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Partner selection, coordination games, and group selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2013

Michael S. Alvard
Michael S. Alvard*
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4352. [email protected]://anthropology.tamu.edu/faculty/alvard/profile.htm
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Abstract

The process of partner selection reflects ethnographic realities where cooperative rewards obtain that would otherwise be lost to loners. Baumard et al. neglect frequency-dependent processes exemplified by games of coordination. Such games can produce multiple equilibria that may or may not include fair outcomes. Additional, group-selection processes are required to produce the outcomes predicted by the models.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 80 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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