Four major new compilations of macropolitical data are compared and evaluated. Each summarizes a large-scale research effort to code or to collect data suitable for theoretically relevant, cross-national comparisons. As a group the new handbooks incorporate many improvements and innovations on earlier handbooks, which concentrated mainly on cross-sectional, aggregate data or simplistically coded judgments about nation-states. About a third of their measures consist of “made” data, derived by coding journalistic and historical sources. All provide some measures for cross-time comparisons; one is devoted exclusively to time-series data. Many of their measures denote properties of internal and international conflict and of international transactions. All but one are painfully self-conscious about problems of reliability and comparability of data. One criticism is the reliance of several of the handbooks on “counts” of conflict events rather than assessment of more theoretically relevant properties of conflict. A second is the paucity of indicators of inequality and, more generally, of measures which give a “view from the bottom” of political systems.

Unlike most studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this one attempts not only to delineate the attitudes of Arab elite (professionals and university students) at home and abroad on the issue but also and primarily, to investigate the determinants of those attitudes. The sources include the relevant political literature, especially since the 1967 war; a set of depth interviews conducted among members of the elite in the Arab world; and a more structured sample survey conducted among Arab students and professionals in the U.S. Conclusions are based on the data from all three sources. The results show that religion, sectionalism, age, and level of education are important determinants of political attitudes and behavior among Arab elite. Neither locale (urban-rural residence) nor socioeconomic background, however, is found to be a significant factor.

In a revolutionary century political science as a discipline has been transformed along with its subject matter. In no more than a generation the discipline has gone through at least three theoretical ages, from a naive Jeffersonianism to a mongrelized Madisonianism to a kind of liberal Burkeanism. It has been going through still another transformation in methodology. The failure of one democratic institution after another has bred uncertainty, and uncertainty has encouraged a vast expansion of the apparatus of inquiry. Even if all the questions might be found in the Great Books, the quest is new—for conditions rather than truths, for degrees rather than absolutes.

Humanist critiques of B. F. Skinner have made valuable contributions to our understanding of his thought, but more attention needs to be paid to his work as potential empirical theory. To evaluate the theoretical merits of Skinner's approach, this paper examines his methodological postulates, his implicit epistemology, and some underlying normative assumptions. It is argued that Skinnerian behaviorism commits a serious error in allowing a methodological presupposition (reduction of the subject matter to observable behavior of the organism) to become a de facto ontology that prematurely forecloses the incorporation of potentially valuable hypothetical constructs at the level of social theory. This theoretical difficulty is critical because the inherent safeguards of science that Skinner proposes as a humane safeguard against misuse would be unlikely to apply to an actual technology of behavior control as employed by political and administrative authorities.

The coattail effect in presidential and congressional races was long supposed to show that the winning presidential candidate led his party to victory by adding votes to the ticket all along the line. The fact that the same party almost always won control of both houses of congress and usually also a majority of the governorships at stake at the time of a presidential victory made this a plausible theory.

More recently, the sweeping nature of such an explanation has been challenged. The first criticism of the simple theory noted that even when a presidential candidate wins, congressional candidates in some districts lead the president. In these cases, presumably, the congressional candidates' coattails are more effective.

A second criticism pointed to the paradox in the assumption that if a presidential candidate leads his party by a wide margin, he is an effective candidate for the party ticket. The greater the margin, presumably, the stronger are the presidential coattails. But large margins, on the contrary, must indicate that the presidential candidate has not been able to transfer all of his votes to the congressional ticket; and so it would seem that the attraction of his coattails is minimal if this margin is great. Thus the most significant symptom of the coattail process is straight ticket voting.

The overwhelming majority of writers on international law seem still inclined to advocate that states only be recognized as legal persons in international law. Since, however, neither the term “state” nor the term “legal personality” is unequivocal, it may well be questioned whether a conclusion reached by means of a mere combination of these terms is adequate to clarify the pertinent problems.

Through constant repetition, the unqualified designation of the state as the only legal person in international law became seemingly self-evident. Yet it should not be overlooked that the concept of the state is much older than the description of the state in terms of legal personality, since the latter terminology does not appear before the middle of the seventeenth century. There seems to be general agreement that Thomas Hobbes originated the usage of speaking of the “state” as a “person,” when he proposed to define a “body politic” as “a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power.”

The empirical study of political ideology in mass publics must ultimately be related to political behavior; otherwise, the ideological description of such publics exists in an action vacuum. Yet, the most detailed and sophisticated descriptions and analyses of American conservatives and their characteristics are those which have most notably failed to connect their findings (about opinions, attitudes and ideologies) with consistent or predictable political activity of any kind.

This absence of systematic linkage between belief and behavior is primarily a consequence of the general absence of ideological structure in the political orientation of the broad American electorate. But it is also a consequence of the researchers' reliance on a priori ideological measures of doubtful validity.

Hence, when the student of politics is informed that reputed conservatives are, or tend to be, authoritarian, anti-Semitic and ethnocentric, or imbued with “… feelings of worthlessness, submissiveness, inferiority, timidity …, …. hostile and suspicious, … rigid and compulsive, … inflexible and unyielding …,” he must question the adequacy of the political designation “conservative” both on descriptive and predictive grounds.

Because of these methodological and empirical problems, I suggest that the findings of prior resaerch and hypotheses related to them, be tested in a different manner. For example, if one examines the membership and/or known supporters of organizations which exist to aggregate and channel conservative political demands, the analysis of political ideology and its correlates can be conducted in a definitively political context, with the labels being supplied (or implied) by the actors themselves.

This article compares the political theories that Mohandas Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghose develop around the assumption that harm or violence is an unavoidable feature of all human action. Both Ghose and Gandhi venerated the Bhagavadgītā and shared a concern to foster life, and they shaped Hindu political theory by combining modern biological concepts with spiritual perspectives to determine the impact of harmful human actions within a totality of interdependent living beings. Although each thinker develops his anticolonial theory by balancing the value of life, the acceptance of an economy of violence, and the duty to act rather than renounce action, they diverge on the acceptability of violence whether in politics or in interactions with nature. Analyzing their framing of human actions as simultaneously biological and spiritual opens up a new perspective on Gandhi's refusal and Ghose's willingness to resort to violence in resistance to British colonial rule in India.

Hannah Mather Crocker was the leading American political theorist between 1800 and 1820 to engage the controversial question of sex equality. In the wake of the postrevolutionary backlash against political radicalism, she became a subtle rhetorician of women's rights. She accepted how her cultural context placed limits on the realization of women's rights, yet she did not analytically conflate these temporal limits with women's capacities to contribute to their polity. She sought to normatively defend and gently extend American women's ongoing informal political participation in the postrevolutionary era and challenged the separate spheres discourse that aimed to restrict it. Through the first comprehensive study of Crocker's oeuvre, this article provides new insight into the political role and rhetorical style of women's rights discourse and women's activism in the early republic and uncovers Crocker's philosophical legacies for scholars who seek to reconcile the standpoints of equality and difference feminism.

Systemic theories of international politics rarely predict conflict short of cataclysmic systemic wars, and dyadic theories of conflict lack systemic perspective. This article attempts to bridge the gap by introducing a two-step theory of conflict among Great Powers. In the first stage, states engage in a dynamic, ongoing process of managing the international system, which inevitably produces tensions among them. In the second stage, relative levels of security-related activity determine how and when those tensions erupt into disputes. A test of the theory on Great Power conflicts from the nineteenth century supports the argument and, moreover, favors the deterrence model over the spiral model as a proximate explanation of conflict in the second stage.

In “Abstract Right,” the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights.

When individuals receive benefits from government programs, does it affect their attitudes toward those programs or toward government generally? A growing literature blends policy feedback theory and political behavior research to explore these questions, but so far it has focused almost exclusively on social policies such as the Affordable Care Act. In this article, we focus on a very different set of government programs that reach a more conservative, rural population: agricultural assistance. Our study ties administrative records on participation in USDA farm aid programs to an original, first-of-its-kind survey measuring agricultural producers’ political attitudes. We find that receiving agricultural assistance is sometimes related to producers’ views of the program delivering the benefits, but it depends on the divisiveness of the program and—for highly partisan programs—recipients’ ideology. However, receiving federal agricultural assistance is not associated with more positive views of government.

Previous work suggests that observing women officeholders increases women’s political ambition. Yet, jumps in women’s representation in the United States’ “Years of the Woman”—following the Anita Hill testimonies and the election of Donald Trump—are linked to women’s exclusion from political decision-making. Drawing on focus groups with prospective women candidates, we theorize that exclusion when combined with a gendered policy threat increases women’s political ambition. Using survey experiments replicated across different samples, we show that women who read about an all-male city council poised to legislate on women’s rights report increased ambition compared with their pretreatment ambition levels and to women in other treatment groups. Women’s increased sense of political efficacy drives these results. When women’s rights are not under discussion, men’s overrepresentation does not move (or even depresses) women’s ambition. Seeing the policy consequences of their exclusion causes some women to seek a seat at the table.

We estimate the causal effect of independent candidates on voter turnout and election outcomes in India. To do this, we exploit exogenous changes in the entry deposit candidates pay for their participation in the political process, changes that disproportionately excluded candidates with no affiliation to established political parties. A one standard deviation increase in the number of independent candidates increases voter turnout by more than 6 percentage points, as some voters choose to vote rather than stay home. The vote share of independent candidates increases by more than 10 percentage points, as some existing voters switch who they vote for. Thus, independents allow winning candidates to win with less vote share, decrease the probability of electing a candidate from the governing coalition by about 31 percentage points, and ultimately increase the probability of electing an ethnic-party candidate. Altogether, the results imply that the price of participation by independents is constituency representation in government.

In this study of lobbyists' techniques and perceptions of the legislative process, the impact of several aspects of the legislative environment is examined, including group competition and the use of issues by candidates in presidential campaigns. Data from a sample of lobbyists indicates that nonconflictual issues are treated differently by lobbyists and the Congress from issues involving group conflict. Similarly, issues used in presidential campaigns are treated differently from those developed outside them. Finally, group size is shown to be a further influence on lobbyists' techniques in dealing with Congress.

The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) is one of the three major groupings—the Social Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists—that have cultivated the ground to the left of center (i.e., to the left of the ruling Christian Democrats) in Italian politics since World War II. As recently as 1951, the PSI appeared to be inextricably linked with the Communists; but the Socialists have gradually worked themselves around to the position, early in 1962, of openly supporting a Left-Center coalition government still headed by the Christian Democrats. This drastic alteration in the Italian political spectrum has created new possibilities for Italy's political development. It has already permitted the long-awaited “opening to the Left”—as a basic alternative to governments dependent on the Center-Right—under which Italy will be ruled by a coalition of Christian Democrats, Republicans, and Social Democrats, with the PSI offering its support in Parliament in exchange for a bold program of economic planning and social reform. But some Socialists see a further possibility: the so-called “Socialist alternative.” They hope for the possible development of the PSI into a second major party in a two-party system which would absorb the great bulk of the Italian electorate, with the exception of minor extremist fringes to the right and left. To be sure, the success of the “opening to the Left” and the eventual emergence of a “Socialist alternative” both depend on the continued supremacy of the more progressive factions within the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party.