for Hopf's findings, and for evidence of multipolarity and increased conflict in the early seventeenth and twentieth centuries, by proposing a relationship between polarity and war that is contingent on scarcity of desired international resources. Midlarsky argues for more attention to contingent relationships generally and draws implications for current and future probabilities of conflict in a multipolar world. Hopf responds by pointing out the need for further development of Midlarsky's analysis, the possible compatibility between Midlarsky's formulation and his own focus on the offensive-defensive balance, and the desirability of a productive unity of the two research programs.

The political party, etymologically and logically, can embrace only a part of the citizenry, politically organized. The party is a fraction; it is pars pro toto. Let us endeavor briefly to analyze its causal origin and its behavior.

According to Max Weber, the political party has a dual teleology. It is a spontaneous society of propaganda and of agitation seeking to acquire power, in order to procure thereby for its active militant adherents chances, ideal and material, for the realization either of objective aims or of personal advantages, or of both. Consequently, the general orientation of the political party, whether in its personal or impersonal aspect, is that of Machtstreben (striving to power).

In the personal aspect, parties are often based on the protection accorded inferiors by a strong man. In the Prussian diet of 1855, which was composed of a large number of political groups, each was given the name of its leader.

The march of events has vindicated the reasoning of those who, for many years, in innumerable books and magazine articles, have been warning the western world of the perils lurking in the “danger zone of Europe,” and the present European war is nothing more nor less than the Armageddon which has at last been removed from the realm of obscure apprehension to that of pitiless reality.

The Balkan question cannot be finally settled by the outcome of military operations alone, however decisive they may appear. If the solution imposed by military force is also the solution dictated by justice, it may be reasonably relied on for permanency. If on the contrary it merely represents the triumph of might over right the decision will be sure to be contested and we must look forward to future wars. Consequently the powers which will determine the form of the treaty of peace should seek a solution in harmony with justice first of all, in a steadfast desire to secure the peace and stability of Europe.

The most tantalizing problems faced by students of international relations are those which revolve around the question of motivation in national action. The rôle of ideas and attitudes in determining the behavior of nations is an obtrusive factor in every international situation. Among characteristic ideologies appearing as a growing determinant of national action is the German ideology regarding Lebensraum. Here is one of those words which have been in the German language for a very long time, but which has been popularized by the National Socialists. Literally translated, Lebensraum means “living space,” and when interpreted by anyone in Germany it is taken to indicate all that which is necessary for guaranteeing the life and development of the German people—physically, politically, and economically. It embraces all kinds of issues based upon prestige, historical, and geographical considerations. The terms “equal status” and “self-determination,” indefinite though they were, may have seemed to have definite limits; but Lebensraum goes much beyond them. It is the greatest single underlying cause of the war and the keyword of the new empire for which Hitler and his followers are struggling. The Nazis became increasingly convinced that nothing can save Germany except a genuine expansion of her Lebensraum and the unconditional return of her old colonies. This new empire must be consolidated in one compact mass in the center of Europe. First, the people of the same blood—Austrians, Sudeten-Germans—had to be incorporated; then the territory of Bohemia-Moravia, because of its geographical and strategic position, even though its inhabitants were mainly Slavs; while Slovakia had to be granted “independence” on account of “internal” disintegration.

One of the most controversial legislative matters considered by the Seventy-eighth Congress was the question of whether or not Congress should simplify voting procedures for service men and women. The popular feeling of the nation strongly favored giving the armed forces every opportunity to vote, not inconsistent with the necessities of war. The controversy in Congress was not restricted entirely to the constitutional question of whether or not Congress had the legal power to provide soldiers with a federal ballot by which they could vote for president, vice-president, representatives, and senators, but in addition, it raised social and political questions of great magnitude. The political significance of the service vote became increasingly apparent when the Gallup Poll announced on December 4, 1943, that the soldier vote, which favored President Franklin D. Roosevelt by 61 per cent, could break the apparent even division of the electorate between the two parties and assure Roosevelt of reëlection. The social significance of liberal federal legislation on the issue was obvious, since numerous states have suffrage laws to prevent the practice of universal suffrage.

The term “veto” has been traced from the power of the tribune of the plebs in ancient Rome to annul or suspend the acts of other public authorities. From the establishment of the Roman tribune, that official had the right of intercession (intercessio), to cancel any command of a consul which infringed the liberties of a citizen; and this was gradually extended to other administrative acts and even to decrees of the senate. The word veto (I forbid) was at least occasionally used by the tribune in such cases.

But historically what is called the veto power of American executives is derived from the legislative power of the British Crown. Until the fifteenth century statutes in England were enacted by the king on his own initiative or in response to petitions. From that time parliament presented bills in place of petitions; and statutes were enacted by the king “by and with the advice and consent of the lords …. and the commons …. and by the authority of the same.” The king's assent was still necessary; and without this assent a bill was not law. For two hundred years the Crown continued to exercise the negative power of declining to accept bills, not by any formal act of disapproval, but by the polite response in old Norman French, “le roy s'avisera.” Since the beginning of the eighteenth century no bill which has passed parliament has failed to receive the royal assent; but the old form of enacting laws is still in use.

A new model of congressional compromise is constructed in which leadership, faced with a bill whose prospects are uncertain, is forced to compromise. Leadership has policy preferences of its own and seeks a compromise that will minimize its expected loss.

A reasonable expression for the probability of each outcome is assumed, and the form of the optimal compromise is derived based on two simple parameters. The solutions are quite revealing and support the expectation of compromises close to a 50-50 split under a broad range of conditions.