The efforts made at the Hague Conference of 1907 to establish a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice in addition to the panel which we call the Permanent Court of Arbitration, bore fruit at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The task of establishing a new court was too delicate for the Peace Conference to undertake. So the Covenant stopped short with directing the Council of the League of Nations to formulate plans for a Permanent Court of International Justice, and submit them to the members of the League “for adoption.” The Council lost no time after its organization in discharging this responsibility. At its second session, in February, 1920, which was really its first session for the transaction of business, it set up a Committee of Jurists to draft a scheme. This Committee deliberated through the summer of 1920, and its draft project was submitted to the Council at San Sebastian in August.

Migration control does not end at the border. Rather, controlling migration (and migrants) continues inside host countries as migration status is used to stratify benefits and limit rights across social, economic, cultural, and political life. This differentiation typically has exclusionary effects and aggravates structural disadvantages that migrants face. This essay argues that we should use anti-discrimination law to address such practices of differentiation and remedy their detrimental effects. While non-discrimination clauses in international human rights treaties provide a powerful resource to this end, they are currently often interpreted in a restrictive manner. “Differentiation within” includes a variety of measures such as restrictions on migration status that limit the right to work, restrictions on political participation, restrictions on freedom of movement based on migration status, and requirements of cultural adaptation.

On November 25, 2015, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) held that the state of Suriname had violated the rights of two indigenous groups by denying recognition of their juridical personality and their entitlement to collective property and judicial protection. In Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, the Court also considered the impact of nature reserves on indigenous land rights, as well as the legitimacy of private titling of property that encroaches on land for which collective title has not been attained. The decision pushes the Court's previous jurisprudence significantly—and somewhat controversially—by asserting that under the American Convention on Human Rights, indigenous peoples are entitled, as collective entities, to recognition of their legal personality. In so doing, the Court challenged ordinary assumptions about the individualized character of most adjudication regarding international human rights and made the possibility of enforcing collective rights more palpable.

Sport is a useful area of study to test assumptions of international law. International law has traditionally focused on states and on international organizations that oversee specialized areas of human activity. International sport is overseen by an NGO—the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Yet sport is of great interest to states, serving as a testing ground of national superiority by providing a simple narrative of “winners” and “losers” in competition. Meanwhile, entities that are not yet states have historically been able to participate in international sport more readily than in other areas of international relations. This essay will examine the connection between participation in the Olympic Games and claims to statehood. In doing so, this essay will outline the modern approach to statehood, consider sport's role in that approach, and examine two case studies: the German Democratic Republic, and Kosovo.

This essay describes the normative dynamics within industry associations that affect their contributions to private transnational legal ordering. It asserts that even the most powerful associations possess characteristics that undermine their autonomy to rulemake for their industries, and so, their ability to govern. Examining the relationships between associations and their members helps us identify the forces that impede the effectiveness of associational governance, an important source of transnational private regulation.

B.S. Chimni's stimulating article makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on customary international law (CIL) by examining CIL from the perspective of developing states, a perspective underrepresented in this literature. His article articulates well many valid points about the sociohistorical biases of CIL. At the same time, there may be reasons for more optimism than Chimni appears to possess about the ability of CIL to serve global interests, including those of the Third World. Furthermore, some of Chimni's proposals merit further refinement. In this essay I propose to evaluate the strengths and potential shortcomings of Chimni's arguments in light of an approach to CIL that I have developed that is based on fundamental ethical principles recognized in international law. After laying out an alternative theory that still has many resonances with Chimni's proposals, I discuss critically three of the key theses articulated by Chimni: First, that CIL is inherently colonialist and inconsistent with the values of Third World peoples; second, that even contemporary customary international human rights law (IHRL) is a means of furthering global capitalism to the detriment of Third World peoples; and third, that the remedy for CIL's biases lies in the creation of a “postmodern” doctrine of CIL that incorporates reference to the “juridical conscience of humankind.”

Una propuesta de Reglamento europeo de 2021 prohíbe el comercio de materias primas y productos relacionados con la deforestación en el mercado de la Unión Europa1. El Reglamento europeo dirige esta prohibición hacia su propio mercado, pero inevitablemente esto tiene consecuencias para los países productores de materias primas en América Latina. La propuesta de Reglamento impactará el intercambio con la Unión Europa, un socio comercial clave para los países latinoamericanos. Si otros Estados industrializados que representan actualmente la cuota más grande de exportaciones para los países latinoamericanos adoptan este tipo de reglamentos, el impacto comercial en América Latina será aún más significativo. Sostenemos que los enfoques regulatorios que se centran en las cadenas de suministro globales —como el Reglamento UE— representan una oportunidad para fortalecer la existente (aunque débil) cooperación ambiental latinoamericana, de manera de abordar las principales causas de la deforestación, principalmente la expansión agrícola. A pesar de la relevancia global de los bosques y la biodiversidad de la región, la cooperación latinoamericana en materia de conservación de bosques no ha sido significativa2.

This essay addresses the interaction between the changes in the international tax regime identified by Mason and U.S. international tax policy. Specifically, I will argue that contrary to the general view, the United States actively implemented the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) recommendations through the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA). Moreover, the changes of the TCJA influenced the current OECD effort of BEPS 2.0. Thus, the current state of affairs can be characterized as a constructive dialogue: The OECD moves (BEPS 1), the United States responds (TCJA), the OECD moves again (BEPS 2). If the international tax regime is to survive, it is important that BEPS 2 will succeed, and that the US will then go along and amend the TCJA accordingly. From this kind of positive dialectic, a new international tax regime fit for the twenty-first century may emerge.

The International Law Commission (ILC) decided in 2012 to add to its agenda a new topic on the “identification of customary international law” and to appoint Sir Michael Wood (United Kingdom) as special rapporteur. That project has reached an important point, with a series of Draft Conclusions having been cleared through the Commission’s Drafting Committee, and ready for the Commission’s provisional approval (together with commentaries) in 2015. As such, now is a propitious time for governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and others to weigh in on the merits of these Draft Conclusions, and additional ones that will be developed in 2015–16.

In the 1990s, international legal scholarship was marked by democratic idealism and the belief that democracy had become the only legitimate political system. The more radical proposals even speculated about legality of pro-democratic intervention. Such re-conceptualizations of international law were met with determined criticism. However, even skeptical voices were willing to admit that democracy nevertheless did have some limited normative force in post-Cold War international law. While it would be an exaggeration to say that nondemocratic governments are illegitimate per se, a consensus started to emerge that international law prohibited at least a coup against a democratic government. In the absence of a workable definition of substantive democracy for international law purposes, a democratic government was understood as an authority which comes to power in an electoral process that is reasonably free and fair.