The heart of Rousseau's thought, as he himself declared, is the claim that society (especially bourgeois society), while necessary now to man's preservation, corrupts the life it fosters. What, then, is this corruption? What, in Rousseau's view, is the problem of bourgeois society? The corruption, I argue, is disunity of soul, through which men lose the fullness of existence they seek by nature. Unity of soul, which is natural, is lost in society through the contradiction of personal dependence: using others entails serving them. Thus modern or bourgeois society, which builds on this contradiction by deriving men's sociability from their selfishness, necessarily divides their souls. There can be no psychic unity in society without true social unity. (Hence Rousseau's analysis of unity is also his defense of justice.) Psychic and social unity are more or less attainable in the just state through patriotism and virtue (“morality”), but perfect psychic unity is possible only beyond society and morality.

Of all the fields of political science where quantitative methods have been developed over the past generation, probably the one where scholarly understanding has been most enriched has been that of mass voting behavior. But while we know vastly more about this behavior on the individual and aggregate level than we did a quarter-century ago, there are still large territories on the map which are blank, or in which exploration has only very recently begun. There remain a number of doubtful areas in which issues of methodology and of substantive interpretation are still very much open to systematic inquiry.

One such area is that associated with the interrelation of socio-economic correlates of the vote. That is, there is a real question as to whether such independent or predisposing variables should be conceptualized as making mutually independent or, alternatively, interdependent contributions to the prediction of voting patterns. The normal practice in research involving multiple correlation of aggregate voting behavior with a set of independent variables has been to assume implicitly that the relationship of these variables is additive (i.e., non-interactive) and that the appropriate theoretical representation is of the general form y = b + m1x1 + m2x2 … + mnxn. Such an assumption seems plausible so far as individual voting for American major parties and their candidates is concerned. Thus, for example, the authors of the MIT 1960 simulation study found strong evidence that predispositional factors summate, i.e., are indeed additive in character.

The rapidly expanding research literature in comparative state politics typically measures its dependent and independent variables with references to means, averages, and per capitas for each state. (For example, environmental inputs may be expressed as per capita personal income, percent of population living in urban places, median school year completed by the population over 25, etc.; political characteristics may be expressed as average voter turnout levels, percent of the total vote cast for the winning party, etc.; policy outputs are often expressed as per capita expenditures for education, average monthly payments for old age assistance, per capita tax revenues, etc.) With measures such as these, the comparative state politics research has systematically explored many of the linkages between environmental inputs, political system characteristics, and public policy outcomes.

Perhaps the most serious reservation regarding this research is its failure to examine distributive and redistributive aspects of state politics. Both dependent and independent variables are generally expressed as levels or amounts or averages for whole states; these can be neatly arranged for comparative analysis both longitudinally and cross-sectionally. But what about the distribution of wealth within a state? Or the distribution of public monies among high and low income groups, rural and urban populations, or other divisions within a state's population. The linkages between the distribution of resources within states, the distribution of influence within state political systems, and public policies reflecting distributional decisions, remain largely untested.

The early modern revolution in political philosophy not only transformed political philosophy itself; it also played a crucial role in shaping the character of modern politics. This article contributes to our understanding of that revolution through an examination of Thomas Hobbes's critique of the classical tradition. Although it is well known that Hobbes was a critic of that tradition, the details of his critique have not been sufficiently uncovered. Hobbes's key target was Aristotle, whom he regarded as the most important source of the tradition he opposed. Hobbes's critique of Aristotle consists of two main lines of argument—one moral-political, the other metaphysical—that ultimately prove to be connected. An examination of Hobbes's twofold critique can help us understand what was at stake in the reorientation of political philosophy that eventually gave rise to modern liberalism.

When the German government announced on March 16 of this year that it no longer deemed itself bound by the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, a great step was taken toward the realization of the demand for Gleichberechtigung which has been the main objective of National Socialist foreign policy. In view of the forthcoming conversations which had been scheduled to take place at Berlin, the time chosen for this decision was unexpected. The act of denunciation itself had been foreshadowed, however, by the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, and by her actual rearming in defiance of the limitations of the Treaty. It involved no sudden innovation in policy, but was merely a public acknowledgment of the fait accompli; it marked the final stroke in one stage of a long and bitter campaign against the “Diktat” of Versailles.

Political science is two realms, the intellectual and the organizational, and the task is to consider how the organizational realm might be adapted to the highest improvement of the intellectual realm. Political science has a certain competence (domain) in the study of politics as the organization of power. It also seeks to expand competence as capability. Charles Merriam provides a point of departure Merriam's most successful idea has been that of enhancing competence through improvements in “the field of method.” Competence, however, now demands methodological flexibility, so as to probe more into the exercise of power. Four fields are strategic: public administration, political interests, urbanization, and the interpenetration of politics and economics. Competence also leads into unorthodox subjects, such as force and foolish, irrational, and pathological decision making (or “the Oxenstierna-Mullins Effect”). Finally, competence demands (and is enhanced by) the reach of political science into serious practical problems of human affairs.

Systematic empirical research into the process of political leadership recruitment has made substantial progress since World War II with emphasis given to those who occupy formal positions of authority within the political system, specifically, legislators and party activists. Generally such studies have been concerned with delineating (a) who the leaders are, (b) how and why they are where they are, and (c) the variables affecting (a) and (b).

The most ambitious recent studies, in the sense that they try to deal systematically with all three aspects of recruitment, are those by Samuel J. Eldersveld, Austin Ranney, and Henry Valen. Their research, and the examples cited of other scholarship, have yielded a substantial number of propositions. Three which lend themselves to testing with data we have gathered on the recruitment of candidates for the Canadian House of Commons, 1945–65, are:

1) The status of individuals recruited by a party in part is a function of the party's competitive positions. (Key, Snowiss).

2) The status of individuals recruited by a party varies with the party's position on an ideological continuum (Eldersveld, Ranney, Marvick and Nixon, Valen).

3) Relative urbanism and the degree of industrialization of communities affect recruitment patterns (Rokkan and Valen, Valen, Snowiss). In the present instance there should be a positive relationship between urbanism and the mean status of candidates.

In testing these propositions we will compare, whenever such comparisons appear appropriate, the data for Canadian parliamentary candidates with findings from some of the previously cited studies and also indicate how, in Canada, multi-partyism is related to the status of recruited candidates.

Group members value informed decisions and hold ideological preferences. A leader takes a decision on their behalf. Good leadership depends on characteristics of moderation and judgment. The latter emerges (endogenously) via advice communicated by “trustworthy associates.” Trustworthy advice requires ideological proximity to the leader. A group may choose a relatively extreme leader with a large number of such associates. Paradoxically, this can happen though it is in the group’s collective interest to choose a moderate leader. To assess whether these insights persist when political groups compete, we embed our analysis in a model of elections. Each of two parties chooses a leader who implements her preferred policy if elected. We find that a party may choose an extreme leader who defeats a moderate candidate chosen by the opposing party. Our results highlight the importance of party cohesion and the relations between a leader and her party. These can be more important to electoral success than proximity of a leader’s position to the median voter.

What is the relationship between armed violence and patriarchal values? This question is addressed with the help of a survey of young men in the conflict-affected southern provinces of Thailand. In Study 1 we find that men with more patriarchal values are more prone to volunteer for paramilitary service. Study 2 uses a natural experiment made possible by the conscription lottery in Thailand to compare survey responses of men who were involuntarily enlisted to do Military Conscription Service (treatment group) with the responses of men who participated in the lottery but were not enlisted (control group). We find no difference between the treatment and control groups in patriarchal values. We conclude that patriarchal values drive voluntary participation in armed conflict, whereas military service as a conscript in a conflict zone does not cause patriarchal values.

How does losing one’s right to vote again after having been eligible to vote before affect political fundamentals such as political efficacy? We draw attention to the hitherto neglected phenomenon “temporary disenfranchisement,” which, for instance, occurs regularly in states that extended the franchise to underage citizens in some but not all elections. If an election with voting age 16 is closely followed by an election with voting age 18, underage voters who are eligible for the former will have no right to vote in the latter. Using original panel data on young citizens in Germany and a differences-in-differences design, we find that temporary disenfranchisement results in a decrease in external efficacy, which remains even after regaining eligibility. Our findings highlight an important side effect of selective voting rights extensions and bear insights that are relevant to other cases of temporary disenfranchisement due to residential mobility, citizenship, or felony disenfranchisement.

This article argues that Ella Baker’s ideology of radical democracy shaped her theory of organizing, including her theories of mass action and indigenous leadership. Against the emerging consensus in realist and radical democratic theory that both Baker’s praxis and democratic organizing more broadly are nonideological, I argue that all organizing is ideological if, with Stuart Hall, we understand ideology not as a rigid set of beliefs but as a dynamic framework for understanding society. Organizers make decisions based on their own ideologies and they attempt to maintain or reshape the dominant ideologies. In this sense, organizers are political theorists: they have self-conscious theories of how society works and changes based on which they make strategic decisions. I demonstrate a method for interpreting organizers’ political theories and argue that Baker’s theory of radical democracy offers democratic theory insight into the practices and organizational structures that advance democratization.

Read throughout the world, H. G. Wells was one of the most famous political thinkers of the early twentieth century. During the first half of the 1900s, he elaborated a bold and idiosyncratic cosmopolitan socialist vision. In this article, I offer a new reading of Wells's political thought. I argue that he developed a distinctive pragmatist philosophical orientation, which he synthesized with his commitments to Darwinian evolutionary theory. His pragmatism had four main components: a nominalist metaphysics; a verificationist theory of truth; a Jamesian “will to believe”; and a conception of philosophy as an intellectual exercise dedicated to improving practice. His political thought was shaped by this philosophical orientation. Wells, I contend, was the most high-profile pragmatist political thinker of the opening decades of the twentieth century. Acknowledging this necessitates a re-evaluation of both Wells and the history of pragmatism.

Questionnaire data that delineate the positions of 197 Labour and 126 Conservative M.P.s in the British House of Commons on ten major policy issues are utilized in an empirical test of some of the positions taken by British political parry scholars, Samuel H. Beer and Robert T. McKenzie. Assuming that policy stances taken on these issues reflect more general ideological orientations, the data support Beer's view that serious ideological differences divide the parties. However, McKenzie's belief that policy differences between the frontbenches are narrower than are differences between their backbench supporters is also confirmed. The data also indicate that the differences between the front and backbenches are greater in the Labour party than in the Conservative party, a situation that could be intrinsic to the parties or merely a function of the fact that Labour was in power when these data were collected. Finally, it is suggested that although there are significant differences between the frontbenches and an extreme wing of their respective backbenches, as McKenzie had assumed, it would be unwise to exaggerate the importance of such intraparty differences.

This note reports the results of an initial exploration into the significance of the social environments (“contexts”) in which people live in the shaping of their individual political behavior. Many scholars have argued that social scientists should pay more serious attention to contextual variables when they go about constructing social theories. But there have been few systematic efforts to demonstrate empirically the overall importance of contextual variables as predictors of individual behaviors, especially relative to the importance of personal (“individual”) predictors. Here the relative potency of two sets of predictors—one individual and one contextual—is investigated for a sample of British voters by means of a well-known multivariate search strategy, “tree analysis.” The results suggest that contextual variables have little to add to explanations of voting behavior based on individual variables—at least for these data.

This essay sketches the strictures put on political scholarship from the early days of patrician amateurs to modern academic professionals, with special attention given to the emergence of political science and the methodological and ideological issues that developed within that discipline. It is argued herein that although some degree of ethno-class variety was eventually achieved in academia, there has been a lag in ideological diversity. Political heterodoxy often has been discouraged and suppressed. Nevertheless some modest democratic advances have been made in academia in the last half-century.

In his final two surviving plays, Assemblywomen and Wealth, Aristophanes turns his comic art toward a consideration of the possibilities of radical economic change. His presentation of those possibilities has been read as either indulging in fantasy or as ironically reinforcing the economic status quo. This essay argues that the two plays in fact work to instill in their audience a complex and challenging sensibility that holds fantasy and irony in tension with one another. Drawing on recent arguments about the relationship and relative priority of economic redistribution and cultural recognition as political goals, I suggest that this sensibility provides an attractive model for theorists and ordinary citizens alike as they grapple with issues of economic and social justice.

We develop and estimate a model of learning that accounts for the observed correlation between economic development and democracy and for the clustering of democratization events. In our model, countries’ own and neighbors’ past experiences shape elites’ beliefs about the effects of democracy on economic growth and their likelihood of retaining power. These beliefs influence the choice to transition into or out of democracy. We show that learning is crucial to explaining observed transitions since the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, our model predicts reversals to authoritarianism if the world experienced a growth shock the size of the Great Depression.