The question of recognition by an international organization of the representation of a Member State, a question recently considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations as a result of a proposal by Cuba, had previously engaged the attention of several international bodies. For instance, after the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, the Credentials Committeeof the Assembly of the League of Nations was confronted with the issue of the seating of Ethiopian representatives in the Assembly.

Writers on the history of the law of nations, in dealing with neutralization as an accepted practice, have seldom given a satisfactory account of the development of the ideas underlying this unusual phenomenon in international law. They have, in general, been inclined to treat it in a rather fragmentary manner; merely to note in passing certain scattered instances as of minor importance and to devote their major attention to the more outstanding occasions on which the European Powers have settled some given problem by the use of the formula of neutralization. It is thus rendered exceedingly difficult to form an objective appraisal of the ideological forces back of the movement, or effectively to analyze and weigh the constituent elements entering into it. In consequence, the movement has for the most part escaped scientific evaluation.

Since entering office, President Trump has taken steps to restructure the U.S. military to raise the profile of both its cybersecurity and space capabilities. The administration has elevated U.S. Cyber Command to a Unified Combatant Command and has implemented policies signaling a shift toward a more offensive cybersecurity mindset. The administration has also begun the process of establishing a U.S. Space Command, as well as pursuing a plan to create a new branch of the military centered around space-related operations. Although this restructuring does not by itself implicate international law, it might do so if it results in operational changes.

In Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?, Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul argue that territorial sovereignty is a primary rule of international law that limits cyber activities. They recognize, however, that not all cyber effects constitute violations of territorial sovereignty, and like Rule 4 in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 and its commentary, they acknowledge a distinct lack of consensus among the Tallinn participants on the critical question of applicable thresholds. Problematically, they do not identify the necessary state practice and opinio juris that would be required to establish either the primary rule that they proffer or the existence and contours of the exception they would recognize.