The links between and among digital trade, development, and inequality are multifaceted and ever evolving. They depend on what is understood as development and as inequality, concepts that transcend the North-South divide, and the fora in which these issues arise. Conceptually, development and inequality are intrinsically intertwined as the measures to address both are often complementary or even the same. In this essay, we consider development and inequality as pertaining to the ability of developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs) to shape and participate in the digital economy, and particularly, the regulatory framework for digital trade. We explore how the relationships between digital trade, development, and inequality are addressed in the main venues for digital trade rulemaking: the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). We then examine two contentious issues in digital trade: the customs duty moratorium and data governance.

This essay examines the challenges and opportunities for regional trade lawmaking in the U.S.-Africa relationship. On the eve of the conclusion of an African continental free trade agreement, the U.S. trade law relationship with the continent remains focused on regional groups. Questions remain as to whether the existing trade law regime offers the flexibility necessary to accommodate alternative models to free trade agreements that may best serve the needs of African and U.S. constituencies. The essay proceeds in four parts. First, I sketch the current state of play in U.S.-Africa trade relations. Next, I outline how the U.S. and African approaches to trade lawmaking have differed. I then turn to two sets of challenges—one domestic and one international—that may impede innovation in developing a U.S.-Africa trade law relationship consistent with African interests. Finally, the essay concludes with an exploration of possible alternatives and issues not yet considered in the transcontinental dialogue on trade.

This contribution engages with Sara Kendall’s and Sarah Nouwen’s article on the legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and their call for an ethos of institutional modesty. I much support the nuanced approach that underlies their call and I see it as a prerequisite to properly and adequately appreciate the ICTR’s past existence and operation. I would even be open to moving one step further in the direction of an ethos of sobriety. Rather than seizing the momentum to celebrate accomplishments and highlight milestones, legacy-talk and legacy-construction of international criminal tribunals should entail a form of reckoning. Indeed, as suggested by Kendall and Nouwen, the “justices not done” and the “justices pending” must be part and parcel of the ICTR’s legacy-constructions so as to offer a fair balance and to capture the ICTR’s overall performance, explicitly accounting for results as well as omissions.

The Judgment of November 20,1950, of the International Court of Justice in the Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case provides a noteworthy illustration of the judicial technique employed in making a determination as to the existence or non-existence of a rule of customary international law in a particular case.

On April 13 President Ford signed a bill unilaterally to extend the fisheries jurisdiction of the United States from the present 12-mile limit to 200 miles onto the high seas (and even thousands of miles at sea with regard to salmon) effective March 1, 1977. Barring a sudden breakthrough in the law of the sea negotiations, as of March 1, 1977 the Coast Guard may begin arresting vessels on the high seas pursuant to this act in violation of the treaty obligations of the United States. This action again exposes the inadequacy of the present foreign policy process for taking an international legal perspective into account. It may also prove the greatest mistake in the history of U.S. oceans policy.

In the dedication of his great work, De Jure Belli ac Pads, to Louis XIII of France, Grotius addresses the king as “ everywhere known by the name Just no less than that of Louis. . . . Just, when you call back to life laws that are on the verge of burial, and with all your strength set yourself against the trend of an age which is rushing headlong to destruction; . . . when you offer no violence to souls that hold views different from your own in matter of religion; . . . when by the exercise of your authority you lighten the burden of oppressed peoples.”

De jure naturae et gentium, “The law of nature and of nations,” is the title of Samuel Pufendorf's eight-volume masterpiece of philosophical jurisprudence, first published in 1672. It provides the tag by which an entire discourse is known, one that dominated legal philosophy at European universities for over two hundred years. Pufendorf's Protestant articulation of its principles was pivotal both for transmitting it to the Eighteenth Century and for giving it a history, which in his eyes began with his fellow-Protestant Hugo Grotius. In fact, however, its roots stretch back to the early Sixteenth Century, to the lawyers whom Philip Melanchthon gathered around him at Wittenberg and (more importantly for the future structure of the discourse) to the Catholic scholastic theologians who were originally based at Salamanca in Spain but subsequently spread out over the whole of Counter-Reformation Europe. In the confessional conflict that would burn throughout the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, theologians on all sides used law to define the space of the political, and used the idea of natural law to underpin that space, even while shaping it differently according to their divergent narratives of sin and redemption. While the ius naturae et gentium was an academic genre, therefore, its content was not. It was a theory and a legitimation of the state, and the arc of its reasoning from nature to the nations ran through the institution of political power. The state and its power are constructed not so much upon right (ius) per se but on the potential for the violation of right (iniuria), and the demand for such violation to be vindicated, by law or ultimately by war. At its very barest—although this is to traduce the richness and complexity of the discourse—the ius naturae et gentium is thus a theory of legitimate violence. When it comes to animals, what we find is that they are systematically excluded from the potential to suffer violation of right and therefore from political space and political justice. As we shall see, however, this did not always mean that they were totally excluded from any kind of right or that every act of violence against them was always legitimate.

International human rights frameworks offer powerful support for a range of reforms to address marital rape. Melanie Randall and Vasanthi Venkatesh’s valuable commentary, Criminalizing Sexual Violence against Women in Intimate Relationships, correctly shines a spotlight on the extent to which marital rape is still accepted in too many countries around the world, and calls for its explicit criminalization under international human rights laws. The commentary serves as an important reminder of the challenges and enduring stereotypes that prevent marital rape from being recognized globally as a human rights violation. But the commentary’s focus on criminalization as the fundamental response is unduly limited. While criminalization, whether explicit or implicit, is a core part of states’ obligations under international human rights law, centering criminal justice risks both shortchanging other approaches and obscuring the problems with criminal justice interventions. Although Randall and Venkatesh acknowledge that criminalization is but one element of a broader strategy, this essay urges a broader view. International human rights laws’ due diligence framework requires a range of responses that include the obligation to prevent, protect, and provide redress, along with the obligation to prosecute and punish. Explicitly framing states’ obligations in terms of that more comprehensive approach would reach broadly to address the cultural and social barriers that allow marital rape to continue without sanction.

In July 1967, one month after Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights, Israel's Military Advocate General (MAG), Colonel Meir Shamgar, appeared before a Knesset committee to discuss the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s duties in the areas under its control. Col. Shamgar had led the MAG Corps in the preparations in the event that a future war would find the army occupying beyond Israel's borders. Col. Shamgar began his presentation by stating:

On January 27, 2014, the International Court of Justice (Court) rendered its judgment in a dispute between Peru and Chile concerning the maritime boundary between them. The Court held that a partial maritime boundary already existed between the parties, and it proceeded to analyze both its nature and its extent on the basis of agreements between the parties, their practice, and other evidence. For the remainder of the boundary extending up to 200 nautical miles, the Court applied the rule of equitable delimitation found in Article 74 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).