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The emotional shape of our moral life: Anger-related emotions and mutualistic anthropology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2013

Florian Cova ,
Julien Deonna  and
David Sander
Florian Cova
Affiliation:
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/floriancova/[email protected]://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/collaborateurs/[email protected]://cms.unige.ch/fapse/EmotionLab/Director.html
Julien Deonna
Affiliation:
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/floriancova/[email protected]://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/collaborateurs/[email protected]://cms.unige.ch/fapse/EmotionLab/Director.html
David Sander
Affiliation:
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/floriancova/[email protected]://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/collaborateurs/[email protected]://cms.unige.ch/fapse/EmotionLab/Director.html
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Abstract

The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to “avoidance” emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to “punitive” emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidence.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 86 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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