Being popular makes it easier for dictators to govern. A growing body of scholarship therefore focuses on the factors that influence authoritarian popularity. However, it is possible that the perception of popularity itself affects incumbent approval in autocracies. We use framing experiments embedded in four surveys in Russia to examine this phenomenon. These experiments reveal that manipulating information—and thereby perceptions—about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s popularity can significantly affect respondents’ support for him. Additional analyses, which rely on a novel combination of framing and list experiments, indicate that these changes in support are not due to preference falsification, but are in fact genuine. This study has implications for research on support for authoritarian leaders and defection cascades in nondemocratic regimes.

The hectic sequence of Germany's constitutional history led that unhappy country, following the final liquidation by Napoleon of the last remnants of medieval constitutionalism, through the confusion of Austro-Prussian rivalry, Empire, democratic Republic, and Fascist dictatorship, to the total vacuum of unconditional surrender in May, 1945. The pretense of a four-power (quadripartite) condominium by means of the Allied Control Council, which at first looked to many responsible people like a feasible stop-gap, has been revealed in this sequence as an empty façade. During the years 1945–49, Germany has been governed by a bewildering maze of conflicting and competing authorities whose legitimacy, beyond the reach of their immediate power, has been in considerable doubt. Authority, power, legitimacy; unless these are effectively combined and balanced, the existence of a true government may well be doubted. Continental Europeans, who prefer to talk about the “state” in discussing problems of government, have therefore been wondering whether the German state has continued to exist—a problem in higher semantics which is briefly discussed below.

The venerable city of Strasbourg has long been famed for its stately Cathedral, its University, its baroque palaces, the quaint houses of its medieval quarter known as La Petite France—and for its greatest single gift to European culture: the invention of printing by Johann Gutenberg five centuries ago. During the past year its people have proudly displayed a new edifice symbolizing what many regard as the greatest single step toward European unity. La Maison de l'Europe, built in five months on land given by the municipality, was formally opened on August 7, 1950. It stands in the northeast quarter of the city at Place Lenôtre, facing the pleasant park of l'Orangerie across the tree-lined Allée de la Robertsau. The long white structure, with fifteen flags floating in the breeze before its central portal, is strictly functional, having been planned, with a view toward efficiency and economy, as a temporary headquarters to last ten years.

This analysis investigates the mass dynamics of competitive electoral politics with respect to the presidential vote during the 1928–36 realigning period for the United States. A formal system of three interdependent differential equations is employed to characterize the dynamic processes of the aggregate voter shifts between the Republican, Democratic, and nonvoter populations. The modeling strategy is used to locate substantial variations in the mass dynamics between large subgroups in the electorate as well as to identify both national and socially interactive components to the patterns of voter movements. The results show that the overall realignment period was quite complex. Vote switching from the Republican party to the Democratic party was the dominant characteristic of the 1932 election, whereas additional Democratic gains in 1936 came mostly from new voters.

The opening paragraph of Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes‥‥ to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.” For what purposes may Congress, in light of this phraseology, spend money raised by national taxation? Hamilton answered, for any purposes which Congress itself found to be promotive of the general welfare. Madison, on the contrary, held the power thus granted to be only instrumental—Congress might spend money only as a means of carrying into effect its other granted powers. So far as the practice of Congress is concerned, Hamilton's view has long since prevailed, but the Supreme Court has never had occasion so far to develop its theory on the subject. Its failure, therefore, to seize the opportunity proferred it in the Maternity Act cases is somewhat disappointing.

By the Maternity Act of November 23, 1921 Congress extends financial aid, in the work of reducing maternal and infant mortality, and protecting the health of mothers and infants, to such states as shall accept and comply with the provisions of the act. The act was attacked on two grounds; first, that the appropriations voted were “for purposes not national, but local to the states,” and secondly, that the acceptance by a state of the terms of the act would constitute a surrender by it of its reserved powers.

It seems to be generaally agreed that Franklin D. Roosevelt is very unpopular with the wealthier groups in society and that he is held to be a very warm friend of the poor. Indeed, it is sometimes asserted that no president since Jefferson has so divided the voters along economic lines as has Roosevelt. Popular opinion on this subject, as on many others, is likely to be exaggerated. In any case, it is well to check by measurement the idea that the rich are against Roosevelt and the poor are for him. This has been done in some of the sample polls. For instance, Fortune finds that the prosperous present about 15 to 20 per cent more opposition to Roosevelt than is found among the poor. Similarly, the Gallup polls have found over twice as much opposition to Roosevelt among the upper third of the population as among the lower third. Where these surveys of opinion on Roosevelt have been presented by social classes, there has been shown, in accordance with popular opinion, this division between the rich and the poor in their attitude toward Roosevelt. But the percentage difference is not quite so large as might be expected.

This difference between the rich and the poor in attitude toward Roosevelt became accentuated around the middle of his first term. It is interesting to inquire into the extent to which those of the lower income groups voted for Roosevelt in 1932 and in 1936.

The conservative of today hardly knows what to conserve. His bargain with destiny seems broken, and instead of consciousness of achievement and contentment with what is, he is more likely to be filled with a sense of frustration. This frustration is an uncertain quantity with which to deal, since it is characteristically explosive and negative. Under its guidance, conservatism may become a driving force to suppress the inconsequential; it may be a force that is forgetful at the same time of fundamental changes that will undermine a way of political existence. The conservative is happiest when he is unconscious of politics, when the essential propositions of social organisation do not have to be defended. But the weakness of conservatism appears in not knowing always what are the fundamental propositions supporting its manner of living, and in inability to judge the consequences of political and economic mutation. Conservatism, however, is at least that body of social thought which does not have to be defended.

Conflict, struggle, and protest must be conscious and filled with a sense of purpose. In conflict, there is always the conscious defense of what is presumed to be an interest, and there is an attack on what others deem to be their interest. Likewise, radicalism can never be unconscious or merely habitual, for it is a protest against something that is. But it must not be forgotten that in no state of society have all interests reached an equilibrium which permits of complete coöperation and no struggle. In this sense, conservatism represents a functional value in existence, since the stability of a conservative society is a situation in which the conflict of interests and wills is muted and restricted.

With the advent of “total war” in Europe, America was shocked into a realization of the inadequacy of her defense measures in the event of becoming involved. While ideas conflicted sharply as to what our attitude toward the war should be, most schools of thought united in urging increased preparedness, and Congress appropriated staggering sums for defense. But the realization likewise came that preparedness involves more than mere appropriations—it takes time, and men, and materials, and industrial plants, and above all, coördination, in order to maintain defenses ample by modern standards. So as we contemplate the possibility of war, the spotlight focuses on our industrial system as perhaps the most important single factor in defense.

The entrance of this country into the last war found us similarly unprepared, from both a military and an industrial standpoint, and it was almost a year before the industries of the nation were meeting the tremendous demands thrust upon them, with production just reaching its peak at the time of the Armistice.

Introductory Comments. How and what to teach has been one of the most engaging topics of conversation in political science circles for many years. Yet it is a remarkable fact that not a single department of political science in the United States, so far as the writer is aware, offers its graduate students a seminar on teaching problems. Seemingly we have been content with the old formula for teaching success: “If you would be a good teacher, saturate yourself with your subject-matter and teach like hell.” Unfortunately, some of our teachers have done just that.

If we needed to reëvaluate our teaching before the war, it is imperative now that a little individual and collective soul-searching be done. The tremendous changes ushered in by the war and the uncertainties of the future emphasize more than ever the importance of our work. The world is entering a new era in which democracy will be put to real test as it continues to meet the challenge of more militant ideologies. It will be an era of bewildering social change accompanied by an increasing awareness of political power on the part of individuals and organized groups. The ideological conflict will be characterized by tension between management and labor at home and the old familiar pattern of power politics—with new forms of nationalism and militarism—in our relations abroad. Students will be bombarded with propaganda from every quarter.

At the beginning of 1948, Italy's first republican constitution went into effect. After exactly a century, the Statuto of 1848 was finally and formally superseded. History will record that the Statuto proved a powerful instrument in the formation of Italian unity and in the development of Italy's freedoms and parliamentary system until 1922, just as it will also be a witness to its rejection and nullification in the course of the subsequent twenty-five years. The new republican constitution represents the first deliberate effort by the Italian people as a whole to guarantee their freedom and common welfare within a constitutional framework.

The influences of many lands are visible in the document. One can see in the rebirth of regionalism the native historical tradition of municipal freedom; the French fear of Caesarism reflected in election of the president by Parliament rather than by the people; British reliance on a balance of power between executive and legislature translated into the almost unlimited executive power of dissolution of the chambers; the time-honored American principle of bicameralism accepted with the creation of two legislative houses of equal power; and the equally famous American doctrine of judicial review tentatively imitated through the establishment of a Constitutional Court. Of Eastern constitutionalism there are only scant traces, the new social and economic rights reflecting rather the general trends of the times than any overt allegiance to the tenets of the Soviet constitution. Indeed, the acceptance of the new has been tempered by a strong restatement of what is valid in the individualistic and liberal traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The significance of inter-party competition for variations in electoral behavior has recently been recognized in a number of political studies. The objects of this article are, first, to refine the concepts of safe and competitive electoral districts, and second, to replicate some propositions relating inter-party competition to the number of contestants in primary elections in Indiana.

Most preceding studies of inter-party competition have examined behavior in large electoral jurisdictions, rarely one smaller than a congressional district and often an entire state. Generally they have examined behavior relating to a single office, usually the governor's or a congressman's, and have assigned every electoral-situation to either a “safe” or an “unsafe” category. They have varied in the tests applied to differentiate the latter. Most tests have determined safeness on the basis of one election; they have differed in the selection of that election and in the size of the majority thought to indicate safety.

When the American form of government and our democratic way of life hang in the balance of armed conflict, the political scientist feels impelled more than ever to rally to the defense of these values. He Writes volumes to defend our system and to attack the systems of our enemies. He writes political philosophy and political ethics—just plain politics is forgotten.

The uninformed layman might expect from his title that the political scientist would be an expert in the analysis of political processes in his own community. He would be disappointed. The following comment made by Aristotle centuries ago applies with equal validity to the problem of political science today: “Must we not admit that the political science plainly does not stand on a similar footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean that while in all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert them are identical (physicians and painters, for instance), matters of Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them practices it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process; for they neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might do more to their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly)….” Since the politician of today remains inarticulate when it comes to discussing his methods for publication, the responsibility of building a science of politics, if there is to be such a science, continues to rest with the political scientists.

Despite broad public support, investment in US infrastructure has not kept pace with growth, population shifts, and rising exposure to climate change risks. One explanation lies in politicians’ electoral incentives: because, in the short term, voters see only the costs of investment and not its benefits, politicians have incentive to pander and spend less than what they or their fully informed constituents would prefer. Local newspapers could help reduce this constraint by increasing politicians’ confidence that voters will receive information that justifies higher spending. In a survey experiment, we found that informing US city and county elected officials about news coverage of infrastructure failures increased support for a costly investment for those in competitive electoral settings. When motivated by reelection, politicians need the benefits of investment to be visible in order to justify its costs. Our results demonstrate the political importance of the nonpolitical news covered in local newspapers.

Women remain underrepresented in cabinets, especially in high-prestige, “masculine” portfolios. Still, a growing number of states have appointed women to the finance ministry—a powerful position typically reserved for men. Drawing on the “glass cliff” phenomenon, we examine the relationship between financial crises and women’s ascension to, and survival in, this post. With an original dataset on appointments to finance ministries worldwide (1972–2017), we show that women are more likely to first come to power during a banking crisis. These results also hold for currency and inflation crises and even when accounting for the political and economic conditions that might otherwise explain this relationship. Subsequent examination of almost 3,000 finance ministers’ tenures shows that, once in office, crises shorten men’s (but not women’s) time in the post. Together, these results suggest that women can sometimes seize on crises as opportunities to access traditionally male-dominated positions.

Four major new compilations of macropolitical data are compared and evaluated. Each summarizes a large-scale research effort to code or to collect data suitable for theoretically relevant, cross-national comparisons. As a group the new handbooks incorporate many improvements and innovations on earlier handbooks, which concentrated mainly on cross-sectional, aggregate data or simplistically coded judgments about nation-states. About a third of their measures consist of “made” data, derived by coding journalistic and historical sources. All provide some measures for cross-time comparisons; one is devoted exclusively to time-series data. Many of their measures denote properties of internal and international conflict and of international transactions. All but one are painfully self-conscious about problems of reliability and comparability of data. One criticism is the reliance of several of the handbooks on “counts” of conflict events rather than assessment of more theoretically relevant properties of conflict. A second is the paucity of indicators of inequality and, more generally, of measures which give a “view from the bottom” of political systems.

Unlike most studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this one attempts not only to delineate the attitudes of Arab elite (professionals and university students) at home and abroad on the issue but also and primarily, to investigate the determinants of those attitudes. The sources include the relevant political literature, especially since the 1967 war; a set of depth interviews conducted among members of the elite in the Arab world; and a more structured sample survey conducted among Arab students and professionals in the U.S. Conclusions are based on the data from all three sources. The results show that religion, sectionalism, age, and level of education are important determinants of political attitudes and behavior among Arab elite. Neither locale (urban-rural residence) nor socioeconomic background, however, is found to be a significant factor.